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MANAGERIALISM. CONSULTATION AND SOCIOLOGY 
What is this thesis about ?
This thesis is about recent developments in the Australian 
welfare state. The historical focus is on the Federal Labor 
administration in Australia in the 1980s. It is concerned 
with questions about the public administration in society 
with regard to social welfare. This concern covers the 
internal arrangements of the bureaucracy, its effect on 
society through its actions, and its interactions with 
society that influence its operation.
The interactions of the state bureaucracy with society take 
place at many levels, including with the monarchy, the 
legislature, the judiciary, the government, the member 
states of the federation, the professions, corporations, 
wage earners and the public at large. Many of these 
relationships are purely instrumental, through which 
existing policies, practices and programs are played out in 
civil society. Many also have a constitutive character, and 
are part of the complex struggle over policy formation and 
resource allocation by the state.
The particular relationship that forms the focus of this 
thesis is between the management strata of the welfare 
bureaucracy and consumer advocacy groups - community based 
organisations advocating change in welfare services for the 
benefit of those receiving the services. These 
relationships have some instrumental dimensions, but are 
essentially constitutive - they are concerned with policy 
development, public sector values and the opportunities for 
action open to the state.
9In the 1980s there was a surge of interest in 
administrative reform. Perhaps this was marked 
symbolically by the publication in 1981 of the 
autobiography of H.C. Coombs, Australia's best known 
public servant. His reflections on the period of post 
war reconstruction and of the establishment of Australia 
as an independent economic actor in the western world 
captured the excitement inherent in administrative 
reform; an excitement somewhat overshadowed by the 
theatricality of parliamentary politics in the 1970s. 
Coombs' interest in culture and the philosophy of Lao Tsu 
broadened the appeal of his account and further distanced 
the image of the senior bureaucrat from one of dull, 
grey, rule-bound servility.
Similarly, in the mass media a reinterpretation of the 
bureaucracy was portrayed in the high rating television 
series "Yes Minister." This showed the wiles and cunning 
of the bureaucracy as it dealt with the contradictions of 
popular politics, identified with a humour born of 
accuracy as attested by numerous professional 
commentators (see for example Sinclair 1982 p 75 and 
Baum 89 p 2). The administrative changes of the 1980s 
could themselves be worthy of an episode or two, as 
suggested by the then finance minister:
"Obviously, Sir Humphrey had not heard of program 
budgeting, and would quake in his boots at the 
thought of a financial management improvement plan" 
(Walsh 1985) .
The 1980s also began at a time of much discussion about 
consultation and participation in government beyond the 
processes of election and political representation. The 
federal Labor Party in opposition was consulting 
extensively with the community sector, and promised to 
keep this up if it won government. This marked a more
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organic role for these groups in policy development in 
comparison to their previous limited involvement on formal 
consultation panels.
Following efforts in the 1970s to open up administrative 
decision making to public scrutiny and judicial review, 
there were moves afoot at the beginning of the 1980s to open 
up policy making processes to public scrutiny. This was 
exemplified by the passing of the freedom of information act 
in 1981. Policy development in the 1980s was thus set to be 
a potentially much more public process than previously.
The two empirical strands of this thesis - managerialism and 
consultation - are subjects well suited to analysis by the 
disciplines of economics and political science. Without 
ignoring these perspectives, my study aims to be a 
distinctively sociological enquiry into recent developments 
of the welfare state. The study of state bureaucracies and 
their relation to society has been a central subject for 
sociology since its treatment by Max Weber. In that 
tradition, this thesis is more concerned with exploring the 
character and possibilities of the various relationships of 
the bureaucracy within society, rather than with the 
quantitative importance of the business done through the 
relationships. Similarly, it is more concerned with the 
norms and operation of the bureaucracy than with its place 
in respect to normative political theory.
The discourse of managerialism itself makes considerable use 
of concepts developed in the sociological study of 
organisations and theories of the social system. These 
conceptual origins make a useful starting point for my 
investigations and are explored in the next chapter.
This introductory chapter discusses the pervasiveness of 
managerial reform and the importance of consultation for the
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democratic welfare state. This is followed by a formulation 
of the central theme of the thesis: how are we to
understand the meaning of managerialism and consumer 
consultation for each other, and for the reconstitution of 
the welfare state during the 1980s ? The chapter concludes 
with a note on methodology and a summary of the various 
perspectives taken. The study seeks to avoid errors of 
reduction of effects and conflation of meaning by the 
development of a multifaceted view taking the perspectives 
of actor, organisation and system independently.
The pervasiveness of managerialism in the 1980s
The bureaucracy is in a constant state of development. 
However there seems to be a consensus that the 1980s were a 
time of rapid and widespread change. In the words of a 
senior academic bureaucrat, it has been:
"a time of unprecedented change in the Canberra 
bureaucracy. Administrative systems are always subject 
to incremental change, but no one who has experienced 
any part of what has been happening to the structures 
and processes of administration can doubt that this 
period of change is more than incremental" (R. Scott, 
Principal of Canberra College of Advanced Education in 
Whettenhall and Nethercote 1988 p viii).
It has been claimed that the changes are comparable in scope 
to the establishment of the Federal Bureaucracy in 1901 and 
its transformations in the wake of World War Two:
"When a comprehensive history of the Australian Public 
Sector is written, the current period will undoubtedly 
be remembered as one of substantial ferment and major 
social change. Even compared to the dramatic
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realignments which accompanied federation and the 
traumatic upheavals and expansions of the Second World 
War and the period of post-war reconstruction, the 
current transformations are substantial" (Considine 
1988 p 4).
The changes are of course diverse, but the most deeply 
penetrating of the reforms has been the introduction of the 
new managerialism. John Halligan from the School of 
Management at Canberra CAE summarised this as follows:
"The shift from a concern with process and regulation 
to a focus on outputs and resources is transforming the 
character of the APS... The function of the Australian 
Public Service is now conceived in terms of managing 
resources in relation to specific objectives, and the 
managerial orientation is now pervading the work of the 
public service" (Halligan 1988 p 29).
The managerialism coming to pervade the public sector had 
itself undergone somewhat of a transformation in the private 
sector in recent times, well summarised by Touraine (if we 
ignore his geographical allusion) as a replacement of 
management principles with management strategies:
"The American pattern of rationalistic management, 
based on general principles such as the separation of 
functions and a far-reaching formalisation of decision­
making processes, is replaced by the Japanese model of 
strategic management which is more concerned with the 
goals to be achieved and the road to them than with the 
general principles of organisation" (Touraine 1989 p 
9) .
Not withstanding this particular transformation, it is 
important to note that the managerialism adopted by the
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public sector is primarily concerned with managing capital 
investments, and displays a property of direct mapping onto 
the financial exchanges and transformations of capital. The 
language of managerialism has some articulation with the 
language of systems theory in the sociological tradition, 
and this is explored briefly in the next chapter. However 
many of the concrete examples of managerial innovations are 
firmly based in the quantitative language of accountancy. 
These include the running cost system, staff budgeting, user 
charging, obligation controls (Keating 1988a), the staffing 
monitor and the Finance ledger system (Keating 1988b), 
program budgeting, management information systems, 
performance indicators and other aspects of financial 
management improvement plans (Allan 1987). Considine notes 
that most corporate management handbooks:
"accept the need to use qualitative measures of output 
and performance, but they do so grudgingly and only 
after establishing a preference for quantification.
Most simply assert the centrality of quantitative 
measurement" (Considine 1988 p 12).
Managerialism and the politics of government.
Why has managerialism been taken up so avidly as the 
principle discourse of bureaucratic reform in the public 
sector ? No doubt it is partly because of a belief in the 
instrumental value of managerialism for public 
administration. This is propagated within the managerialist 
discourse itself. In addition to this, in a series of wider 
political debates managerial reform has been welcomed as a 
constructive contribution to both the substance of the 
debates and the polemics. It was imbued with an historical 
symbolism by the Hawke Labor government; it was a 
strategically important reform to enhance the stability of
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the government; and it provided a valuable counter argument 
to the small government movement. I shall now discuss each 
of these in turn.
There is a similarity between the way politicians plan their 
reform and historians interpret these reforms. Both are 
concerned with the symbolic meaning of action in a narrative 
account of society. Because of this, it can be as valuable 
to interpret the symbolic intent of reform as to review its 
social impact. For example, the symbolic impact of the 
draconian enforcement powers that accompany many pieces of 
regulatory legislation is of far greater importance than the 
actual exercise of those powers, which is usually infrequent 
and carried out in an ameliorated fashion. In a review of 
96 Australian regulatory agencies carried out in 1984/5, 
Grabosky noted:
"The majority of agencies we studied are vested with 
statutory powers of entry, search, seizure and 
investigation which would make them the envy of 
Australian police forces. However, these powers are 
rarely if ever, used. In fact, some regulatory 
executives expressed embarrassment at their very 
existence" (Grabosky and Brathwaite 1986 p 2).
Although of little practical significance, these powers can 
be understood as inclusions in regulatory legislation that 
are meant to signal to the public the strength of the will 
of the legislators to achieve the regulatory reform 
proposed.
While the symbolic impact of political action by governments 
can be achieved through signaling the scope and depth of 
intention, reforms are still judged historically on the 
basis of their actual social impact. In order to lay to 
rest the bungling image of the Labor government of the
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1970s, the Hawke Labor government in the 1980s needed to 
establish to the public its credentials as competent to 
govern, yet retain its reformist commitment to its own 
party. Managerial reform of the APS provided the symbolic 
impact required for this, and the focus on the only part of 
Australian society under direct Commonwealth government 
control made the prospect of real impact much more 
attainable than the risky business of achieving private 
sector reform.
A second development related to the interest of politicians 
in managerial reform of the APS was the rising political 
cost of bureaucratic action. In the 1970s all major parties 
when in opposition, developed to a high art the political 
strategy of sheeting home responsibility to ministers for 
the actions of the bureaucracy as the main way of collecting 
government scalps. The Whitlam government lost a large 
number of ministers because they had incompetently handled 
their portfolios. The Fraser government also lost many 
ministers through sacking or resignation due to improper 
handling of their portfolios. With the election of the 
Hawke government in 1983, this essentially stopped. The 
tactic is still used by the opposition, strengthened by the 
weapons of the freedom of information act and the processes 
of the senate committees, but only one minister (Brown in 
1988) has been forced to resign in this way since 1983. The 
successful opposition tactic has been translated into a 
higher standard of ministerial accountability for public 
administration. This has been pursued through the 
implementation of managerial reform of the APS by the 
government, with the promise of making departments more 
accountable to their ministers and the opportunity to review 
the definition of roles and responsibilities between the 
parliament and the administration.
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The third political development in the early 1980s related 
to managerial reform was the debate over the size and social 
value of the public sector. Yeatman summarises that the 
Labor government:
"sought to manage neo-conservative and New Right 
demands for smaller government by turning them into 
demands for more efficient government. Moreover, they 
sought to manage the increasing alienation of ordinary 
people with respect to the over-bureaucratisation of 
the delivery of public goods and services by making 
this delivery more responsive to users' needs and more 
open to public participation" (Yeatman 1990 p 1).
Perhaps the best review of Australian arguments at that time 
is Dr Peter Wilenski's essay "Small Government & Social 
Justice", published on the eve of election of the Federal 
Hawke Labor Government in 1983, and written whilst Wilenski 
held a professorial appointment at the social justice 
project based at the ANU.
The size of the Federal Government had been steadily 
increasing in both absolute terms and as a percentage of the 
GDP since the Second World War, and the trend had shown no 
sign of abating during the Fraser administration of the 
early 1980s. The possibility that this trend has apparently 
flattened off or reversed during the second half of the 
1980s need not concern us here, and indeed it is perhaps too 
early to tell if this is an actual change in the trend or 
merely a cyclical deviation below the trend line linked to 
the rapid growth of the national product in this period. 
Wilenski is concerned with debates about the appropriateness 
of the size of the public sector in the context of what 
could be called the public sector guestion. These are 
normative debates, about what to do with the public sector
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rather than analytical debates about what the public sector 
is like. In his essay, Wilenski
"examines the claims of the proponents of small 
government that reducing government will increase the 
well being of all groups in the community rather than 
particular sectors of it" (Wilenski 86 p 15).
Wilenski argues that in using ethical arguments about what 
size the public sector should be, the small government 
movement has paid scant attention to what size the public 
sector is or to what impact their proposals would have on 
it. Indeed when their strategies have been implemented in 
Australia, the UK and the US, they have
"not resulted in reduction of governmental size, but... 
in regressive redistribution of government activities"
(ibid).
Managerialism has something to offer both sides of this 
debate. Firstly, the entry point for managerialism is the 
promise held by its rhetoric of accountability for 
determining what the situation actually is. For example the 
accounting devices of program budgeting imposed by the 
Finance Department on other departments are a means of 
surveillance as tools for facilitating program development. 
Their contribution to the latter is in delineating the 
functional impact of reductions or additions of money to 
specific programs.
Secondly, the device of performance indicators and the 
emphasis on effectiveness and efficiency give the proponents 
of public sector expansion the opportunity to prove the 
value of public sector work. For proponents of smaller 
government these devices promise to highlight 
inefficiencies, thus offering targets to axe.
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Thirdly, both sides seem to accept the assumption that 
scrutiny of effectiveness and efficiency will itself provide 
the means of doing the same for less:
"the necessity of managing a no-growth public revenue 
base in a context of increasing demands on the social 
security and welfare system has meant that these 
governments have emphasised cost-effectiveness and 
'doing more with less' as the essential attributes of 
good public administration" (Yeatman 1990a p 1).
Wilenski quotes Prime Minister Fraser's view that "the state 
is likely to be in many ways an inefficient and wasteful 
provider" (Wilenski 1986 p 36) but counters that:
"comparative studies of Management styles [in the 
public and private sectors] suggest no systematic 
differences based on the profit motive... the evidence 
does not indicate any superiority in efficiency of the 
private over the public sector" (Wilenski 1986 p 37).
"Doing more with less" has been tied to an expansion of the 
activities of governments in profit making activities within 
the corporate sector. In a symbolic sense this was to be the 
paramount achievement of managerialism. Yeatman quotes from 
the WA (Burke) Government's 1986 White paper on improving 
government administration:
"Many Australians hold the view that the Government's 
share of the economy must not be allowed to increase 
further. This means that additional services must be 
funded both at the expense of other services and by 
improving efficiency in the delivery of other services, 
although the new Government entrepreneurial activities
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will provide some additional reserves" (Yeatman 1987 p 
340) .
Some of the difficulties of government operation in markets 
are addressed in the final chapter. For the moment it is 
sufficient to note that entrepreneurial activities can 
result in losses by the state, as demonstrated by a number 
of government investment agencies in the late 1980s.
The underlying concern with producing desired outcomes with 
least resource input is a common theme for both sides of the 
polemic on small government. Instituting managerial reform 
can be seen as beneficial to those advocating smaller 
government and those advocating increased government 
intervention in society. For the former, efficiency gains 
lead to savings and the same outcomes for less cost, while 
for the latter it offers better value for money and greater 
accountability to silence the critics.
The above discussion has aimed to explicate the context of 
support for managerialism in relation to political tactics 
and public debates about the bureaucracy. These form a back 
drop to the landscape into which managerialism has 
insinuated itself so intricately during the 1980s. Wilenski 
holds the view that the measure of power in society is best 
indicated by who sets the political agenda:
"This subtle agenda setting influence is perhaps the 
most important way that holders of power in society 
retain it" (Wilenski 1986 p 17).
Perhaps, but it may be that the terms of the debate are even 
more important, and it is at this level that managerialism 
has been introduced.
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Community advocacy and consumer consultation
The second empirical strand of this thesis is about the 
interaction of the bureaucracy with community advocacy 
groups in the formation and implementation of welfare 
policy. These groups seek to influence policy and resource 
allocations that directly effect government matters 
important to life in the suburbs and towns. Questions of 
health care, income support, education, employment 
opportunities and accommodation are understood with passion 
by everybody as they go about living their lives.
These questions are at the heart of modern sociological 
critiques of the democratic state. They are the terrain in 
which Clause Offe has attempted to map the contradictions of 
the welfare state (Offe 1984). Government action relevant 
to the private lives of its citizens provides the motivation 
for people to support and the legitimate the role and very 
existence of the state. As Habermas has put it in his 
inimitable style, the legitimation crisis of the modern 
state is the dilemma over resource allocation by the 
political sphere to the lifeworld of its citizens (Habermas 
1976 p 68).
In distinction to the largely atomistic individual process 
of voting in state elections, the interaction of citizens 
with policy making processes is frequently mediated through 
community groups. Altman points out that people in 
Australia have a wide and detailed acquaintance with 
democratic participation in local clubs, associations and 
semi-formal groups (Altman 1988). In addition to their own 
business, these groups also participate in the public life 
of civil society through securing political support and in 
political lobbying, perhaps through membership of umbrella 
organisations with this as their principle focus. The 
membership and operation of these groups is extremely varied
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and is independent from the groups' relationship to 
government and policy making. Local members of parliament 
may secure the support of their constituency of citizens 
through these local groups. With respect to government 
policy making, ministers are better described as building a 
constituency of lobby groups.
There has been an increase in the involvement of non­
government agencies at the interface between the public 
service and the public. Since 1983, there has been a 
conscious policy on the part of the Labor Federal Government 
to increase this involvement for both political and economic 
reasons. Politically, it acknowledges the contribution 
various organisations can make to the government agenda. 
Non-government agencies can often operate more effectively 
than government departments because of their intimate 
knowledge of their clients, who may participate in the 
operation of the organisation. They can also be more 
efficient on a value for dollar basis for the same reason, 
and because they are less bound to wage and salary awards.
Several government departments, notably Community Services 
and Health, have provided funding for both infrastructure 
and specific policy work to consumer organisations such as 
the Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations, the 
Consumers Health Forum and the Australian Council of Social 
Services. These develop policy positions based on 
theoretical and empirical studies of the interests of the 
consumers they advocate on behalf of, rather than through 
the direct consultation and representative democracy used 
for policy development by, for example, the major political 
parties and the ACTU. Occasionally, this difference in form 
of representation is responsible for tensions in 
consultations, and this is discussed in chapter five.
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All these organisations enable members of the public to 
participate in policy formulation, and make a substantial 
contribution to policy debates at a high level. These 
organisations manage a process of consultation with the 
public at arm's length from the government and provide a 
sophisticated processing of public views, according to the 
interest coalition that the organisation seeks to represent. 
The government is then able to pay more or less attention to 
the views of the different organisations in the political 
process of managing the electorate.
This perspective goes beyond the legal rational 
understanding of the interface between the state and its 
citizens by acknowledging that the influence of citizens on 
the state involves much more than casting votes at the 
ballot box. The idea of democracy extends to the 
interaction of citizens with the state bureaucracy and with 
the policy making processes of government. This interaction 
is itself constitutive of the state.
Within this crude sketch of the web of relationships and 
interactions between the state and the public, it is 
possible to outline the focus of this thesis. it is 
concerned with the relationship of community advocacy groups 
with the state, particularly the bureaucracy. in 
particular, it examines the impact of managerial reform on 
this relationship. it is more interested in the way that 
managerialism operates as a discourse that frames the 
exchanges and interactions between the state and non­
government groups than in how the managerialist discourse 
itself portrays these relationships.
The discourse of managerialism has come to be a dominant 
form of expression of power within the interaction between 
government agencies and community advocates. This is so for 
expressions of domination and expressions of resistance.
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These expressions constitute an important boundary of the 
state, between the bureaucracy and organised groups of 
citizens.
The development of a multifaceted view: actor,
organisation. system.
The modulation of the state's interaction with other 
aspects of society can be treated at a number of analytic 
levels. Three well theorised levels of analysis in the 
sociological tradition are the level of the actor, the 
organisation and the social system. Clause Offe has taken 
this approach in a study of the interaction of interest 
groups and the state in his essay on the attribution of 
public status to interest groups:
"Like all social phenomena, interest groups can be 
analysed from three theoretical perspectives...
Speaking loosely and metaphorically, one could say that 
these three perspectives look on interest organisations 
from 'below', 'within', and 'above'." (Offe 1985 p 
221) .
This approach creates important tensions that shape the 
fabric of any such analysis. There is a tension between 
particular analysis at one level and integrated analysis at 
all three levels. Offe continues:
"It is only when we combine these three dimensions of 
organized forms of interest representation that we can 
arrive at a sufficiently complex explanation of their 
operation." (ibid).
The complexity of explanation is achieved through 
considering the implications of events or relationships at
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one level for things at the other levels. However there is 
a danger of over-interpretation. The hierarchical 
arrangement of the levels carries with it the possible 
interpretation that events and relationships at one level 
are determining for those at another. For example, vulgar 
Marxism understands the personal relationships between 
individual actors as determined by economic relationships at 
the level of the social system. This type of analysis 
conflates a myriad of historical phenomena into an 
overarching analytical explanation. Conversely, economistic 
analyses see the best aspects of the social system as 
determined by individual exchanges:
"Adam Smith's flash of genius was his recognition that 
the prices that emerge from voluntary transactions 
between buyers and sellers - for short, in a free 
market - could coordinate the activity of millions of 
people, each seeking his own interest, in such a way as 
to make everyone better off" (Friedman 1980 p 32).
This type of explanation reduces the complexity of system 
dynamics to a logic of individual actions. The problem of 
conflation and reduction in accounts of sociological 
subjects is often not as visible as these examples, and in 
some ways may be unavoidable. As with any theory, over- 
adherance to or over-avoidance of a particular type of 
explanation can wreck the integrity of the account.
A second tension is that even if errors of conflation and 
reduction are avoided, a multifaceted analysis can give the 
impression of a unified subject that merely appears 
differently from each perspective. However, sociological 
subjects are not cohesive totalities. The different 
analyses at the different "levels" explore different things. 
The subject is understood as much by the discontinuities in 
the various accounts generated in this way as by resonances
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that can be traced through the different views (Lacan 1977 p 
299) .
An Outline of the thesis
This thesis develops a multifaceted view to divide the 
subject of the impact of managerialism and consumer advocacy 
on developments in the welfare state into three main 
sections. These take in turn the perspectives of the 
organisation, the actor and the social system.
Section II, comprising chapters two, three and four, is 
about the organisational impact of managerialism on the 
welfare bureaucracy and consumer advocacy groups. It begins 
with a discussion of the conceptual antecedents of the 
managerial discourse in the work of Max Weber, Talcott 
Parsons and Elton Mayo. This is followed by a reading of 
various reports on the management of the Commonwealth 
government administration written in the 1970s and 1980s.
The section concludes with an analysis of the impact of 
managerialism on consumer advocacy organisations funded by 
the Commonwealth.
Chapter two discusses the way Weber described the 
bureaucracy, as the powerful but soulless agent of legal 
authority, whose development has expanded the spheres of 
commerce and government hand in hand; soulless because of 
its commitment to the legal authority that controls it, 
whatever the legitimacy of that authority. Weber was 
profoundly pessimistic in his view that the expanded spheres 
of society effected through the irresistible process of 
bureaucratisation would in the end turn out to be little 
more than an iron cage for humanity.
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Much of the managerial discourse is a reaction to Weber's 
analysis of the bureaucracy. This reaction has been 
influenced by challenges to Weber's view in the work of 
Parsons and Mayo. Parsons guestioned the importance Weber 
attached to bureaucratisation in the development of society. 
He also developed a model of the social system that assigned 
a functional role to the state policy making apparatus as a 
managerial system for society, which gives the state 
bureaucracy a key role in struggles over the development of 
state programs, a role Weber saw the bureaucracy as 
constrained from actively engaging in. Mayo developed a 
very positive view of the potential for human emancipation 
through better human relations within bureaucracies. The 
possibility of humanising the bureaucracy gave the human 
relations school much cause for optimism, even though their 
approach seems to ignore questions of the legitimacy of what 
their humanised organisations are doing, and for whom they 
are doing it. Chapter two concludes with a discussion of a 
recent trend in managerial theory toward the active 
involvement of the organisation in securing its ownership 
for its own and society's benefit. At this point, the 
experience of public sector bureaucracies could be valuable 
for the future development of managerial theory.
Chapters three and four trace the impact of managerialism on 
the public service and community advocacy groups. Chapter 
three traces the debates of the 1970s over administrative 
reform of the Australian Public Service, and the 
implementation of reform in the 1980s. It begins by 
considering the change in the focus of debates, from reform 
of the system of legal authority over the bureaucracy, to 
reform of the organisation and operation of the bureaucracy 
itself. The latter debates, exemplified in the report of 
the Coombs Royal Commission (Coombs 1976), show an expansion 
in the operationalisation of the public service value of 
equality of treatment for individuals, to embrace a concern
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for equity of outcome for social groupings. In a related 
move that sought to facilitate this, Coombs considered the 
relationship between the administration and consumer groups 
as an important topic for reform. The chapter concludes 
with a review of administrative reform in the 1980s, 
including the move to program budgeting, flatter structures 
and the emergence of consumer consultation within the 
managerial framework.
Chapter four discusses the transformation of consumer 
advocacy that has paralleled the managerial reform of the 
APS. This has affected the organisation of the groups in 
relation to each other and the bureaucracy, as well as the 
operation of the groups themselves. For input to equity 
oriented policy development, the groups have developed a 
form of representation based on interest analysis of 
ascriptive groups. This has created tensions for their 
public lobbying efforts, as democratic representation 
through elected delegates has remained the sine qua non of 
legitimacy in the political arena.
The next section, comprising chapters five and six, takes 
the perspective of the actor, corporate or individual, and 
reviews the terrain for strategic action in the interaction 
between public service management and consumer advocacy 
organisations. Chapter five takes the perspective of the 
manager. It commences by discussing a version of the debate 
on public service values elucidated in the Coombs 
Commission. Yeatman has described the way that the Labor 
administration of the 1980s has implemented the two separate 
and conflicting agendas of administrative reform in the 
1980s: managerialism with its emphasis on effectiveness and
efficiency; and the social-political reform agenda with its 
emphasis on access, equity and participation. She notes 
that:
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"the tension between these agendas can be carried over 
into the managerialist rhetoric itself... the 
application of managerialist agendas to public service 
means that they [can] converge with the social and 
political agendas of administrative reform" (Yeatman 
1990a p 2).
The main part of chapter five explores the dimensions of 
interaction between managers and consumer advocates as they 
appear within the managerialist framework. The chapter 
concludes by noting the importance of traditional public 
service policy skills for successful consultation; skills 
that are undervalued within the new managerial culture.
Managerialism in welfare agencies, with its private 
enterprise background, casts citizens primarily as consumers 
and community organisations as consumer advocacy groups; 
this is of course a very stylised view. Chapter six takes a 
powerful alternative view from theories of the new social 
movements, and applies this analysis to community health 
advocates.
A principal methodological theme of this thesis is that 
sociological phenomena are not unitary subjects and that 
their interpretation is best pursued by tracing the creative 
interpretations of the actors involved. This method is 
adopted for the analysis of the community health movement to 
explore the strategic orientation and possibilities of 
advocates. As might be expected, the terrain covered is a 
very different part of the social landscape than that 
explored from the management perspective. The opportunism 
of community advocates contrasts markedly with the "set 
piece" approach adopted by management for consumer 
consultation (Slater interview).
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Section IV of the thesis, comprising chapters seven and 
eight, takes the perspective of the social system to review 
recent developments of welfare in society. Welfare services 
develop in a dual relation to the state and civil society. 
This development is commonly understood as a working out of 
contested political demands on the state. This 
interpretation is giving way within administrative circles 
influenced by the new managerialism, in favour of a modified 
market analysis of consumer demands, welfare needs and 
service development within this market.
Both these interpretations are partial and flawed, but 
nevertheless offer a range of insights that are valuable for 
understanding recent developments of the welfare state. 
Chapter seven begins by considering Marshall's model of the 
hyphenated society as a basis for theorising the 
articulations between capitalism, democracy and welfare.
The work of Lindblom on circularities of control over policy 
development is reviewed and applied to welfare policy. The 
chapter then concludes by considering Offe's work on 
contradictions of the welfare state. Specifically, Offe 
contends that policy innovation within the welfare state is 
principally based on the need to solve competing and 
contradictory demands on the administration through 
innovations compatible with, on the one hand, the demands of 
capital accumulation, and on the other, of defusing class 
conflict. Such innovations need to be reinterpreted at each 
substantive application, and rarely have the effect intended 
by their adoption. Offe's analysis is illustrated with 
examples of two classes of managerialist innovation: 
prevention as a strategy for efficiency; and an orientation 
to outcomes as a strategy for effectiveness.
Chapter eight turns to articulations between capitalism and 
welfare services. It begins by considering the relation 
between welfare and labour markets. It then turns to
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consider the exchange of welfare services as a market 
itself. Whatever its difficulties, this approach is 
important because it is encouraged by managerialism and is 
influential in the minds of a wide range of policy makers 
including managers and consumer advocates. The concepts of 
commodity, profit and equity in relation to welfare markets 
are discussed in a provisional way, and problematic aspects 
in their application to the development of welfare services 
are highlighted.
The concluding chapter, chapter nine, draws together some 
general themes that emerge throught the thesis. Firstly, 
the changes in the 1980s toward increased accountability for 
outcomes, tighter targetting of welfare, and greater 
emphasis on consultation are summarised under the heading 
"the equity complex." Secondly, the constitutive nature of 
struggle at the boundaries between the state and society is 
discussed. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the 
speculative interaction between social theory and 
developments in the welfare state.
The source material on managerialism for this thesis has 
been drawn from the primary and secondary literature on 
administrative reform in the APS during the 1980s. Material 
on consultation has been drawn from government sources and 
from consumer advocacy groups themselves. I also conducted 
interviews with four people working within the interaction 
between consumer advocacy groups and the bureaucracy: two
directors of peak councils, a senior manager and the 
secretary of a parliamentary committee on community affairs. 
The transcripts of these interviews were cleaned and edited 
by the author, then sent to the interviewee for approval. 
They can be found below as an appendix to the thesis.
I have found the interviews an important addition to 
published sources for two reasons. Firstly, they partially
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redress the imbalance in available texts on managerialism 
and consumer advocacy, the former far outweighing the latter 
in volume and sophistication. Secondly, the managerial 
texts with currency in the public sector contain very little 
discussion on consumer consultation, despite their frequent 
exhortations to get close to the customer.
The transcripts also underline the overtly sociological 
nature of this subject. Those interviewed were comfortable 
with the concepts and analytical logic of sociology, and 
used this to some extent in their work. Just as managerial 
concepts are reinterpreted and reinvented each time they are 
applied, so too the subject of the thesis - the intersection 
of managerialism and consumer consultation in the 
development of welfare services - was reinterpreted in each 
interview, giving a richness to the analysis well beyond the 
capacity of the author alone.
SECTION II
THE ORGANISATIONAL IMPACT OF MANAGERIALISM
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Chapter 2
THE CONCEPTUAL ANTECEDENTS OF MANAGERIALISM
Discourse and the organisation
This section, comprising three chapters, is about 
organisations. Organisations - in particular the state 
bureaucracy and business organisations - have been subjected 
to extensive theoretical analysis. As subjects, 
organisations have responded to these analyses theoretically 
and practically. This reciprocity gives analyses of 
organisations a particularly active character. In addition, 
state bureaucracies themselves operate and develop with a 
heavy reliance on documentation. The discourse of 
managerialism, which appears in both external analyses and 
internal documents of the state bureaucracy, can thus be 
readily engaged as text at the level of the organisation. 
Such an engagement is the method of this section.
This chapter is on organisation theory. It examines how 
several well known debates in this literature contribute to 
managerialism as it straddles both the internal operation 
and culture, and the external relations and mission of 
bureaucracies. My general argument is that these debates 
have been shaped in reaction to Weber's pessimistic analysis 
of the bureaucracy. Chapter three traces the Australian 
state's own development and implementation of managerial 
reform. This is done through reviewing a series of 
documents covering the formative debates before the Coombs 
Commission in the 1970s and the restructuring of the 
Australian Public Service during the 1980s.
While developing this perspective on managerialism in these 
two chapters, I have tried to keep in view the relevence of 
the reforms for community activism and consumer advocacy.
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The organisational impact of managerial reform on the 
community sector as it interacts with the Commonwealth 
bureaucracy forms the subject of the third chapter of this 
section. While this impact is considerable, it does not at 
all amount to a working out of the tenets of managerialism, 
nor of the stated intentions of the reformers.
This chapter discusses the contribution to organisational 
analysis of two classical social theorists - Weber and 
Parsons - and three management gurus (to adopt the language 
of their publishers) - Mayo, Peters and Drucker. The 
chapter begins with a rehearsal of Weber's analysis of the 
instrumental operation of the bureaucracy based on legal 
rationality, followed by a review of his fatalistic outlook 
on the implications of the bureaucracy's value neutrality 
with respect to struggles between privileged and 
disprivileged groups for legitimate authority over the 
bureaucracy. Much of the drive for managerial change can be 
described as a shift away from the conception of the 
bureaucracy found in the work of Max Weber, of the 
formalised, hierarchical, rule bound machine that would give 
society a seamless iron cage of administrative rationality. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised around three such 
shifts.
Firstly, Parsons judges that Weber overestimated the force 
of bureaucratic development and underestimated the 
importance of professionalisation and democratisation in 
society. Managerialism embodies Parsons judgement on this 
balance through its push to professionalise the manager and 
its aim of rendering the bureaucracy controllable by 
democratic institutions. However the nature of its uptake 
also brings out problems in Parsons' arguments on these 
matters.
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Secondly, the Human Relations School including Mayo and 
Peters, reject the dehumanising, rule bound ethos of 
bureaucracies as a necessary consequence of their 
development. They provide a much more optimistic account of 
the possibilities of bureaucratic culture.
Thirdly, recent developments in management theory can be 
taken as a challenge to Weber's contention that 
bureaucracies are value neutral with respect to the 
legitimacy of their controlling authority. Specifically, 
Drucker emphasises the importance for private sector 
management of securing ownership and control structures 
favourable for the long term development of the firm. 
Translated to state bureaucracies, this theoretical 
development legitimates the involvement of public sector 
managers in the political processes of government.
A fourth shift from Weber's portrayal of the bureaucracy is 
discussed in the next chapter. Coombs and Wilenski argue 
that the bureaucracy can take on an emancipatory role in the 
social struggle between privileged and disprivileged groups. 
They propose this through a reworking of the operative value 
of equality in the bureaucracy, from a focus on equal 
treatment of individuals in administrative matters to a 
focus on equity of outcome in welfare programs.
Weber and the rule bound bureaucracy
The work of Max Weber is imbued with a profound 
disenchantment with the values of the reformation and the 
logic of the enlightenment. Turner has pointed out that 
this disenchantment was grounded in his conception of a 
central paradox of history, in which progress would always 
be self defeating:
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"in which the best intentions of social actors always 
ultimately end in a form of self-destruction and self- 
cancellation" (Turner 1986a p 54).
Weber's most powerful metaphor of the iron cage resonates 
with his analysis of the large organisations that 
characterise twentieth century industrial society, where
"the principal values of western society result in 
their self-cancellation in a world dominated by formal 
reason where people had been reduced to cogs in the 
machine" (ibid).
For Weber, the development of the modern bureaucracy was a 
result of the change in the balance of the authority 
structures of society toward the dominance of legal 
authority over charismatic and traditional authority.
In Economy and Society Weber describes the rule bound 
character of the modern bureaucracy as an elaboration of 
legal authority. He contrasts this with the exercise of 
charismatic and traditional authority by comparing the 
personal and historical location of the authority figure in 
a relationship with others that commands obedience:
"In the case of charismatic authority, it is the 
charismatically qualified leader as such who is obeyed 
by virtue of personal trust in his revelation, his 
heroism or his exemplary qualities so far as they fall 
within the scope of the individual's belief in his 
charisma" (Weber 1978 p 216).
The person exercising charismatic authority over others 
draws on their belief in him as a charismatic individual, 
and is constrained only by the requirement to sustain this
belief. By contrast the person exersising traditional 
authority is constrained by the traditions themselves:
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"In the case of traditional authority, obedience is 
owed to the person of the chief who occupies the 
traditionally sanctioned position of authority and who 
is (within its sphere) bound by tradition" (ibid).
While the exercise of traditional authority is bound by 
tradition, and although this appears to limit its scope in 
comparison to charismatic authority in any given situation, 
the prescriptions of tradition serve to extend the authority 
of those placed to actualise them, without the necessity of 
inspiring personal loyalty. Thus the scope of traditional 
authority is often wider for the individual who wields it 
than any charismatic authority they may have sought to 
inspire. Similarly, the breadth and depth of traditional 
authority is in general much wider than the reach of 
charismatic authority. Weber sets up a similar trade off in 
scope between traditional and legal authority:
"In the case of legal authority, obedience is owed to 
the legally established impersonal order. It extends 
to the persons exercising the authority of office under 
it by virtue of the formal legality of their commands 
and only within the scope of authority of the office" 
(ibid p 215-216).
Weber sees this dependence on the legal order as the basis 
of the rule bound impersonality of the modern bureaucracy.
"This stands in extreme contrast to the regulation of 
all relationships through individual privileges and 
bestowals of favour, which... is absolutely dominant in 
patrimonialism, at least in so far as such
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relationships are not fixed by sacred tradition" (ibid 
p 958).
But as with the seeming limitation of traditional authority 
in comparison to charismatic authority, the formal legal 
requirements of the modern bureaucracy are actually enabling 
in modern society. He advances two reasons for this. 
Firstly, it is well suited to the egalitarian ethos of 
capitalist society with its traditions of free markets and 
equality of opportunity. Weber discusses this in relation 
to the division of labour in bureaucracies according to the 
objective consideration of merit and skills:
"'Objective' execution of business in this context 
means execution which has 'no regard for persons' and 
which follows calculable rules. 'No regard for 
persons' however, is also the slogan of the 'market' 
and of all forms of the naked pursuit of economic 
interests in general... calculable rules [are] the 
most important for a modern bureaucracy. The nature of 
modern cultures, especially its technical and economic 
substructure, requires precisely such 'calculability' 
of consequences" (ibid p 351).
The second and more powerful reason he advances for the 
greater scope of legal administrative authority is its 
technical superiority:
"The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic 
organisation has always been its purely technical 
superiority over every other form. A fully developed 
bureaucratic apparatus stands to these other forms in 
much the same relation as a machine does to non­
mechanical means of production" (ibid p 350)
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Weber's ideal type of authority structures contains the 
paradox of self-cancellation and self-destruction. Put 
simply, the increase in the scope of authority from 
charismatic to traditional to legal authority, is coupled to 
a decrease in potential for creative personal input to the 
use of that authority. This is the nub of Weber's metaphors 
of dehumanisation.
Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy stands at the heart of his 
conception of the relations between the modern state, 
capitalist enterprise and the public administration. In 
reading Weber it should be kept in mind that the ideal type 
of legal-rational administration was applicable to both the 
public and the private sector:
’’The idea that the bureau activities of the state are 
intrinsically different in character from the 
management of private offices is a continental European 
notion and, by way of contrast, is totally foreign to 
the American way" (ibid p 957-958).
Of course Weber does point to the legislative backing of the 
public administration as a point of difference to the purely 
economic backing of the private firm, but uses this point to 
emphasise the importance of the abstract calculation of 
administrative action:
"The reduction of modern office management to rules is 
deeply embedded in its very nature. The theory of 
modern public administration, for instance, assumes 
that the authority to order certain matters by decree - 
which has been legally granted to an agency - does not 
entitle the agency to regulate the matter by individual 
commands given for each case, but only to regulate the 
matter abstractly" (ibid p 958).
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Today the rule-bound approach of the public service is 
routinely contrasted with the managerial involvement and 
creativity of the entrepreneurial private sector office.
The shift since Weber in public administration from rules, 
regulations and sanctions to incentive, cooperation and 
encouragement will be discussed below, but at this point it 
can be speculated that the more flexible modern approach has 
developed out of necessity in the private sector precisely 
because it does not have recourse to as many instruments of 
authority as the public sector, and as Weber has outlined 
has eschewed strategies of regulation of the opportunities 
available in the market.
Weber attaches primary importance to equality of treatment 
before the law, and by extension equality of treatment by 
the bureaucracy. Turner points out that this formulation 
of a content free ideal type of administrative arrangement 
merely sets the stage for
"the major task of any sociology which, in the words of 
Weber, aims to reveal the characteristic uniqueness of 
our times" (Turner 1981 p 352).
There is a deliberate circularity in Weber's definition of 
legal legitimacy. This was a point of criticism by Reinhard
Bendix, which we shall come across again below in relation 
to Mayo:
"Laws are regarded as legitimate if they have been 
enacted and the enactment is legitimate if it follows 
norms defining the correct procedures to be followed" 
(Turner 1981 p 357).
This leaves open completely the question of legitimate 
control over the state apparatus:
41
given Weber's value—neutrality in the definition of 
legitimate authority, any state is legitimate by virtue 
of political monopoly over the apparatus of power" 
(Turner 1981 p 359).
The state bureaucracy thus forms a backdrop to, but is not a 
participant in, the struggles that shape the particularities 
of a given society. In analysing the "characteristic 
uniqueness of our times," Weber saw the formal rationality 
of legal authority as the arena in which is played out
the general conflict between dominant and usurpatory 
social collectivities for control of scarce resources 
via the tactics of social closure and social 
penetration" (Turner 1981 p 356).
Within the legal formality of the modern state, struggles 
between various groups are waged through their seeking to 
have legislation enacted that benefits one group or another. 
Weber's analysis of the state bureaucracy focuses on its 
role in providing the conditions and stability for the 
expansion of markets. He did not pre-empt the expansion of 
the welfare activities of the state in the post second world 
war period. The development of the welfare state has had 
two particular consequences for the bureaucracy that are 
important for a discussion of the relation of consumer 
advocates and the public administration.
The first is the expansion in the operationalisation of the 
value of equality into a concern for social equity, whereby 
the desired effect of welfare programs is to equalise social 
outcomes. This is discussed in the next chapter. The 
commitment of the bureaucracy to social equity through 
welfare forms the backdrop for the second development, 
namely the opening up of arenas of struggle between citizens 
receiving welfare and the administration. This has occurred
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in a way that recognises both the crucial role of the 
administration in the allocation of welfare resources and 
the policy development process. This development underlies 
the general subject of this thesis, anad is discussed 
explicitly in chapter seven below.
In the remainder of this chapter I shall consider some of 
the challenges to Weber's view of the bureaucracy that are 
not based on the expansion of the welfare state. These 
challenges question:
- the interpretation of the importance and place of the 
bureaucracy in the development of the social system 
(Parsons);
- the dehumanisation of the bureaucracy (Human 
Relations School); and
- the neutrality of the bureaucracy with respect to the 
legitimacy of its controlling authority (Drucker).
Parsons' double interchange model of the organisation
The writings of Talcott Parsons on bureaucracies can be read 
in a way that aknowledge his debt to Dürkheim, so that his 
analysis can be described as having synchronic and 
diachronic dimensions. I shall first discuss his systems 
perspective on the state bureaucracy, and Habermas' critique 
that Parsons' formulation does not extend to the concept of 
systems crises. Secondly I shall discuss Parsons' thoughts 
on the bureaucracy in social evolution. The uptake of 
managerialism by the state illustrates the cross cutting 
effects of bureaucratisation and professionalisation as 
parallel trends in the development of the social system.
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In his synchronic analysis, Parsons expanded his description 
of the interaction of organisations in society, including 
the state bureaucracy, through a double interchange model of 
systems relations. I shall discuss two aspects of this that 
are important for my thesis. Firstly, Parsons' systems 
analysis of the function of organisations can be used to 
understand the interaction between consumer organisations 
and the state bureaucracy. Secondly, his analysis extends 
metaphors from the economic performance of firms in the 
market place to cover state bureaucracies in the democratic 
system of government. This is a forerunner to the transfer 
of managerial tenets from the private sector to the state 
bureaucracy.
Parsons made a major contribution to the application of 
cybernetic systems theory to the study of society. Systems 
theory, including the notion of self-steering, has a long 
history in mathematics, the physical sciences, biology and 
the social sciences. In sociological theory this history 
goes back to Herbet Spencer, who proposed a complex 
transposition of notions of structure, function and 
equilibrium from biology to the study of society in the last 
century (Spencer 1967). Parsons himself would have received 
a thorough grounding in key concepts of systems theory 
during his early undergraduate studies in biology (Parsons 
1977 p 22) .
A key aspect of Parsons use of systems theory with reference 
to large organisations is that he, like Weber, locates the 
organisation as a component of the social system, not only 
as a system itself. Parsons articulates his discussion of 
organisations with a four function paradigm of the social 
system, in which he proposes a classification of 
organisations into four broad funtional types, namely 



















Table one: Parsons' AGIL paradigm applied to organisations
Parsons notes that within this classification, the 
orientation refers to the primary goal of the organisation, 
and that within any particular organisation, secondary goals 
relevant to the other AGIL functions will still be found. 
This theoretical flexibility is necessary to discuss the 
interaction of consumer advocacy organisations and 
government departments, and makes it possible to consider 
the commonality of purpose within interactions between 
organisations of different functional types. Thus one could 
talk about the secondary integrative function of a 
government department (primarily oriented toward achieving 
politically set goals), achieved by participating in 
discussions with interest groups. Conversely, the primarily
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integrative interest groups could be seen as participating 
in the goal attainment programs of a government department. 
The focus of consumer consultations on secondary goals of 
both government agencies and consumer groups could be a part 
explanation of why such discussions are difficult to 
organise and conduct, and are often overlooked.
Parsons specifically refers to the policy making parts of 
the state bureaucracy as a managerial system, 
differentiating it from the direct service bureaus:
"In the field of government, 'bureaus' are mainly 
technical organizations, while the 'political' parts of 
government are, literally, the 'policy-making' parts. 
Perhaps a good name for this level of organization 
is... a 'managerial' system (Parsons 1960 p 62).
He then goes on to outline the "double interchange" between 
the organisation and its operating environment. The 
managerial subsystem within the organisation mediates 
between it and its environment to secure the necessary 
resources for its operation and to distribute its products 
to users. He notes that where these products are services, 
management is also responsible for motivating the necessary 
cooperation of recipients of services:
"the performance of 'services' requires the co­
operation of the recipient of the service. This co­
operation cannot always be taken for granted; it has to 
be motivated" (Parsons 1960 p 72).
Consultation with consumer groups would thus provide two 
types of input for service agencies: it could be a source 
of ideas for service development; and it could nuture the 
motivation for cooperation by service users necessary for 
successful service delivery.
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A major theme of managerialism in the public sector is the 
use of concepts and metaphors common in the self 
understanding of private firms to the delivery of services 
and even policy development by public sector agencies. In 
what amounts to a forerunner of this, Parsons use of the 
double interchange model of the organization's interaction 
with its environment enabled him to directly transpose 
economic management concepts to political management tasks. 
In the economic sphere, the double interchange of the firm 
involves:
1) The use of raw materials (input) for the production 
of goods (output) that supply the market; and
2) The use of labour (input) in exchange for the 
payment of money (output) that supports demand in the 
market (Parsons 1960 p 74).
In the political sphere, Parsons delineates a similar double 
interchange of inputs and outputs:
1) The agency utilises the cooperation of the public 
(input) to implement service delivery decisions 
(output) reached by the government; and
2) The public, through voting and other ways (input) 
support the political leadership responsible for the 
decisions (output) themselves (Parsons 1960 p 79).
Thus the business firm through its double interchange with 
the economic market, provides both the products and the 
money that buys them. Similarly, the government agency, 
through its double interchange with the political market, 
contributes to both aspects of the exchange of policies for 
power.
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This similarity between government and business 
organisations calls to mind Weber's comment discussed above 
that his diagnosis of bureaucratisation applied equally to 
private and public sector organisations. Both Weber and 
Parsons' analyses provide scope for the transfer of 
techniques and forms of organisation between the private and 
the public sector. This transposition of metaphors is taken 
up in the chapter eight below on the welfare market, where I 
argue that public sector managerialism is part of a wider 
application of metaphors drawn from the economic analysis of 
markets to the activities of the welfare state.
Habermas has commented on the differences between the 
analyses of Weber and Parsons. He contends that Parsons' 
analytical scheme does not allow for the possibility of 
system crises, where tensions within the system threaten its 
overall cohesion, rather than just bring about a new 
equilibrium. For Weber, the increasing reach of bureaucracy 
and its lack of concern for values is associated with a loss 
of freedom and a loss of meaning in society. Parsons 
counters this pessimistic view with his analysis of the 
ascendency of professionalisation, with its collegial forms 
of organisation and emphasis on individual autonomy and the 
collective expansion of knowledge. Parsons was convinced
"that modern societies had brought about an 
incomparable increase in freedom for the great mass of 
their population. He rejects both elements of the 
Weberian diagnosis - the thesis of the loss of meaning 
as well as that of a loss of freedom" (Habermas 1987 p 
291) .
Habermas contends that the problem with Parsons' conception 
is that it does not recognise "the far-reaching uncoupling 
of system and lifeworld" (ibid p 283) that marks modernity.
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The implication of this is that developments that strengthen 
the social system (eg measures that improve economic 
steerage), but are dangerous for and provoke resistances 
within the lifeworld, are not recognised as crises that 
threaten the integrity of the system. Rather, they are 
misinterpreted as disequilibria of exchange media that will 
be resolved harmoniously through media dynamics.
Habermas sees the strength of Weber's analysis as lying in 
his complex conception of rationality itself:
"He can find in his complex concept of rationality 
itself the criteria for those structurally generated 
"aporetic" or "paradoxical" experiences that, in 
certain circumstances, get worked up in the form of 
social pathologies" (Habermas 1987 p 292).
Parsons does not have anything similar to give his analysis 
of system disequilibria a convincing resonance with the 
experience of the symptoms of crisis that mark modernity:
"Parsons does not have these, or similar, conceptual 
means at his disposal; he applies the concept of 
crisis in the sense of a disturbance of intersystemic 
interchange relations, independent of the experiences 
of those involved and without reference to identity 
problems. On this approach the crises that arise in 
modern societies can only be grasped in terms of media 
dynamics, the model for which is supplied by economic 
inflation and deflation" (ibid p 292 - 293).
Notwithstanding this criticism, Parsons analysis of the 
organisation in society has considerable merit, and is not 
incompatible with a wider analysis that takes the 
possibility and symptoms of system disintegration into
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account. Nor is it incompatible with efforts to take 
central account of the experiences of the people concerned.
Professionalisation and bureaucratization
In a discussion of his theoretical influences and 
development, Parsons notes:
"Dürkheim was giving an emphasis in his interpretation 
of some of the main trends of modern society that was 
different from Weber's emphasis on bureaucratization.
It gradually became clearer that this pattern 
identified by Dürkheim was closely associated with that 
of the professions and, up to a point, also with that 
of the market, precisely in contrast with the 
predominantly hierarchical stress of bureaucracy" 
(Parsons 1977 p 318).
Parsons describes the progressive pattern of change in 
modern society as the interplay of three "revolutions - 
industrial, democratic, and educational" (Parsons 1977 p 
53). Parsons mounts two challenges to the preeminence that 
Weber accords the tendency to bureaucratisation, the first 
based on the importance of the democratic revolution and the 
second on the importance of the educational revolution. In 
a passage that pre-empts the arguments of Daniel Bell about 
the independence of the culture and the polity, Parsons 
argues that:
"Weber, in his focus on the process of 
bureaucratization, tended to relegate the democratic 
revolution to a place secondary to the industrial. 
Increasingly, it has seemed to me that the two should 
be placed in positions of coordinate importance. From 
the broad point of view of my paradigm, no matter how
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highly interdependent they were, one should be 
interpreted as being of primarily economic and the 
other of political significance in the analytical 
senses" (Parsons 1977 p 53).
At first sight it seems odd that Parsons would argue that 
Weber underplayed the "democratic revolution" By focussing 
on Bureaucratisation. After all, the bureaucracy of the 
democratic state was one of Weber's principal subjects, and 
the expansion of power of the democratic state through the 
technical superiority of the bureaucracy one of his main 
themes. Weber conceptualised the political struggle over 
the direction of bureaucratic action as taking place in the 
parliamentary and party political arenas, preferring to 
paint the bureaucracy itself as instrumentally oriented but 
devoid of substantive value commitments.
Parsons is right to draw attention to the inadequate 
attention paid by Weber to aspects of democratisation in his 
discussion of the pressures toward the rule of law and the 
effects of bureaucratisation. However Parsons does not go 
on to fill this gap by considering the implications of his 
conception of the democratic revolution for bureaucracies 
themselves. Instead, he seems to conceptually limit 
bureaucratisation to being a process of the industrial 
revolution. This interpretation makes sense of Parsons' 
argument that it was Weber's focus on bureaucratisation that 
"tended to relegate the democratic revolution to a place 
secondary to the industrial" (Parsons 1977 p 53).
Parsons second challenge to the importance of 
bureaucratisation lies in his contention that the 
educational revolution leads to an increase in collegial 
association, and through its impact on the division of 
labour tends to replace bureaucracy as the chief vehicle for 
the increasing differentiation production:
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"As a result [of the educational revolution], the 
occupational structure has altered profoundly - having 
its primary focuss in the professions themselves, as 
specially articulated in and with the system of higher 
education, rather than in 'line' bureaucracy" (Parsons 
1977 p 53).
Parsons continues:
The principle point of reference for a different view 
[from Weber's] in my case has been the work of 
Dürkheim, notably his conception of organic 
solidarity... The professions clearly do not tend 
toward a bureaucratic type of organization, but so far 
as they are involved in collective decision making, 
claim considerable autonomy relative to agencies not 
belonging to the profession in question and act mainly 
as associational groups" (Parsons 1977 p 55).
Thus Parsons argues that Weber overestimated the importance 
of his model of bureaucratization in the development of 
western society because he did not give adequate weight to 
the rise of collegiate forms of organisation coupled with 
professional closure and autonomy. For the purpose of this 
thesis we must look at the implications of Parsons' argument 
for the development of the state bureaucracy itself. There 
are three comments I would like to make in relation to this.
Firstly, the inroads made by the professions into the 
bureaucracies that was apparent in the 1950s and 1960s has, 
at least in Australia in the 1980s, been replaced by a trend 
away from professional control. Specifically, managerialism 
has promoted the replacement of the expert director of 
public sector agencies with generic managers, emphasising
techniques of directing and coordinating expertise as 
necessary.
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Secondly however, it is possible to interpret the rise of 
the generic public sector manager as an example of 
professionalisation replacing a bureaucratic form.
Management can itself be considered a profession, with its 
associated faculties of management education. The Senior 
Executive Service of the APS encourages lateral collegiate 
association and study of codified knowledges relating to 
management technique. In discussing bureaucrats undertaking 
career service within the state bureaucracy, Wilenski talks 
of "professional government" (Wilenski 1986 p 216). This 
development within the bureaucracy does not undermine 
Weber's vision of the expanding influence of bureaucracies, 
however it does call into question the dominance of the rule 
bound form of bureaucracy he portrayed arising of necessity 
from the nature of the legal authority that underpins the 
bureaucracy.
Thirdly, the increased differentiation of the professions 
has been paralleled by a counter trend toward 
interdisciplinary collaboration, particularly in relation to 
community oriented health and welfare programs.
Bureaucracies have been able to harness and subsume 
professional and academic opinion to their own decision 
making requirements by promoting interdisciplinary 
collaboration, both internally in the bureaucracy and 
through commissions, in a way that substantively restricts 
the autonomy of the professions and limits their influence. 
Of particular interest to my investigations has been the use 
of consumer organisations to balance and temper professional 
advice to the government within interdisciplinary forums.
For example in the face of the AIDS epidemic, most 
Australian governments have sought advice beyond their 
bureaucracies, principally because of the limited expertise
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within the bureaucracies and the long lag times necessary to 
build this up (Blewett 1988). These external advisory 
bodies have been constituted to include members of the major 
groups at risk of AIDS, notably activists from homosexual 
organisations, in addition to the usual complement of 
medical practitioners, academics and administrators (see the 
discussion below of Matthews 1976).
My point here is to show the complexity of the crosscutting 
influences of historical trends toward bureaucratisation and 
professionalisation for each other. This interaction has 
been influential in shaping the modern welfare bureaucracy 
and its modes of operation, and is an important part of the 
background against which the new managerialism has been 
introduced.
Mayo and the ethos of human cooperation
I now turn to a discussion of some of the ideas on 
management technique and organisation structure of the human 
relations school, perhaps the most influential body of 
management theory to develop since the Second World War.
Elton Mayo was born in Adelaide in 1880. He initially 
studied medicine there and in the United Kingdom, but "lost 
interest" and undertook a B.A.. in psychology at the 
University of Adelaide. He was influenced by Freud and 
Janet, and in fact developed a psychoanalytically based 
treatment for shell-shock with a Brisbane physician whilst 
he was an academic at the University of Queensland. In 1922 
he went to the U.S.A. and joined the Harvard School of 
Business Administration in 1926, becoming Professor of 
Industrial Research in 1929 (Australian Dictionary of 
biography vol 10 1986).
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Mayo's empirical studies conducted whilst he was at Harvard, 
notably those at the Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric 
Company, showed that the conflict between workers and 
supervisors, and the sense of futility frequently found on 
the shop floor, had more to do with the organisation of 
workers than with the psychological make-up of the workers 
themselves. Experiments with small groups of workers at 
Hawthorne showed that freer supervision, the development of 
personal relationships between workers and generally 
improved morale were associated with improved productivity. 
Quoting from an early report of the studies, Mayo tells us:
"'A relationship of confidence and friendliness has 
been established with these girls to such an extent 
that practically no supervision is required. In the 
absence of any drive or urge whatsoever they can be 
depended upon to do their best. They say they have no 
sensation of working faster now than under the previous 
conditions'" (Mayo 1945 p 74).
Mayo's approach of seeking greater production and social 
progress through industrial harmony born of good human 
relations between workers and management is clearly evident 
in his early Australian writings. In "Democracy and 
freedom", a pamphlet written for the Worker' Education 
Association, he polemically argues against the ability of 
either organised conflict, as promoted by the syndicalists 
and the unions, or organised cooperation, in the form of 
parliamentary democracy, to make a positive contribution to 
the effective operation of industry or to increase the 
wealth and well being of the community. In opposition to 
the focus on social structures and politically arbitrated 
regulation proposed by organised labour and liberal 
democrats, Mayo focussed on getting the best out of the 
knowledge and skills of workers by improving human relations 
in the work place:
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"It may be said for the 'capitalistic' system that, 
although managers and business organisers generally 
have unduly neglected to take account of the human 
factor in industrial problems, the system has, 
nevertheless, tended to conserve social skill, to 
protect the specialist worker against the assaults of 
so-called 'democracy'... The outstanding failure of 
democracy is its failure to appreciate the social 
importance of knowledge and skill" (Mayo 1919 p 59).
Mayo summarises his concerns in the rhetoric of the humanist 
tradition in which the W.E.A. has its roots:
"No social system can be considered satisfactory which 
deprives the great majority of mankind of every vestige 
of autonomy. No society is civilised which exploits 
the many in the interest of the few. When 'work' 
signifies intelligent collaboration in the achievement 
of a social purpose, 'industrial unrest' will cease to 
be" (Mayo 1919 p 60).
For Mayo, this dissolution of industrial conflict could be 
achieved through better human relations at the workplace, 
whilst leaving the pattern of ownership untouched. Elswhere 
in the pamphlet, he offers a psychological analysis of 
communists as disaffected outsiders with unhappy childhoods, 
usually found sitting at the back of meetings of workers, 
heckling with poorly understood slogans (Mayo 1919).
Mayo was the central figure of the human relations school of 
industrial psychology. This school of thought developed 
against a background of an individualistic conception of the 
worker motivated only by money and requiring strict 
supervision; and the theories of "scientific management" 
that emphasised increasing specialisation of tasks and tight
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hierarchical supervisory structures with a narrow span of 
control:
"The concept of span of control involved an essentially 
mechanical theory of organization. It placed emphasis 
on the formal structure and upon building control into 
the organization from the top down. It assumed that 
one man could supervise adequately only a small number 
of people" (Whyte 1961 p 101-102).
In distinction to this authoritarian, task centred approach, 
human relations theory brought to the structure and 
management of large organisations the values of 
collaboration, skill and freedom that had concerned Mayo 
since his W.E.A. days:
"We find that the way you build your organization has a 
great influence on its pattern of human relations...
If we really want delegation of authority and the 
improved morale that seems to go with it, we might 
adopt the organization structure approach of giving the 
boss so many subordinates that he cannot possibly 
supervise then closely. Such a course means building a 
broad, flat structure with relatively few levels of 
authority from bottom to top. This management 
philosophy - the exact opposite of the span of control 
concept - is practiced by Sears and is becoming 
increasingly popular in American industry" (Whyte 1961 
P H D -
Sears, a large U.S. retail firm, developed a systematic 
approach to management training in the 1930s when they set 
up a network of retail department stores (there were 700 by 
1951) to supply the vast urban market of low income workers 
in the cities as they aquired middle class tastes:
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" [low income workers aquired] both the money and the 
desire to buy the same goods as the middle and upper 
classes. In other words, the country was rapidly 
becoming one big homogenous market - but distribution 
system was still one of separate and distinct class 
markets" (Drucker 1955 p 28).
This network of retail stores was fundamentally different to 
the mail order operation of Sears in the first part of the 
century, when they were known as "The farmer's friend," 
offering middle class goods to the geographically isolated 
rural middle class. Where the mail order operation could be 
run and managed centrally, the retail store network had to 
be managed locally. The managers could not be recruited, 
they had to be trained:
"The greatest bottleneck for the first ten or fifteen 
years of Sears's retail operation, that is almost until 
World War Two, was the shortage of managers. The most 
systematic innovations had to be in the field of 
manager development? and the Sears policies of the 
thirties became the starting point for all the work in 
manager development now going on in American industry" 
(Drucker 1951 p 29).
The trend toward flatter organisational structures has 
indeed continued and has formed the basis of the approach 
toward restructuring taken by management consultants such as 
McKinsey and Co. It has been identified as one of the key 
components of success in the "excellent companies" research 
of Peters and Waterman (conducted under the auspices of 
McKinsey and Co.) reported in their popular book "In search 
of excellence," and has been an important component in the 
restructuring of Australian Public Service Departments, one 
of the first examples being the 1986 restructuring of the
Department of Veterans' Affairs (for which McKinsey and Co 
were the management consultants).
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Mayo has been criticised for his abhorrence of conflict and 
the optimism of his belief in spontaneous cooperation in 
human relations:
"The implicit denial of the inevitably authoritarian 
aspects of a factory system plays a strategic role in 
Mr. Mayo's philosophy. He seeks to restore 
'spontaneous cooperation.' The men he charges with 
this task of restoration are the industrial managers" 
(Bendix and Fisher 1962 p 121)
In a tacit comparison with the problem of legitimacy and 
substantive authority in the work of Weber, Bendix says in 
his analysis:
"Mayo has shown no intention of dealing with - problems 
of agreement on the nature and the ends of industrial 
organization itself" (Bendix and Fisher 1962 p 114).
What has become of the human relations perspective in the 
1980s? Management theory in the USA is like pop philosophy 
in France. Seemingly obscure books on the subject are a 
staple fixture on the best seller lists. New textbooks 
appear constantly to feed students in the many business 
schools. The best seller by Thomas Peters and Robert 
Waterman, "In search of excellence" (1982), provides a 
valuable insight to recent developments in the human 
relations school, not least because it is well referenced. 
They claim:
"The stream that today's researchers are tapping is an 
old one, started in the late 1930s by Elton Mayo and 
Chester Barnard, both at Harvard. In various ways,
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both challenged ideas put forward by Max Weber, who 
defined the bureaucratic form of organization, and 
Frederick Taylor, who implied that management really 
can be made into an exact science. Weber had pooh- 
poohed charismatic leadership and doted on bureaucracy; 
its rule-driven, impersonal form, he said, was the only 
way to assure long-term survival” (Peters and Waterman 
1982 p 5).
This needs to be taken metonymically. Weber of course did 
not ”pooh pooh" charismatic leadership, and in fact claimed 
that:
"charisma is indeed the specifically creative 
revolutionary force of history" (Weber 1978 p 1117).
Peters is actually taking issue with Weber's belief in the 
inevitability of the suffocation of charisma (ibid p 1120) 
in the bureaucratic form. Arising from the initial 
observations of the Hawthorne experiments, it is a central 
tenet of the human relations school that personal attention 
paid by management to workers is the key to improved 
productivity, and that this is due to the fact of this 
attention, not the external content of what is attended to. 
"In search of excellence" continually attests to the value 
of charismatic leadership in large organisations, noting 
that
"We desperately need meaning in our lives and will 
sacrifice a great deal to institutions that will 
provide meaning for us" (Peters and Waterman 1982 p 
56) .
"In search of excellence" is very much about human relations 
in large organisations. It emphasises human creativity, 
caring and commitment to people, and the importance of not
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letting formal structures overshadow this. The book 
proceeds by a plethora of anecdotes that bring out the best 
in people, collected through research with companies and 
through training seminars.
"it is attention to employees, not work conditions per 
Se, that has the dominant impact on productivity.
(Many of our best companies, one friend observed, seem 
to reduce management to merely creating "an endless 
stream of Hawthorne effects.") (Peters and Waterman 
1982 p 6).
This human relations perspective is all embracing. In the 
chapter entitled "Close to the customer," they make only 
glancing reference to perspectives that conceptualise the 
organisation in relation to society:
"At most, recent theory talks about the importance of 
the external environment in influencing the 
institution. It misses by a mile, however, the 
intensity of customer orientation that exists within 
the top performers" (Peters and Waterman 1982 p 157)
Within their very organisation centred approach, the 
customer environment orients the values and frames the 
internal operation of the excellent companies. The authors 
develop their human view of the organization against a straw 
man they call "the rational model":
"The word 'strategy', which used to mean a damn good 
idea for knocking the socks off the competition, has 
often come to be synonymous with the quantitative 
breakthrough, the analytic coup, market share numbers, 
learning curve theory, positioning business on a 4- or 
9- or 24-box matrix (the matrix idea, straight from
mathematics) and putting all of it on a computer" 
(Peters and Waterman 1982 p 30).
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Ironically, they devote much of the book to discussing the 
human side of large computing companies, whose market 
expansion has of course been based on everone else "putting 
it all on computer." Their main point is that management's 
leadership role is expressed in relation to the values 
within the organisation rather than in relation to the 
organisation's instrumental operation:
"The excellent companies seem to have developed 
cultures that have incorporated the values and 
practices of the great leaders... it appears that the 
real role of the chief executive is to manage the 
values of the organization" (Peters and Waterman 1982 p 
26) .
They propose that "excellent companies are marked by very 
strong cultures" (Peters and Waterman 1982 p 77), and that 
these cultures create meaning for those who work there. 
Dysfunctional organisations can also display strong 
cultures, possibly with the abuse of position and power that 
this can engender. The difference is that the cultures of 
the excellent companies include openings and spaces for 
customers:
"[They] are not inwardly focused. The world of the 
excellent company is especially open to customers, who 
in turn inject a sense of balance and proportion into 
an otherwise possibly claustrophobic environment" 
(Peters and Waterman 1982 p 79).
"In search of excellence" is at base a study that recognises 
the value of charisma and creative human relations.
Although it claims to be part of a tradition that rejects
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Weber's diagnosis of the increasing rationality and 
impersonality of the bureaucratic form, it can be read as a 
manifest example of the process identified by Weber of the 
routinisation of charisma. Peters' study identifies what 
characteristics are associated with large profits, and 
recommends that these characteristics be studied and 
implemented by other managers wishing to maximise their 
profits. The human relations school plays down the rigid 
internal authority structures of large organisations and 
emphasises their potential to encourage creative human 
action. However, it seems to me that the ideal bureaucracy 
of the human relations school is not radically different to 
Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy. The difference in their 
perspectives is that the human relations school is 
fundamentally optimistic about the benefits to society of 
"excellent” large organisations through the creation of 
meaning for their employees and the creation of wealth for 
society. This does contrast markedly with Weber's 
pessimistic view that whatever value for society these 
organisations promise will in the end cancel itself out. I 
discuss in chapter seven below a similar debate over the 
value of reformism in Marshall's counter arguments to Weber 
on the role of the state in society.
The manager and the politics of control
This chapter concludes with another challenge to Weber's 
view of bureaucracy, specifically his contention that 
bureaucracies are disinterested in the character and 
legitimacy of their controlling authority. In the public 
sector, this controlling authority is the elected 
government, and the next chapter takes up debates about the 
active role for senior managers in politically supporting 
the government. In the private sector, the controlling 
authority of the firm is its owners, and I now consider
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through a review of Peter Drucker's recent book how 
management theory has come to regard active involvement in 
struggles over ownership as a central activity for managers. 
Just as Weber pointed out that the bureaucratic form of 
organisation occurs in both the private and the public 
sector, Drucker also sees the discipline of management as 
influential in both sectors. He notes that public sector 
management has been an important part of the U.S. 
Administration:
"when the Eisenhower Administration was formed in 1952, 
it was formed concisely as a 'Management 
Administration'" (Drucker 1955 p 3).
Druker contends that the role of the manager has emerged as 
essentially a twentieth century phenomena:
"The emergence of management as an essential, a 
distinct and a leading institution is a pivotal event 
in social history. Rarely, if ever, has a new basic 
institution, a new leading group, emerged as fast as 
has management since the turn of this century" (Drucker 
1955 p 3).
General trends can be discerned over the century as to what 
has been the central focus of management activity, and 
Drucker has been both a contributor to and a commentator on 
these trends. In broad terms, three phases can be 
delineated. These are: the management of production; the 
management of entrepreneurship; and the management of 
ownership.
The industrialist of the 19th century used their capital to 
set up manufacturing operations that in terms of their 
productive output were far superior to the craft and village 
based production of similar products. With assistance from
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employed managers virtually unknown, the capitalist himself 
made the decisions about which technology to invest in and 
how to set up and staff the production process. Drucker 
draws our attention to the specific case of a well known 
19th century industrialist:
"in Engels mill - one of the most profitable businesses 
of its day - there were no 'managers,' only 'charge 
hands' who, themselves workers, enforced discipline 
over a handful of fellow 'proletarians.'” (Drucker 1989
p 221)
In the early 20th century, "management" underwent a shift 
from being something that owners did (verb) to being a type 
of employee (noun). Management became a class of 
specialised employees and a body of specialised knowledge 
that codified the techniques of the successful capitalist in 
deploying technology and labour. This codification of 
knowledge was, in the style of the time, couched in the 
rhetoric of science:
"It was an American engineer, Frederick W. Taylor, who 
did what no one had even thought of before: he treated 
manual work as something deserving study and analysis. 
Taylor showed that the real potential for increased 
output was to 'work smarter.'... Taylor's Principles 
of Scientific Management (1911) not only tremendously 
increased output. It made possible increasing workers' 
wages while at the same time cutting the product's 
prices thereby increasing the demand for it. (Taylor 
actually refused to take a factory as a client unless 
the owners first substantially raised wages, sometimes 
tripling them)" (Drucker 1989 p 189).
The potency of this approach derives from what Parsons 
described as the double interchange of the firm with the
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economy, for if Taylor's approach was taken up, not only 
could workers produce more, they could also buy more.
Demand for product went up as supply increased.
The manager's relationship with capital was essentially one 
of being a personal employee of a particular capitalist, 
employed to manage a production process. Their relationship 
to consumers in the market was first of all providing their 
employees with wages based on productivity thus actually 
funding the market, and secondly getting their product to 
the market. This occurred in a climate of heavy 
concentration of capital ownership in individual hands, a 
strong class structure oriented to the means of production, 
and a predominance of local markets with nascent but rapid 
growth in trade and mass markets.
The middle part of the 20th century saw the emergence of the 
entrepreneur. The best return on investment was made by 
exploiting the potential of unsophisticated local markets 
with untapped demand, by supplying products from well 
managed production processes whose output was not previously 
reaching these markets. Alternatively the entrepreneur 
could set up a tried and tested production process (with an 
experienced manager) to supply the market from close at hand 
and undercut imported products.
As the industrialist preempted the production manager, the 
entrepreneur paved the way for the marketing manager and 
marketing science. Much of econometrics is actually 
techniques for speculating with "what if?" questions about 
markets. The discipline of the marketing manager draws on 
these techniques and on the codified experience of the 
entrepreneurs:
"One important advance in the discipline and practice
of management is that both now embrace entrepreneurship
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and innovation... we now have a 'discipline' of 
entrepreneurship and innovation. It is clearly part of 
management and rests, indeed, on well-known and tested 
management principles" (Drucker 1989 p 227).
Because of increasing diffusion of capital ownership and the 
growth of publicly listed companies around the period of 
World War Two, the manager's relationship to capital 
altered. The manager was required to assume entrepreneurial 
functions to ensure a satisfactory return to an increasingly 
diffuse ownership, increasingly unable to act themselves as 
entrepreneurs with the aggregated capital. Management's 
relationship to consumers was also transformed by the 
requirement to understand in detail the preferences and 
purchasing power of the various markets they supplied.
Market research and a dialogue with consumer organisations 
emerged as tools of marketing science.
The last twenty years have seen a massive growth in capital 
speculation, whereby investors have sought undervalued 
companies, private or publicly listed, gained control of 
them and realised their true value by reselling the company 
or its assets. The whole may well have been worth less than 
the sum of its parts. Drucker draws attention to the danger 
to enterprise management from this phenomena, calling it
"The most serious assault on management in its history 
- a far more serious assault than any mounted by 
Marxists or labor unions: the hostile takeover... What 
underlies the takeover bid is the postulate that the 
enterprise's sole function is to provide the largest 
possible immediate gain to the shareholder... and only 
too often immediately dismantles or loots the going 
concern, sacrificing long-range, wealth-producing 
capacity to short-term gains." (Drucker 1989 p 228)
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The challenge for management that the threat of hostile 
takeover poses has been met in focussing attention on the 
interests of shareholders. The company paying good 
dividends and providing profitable opportunities for 
additional shareholder investment is unlikely to have its 
shares undervalued on the stock market, making it a 
difficult takeover target. In the event of a takeover, the 
new owners will question their capacity to increase their 
return on investment by a management shake up. Codified 
knowledges addressing these issues have now emerged, for 
example shareholder value analysis, initially directed at 
investors rather than enterprise management. If Drucker is 
right that the threat of takeover is currently the biggest 
challenge to management, we can expect to see these 
knowledges expand with a management orientation.
In the public sector, the management focus on maintaining 
political support for the government is readily apparent. 
Wilenski has noted the "essentially political role of the 
civil service in policy formulation and implementation" 
(Wilenski 1986 p 206). Much of the introduction of the new 
managerialism has been concerned with strengthening the 
links between the cabinet and the bureaucracy. Given the 
widespread uptake of management theory and techniques by the 
public service, we can expect an expanding contribution from 
this sector to management theory in the future. It may be 
hard to imagine the captains of industry combing the 
publications of RAIPA for ideas, but the expertise in the 
public sector with the politics of control could well prove 
the fatal attraction.
This chapter has outlined a series of arguments about the 
nature and development of bureaucracies. The work of Max 
Weber provided a starting point for examining the arguments 
of various authors whose writing has been important for the 
development of managerialism. My point has not been to
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arrive at a definitive theory of bureaucracy against which 
to understand managerial reform, but rather to uncover some 
of the tensions in analysis of bureaucracies that form a 
backdrop to managerialism. In particular my analysis has 
sought to show how Weber's pessimism about the development 
of bureaucracy in society sits as an undercurrent in 
managerialist theory, an undercurrent its unbounded optimism 
does not quite conceal.
Chapter 3
Managerial reform in the Australian public service
The control of bureaucratic power
At a pro-labor academic forum held just before Whitlam won 
government, John Kerr contended that:
"the interesting history in the Western world is not so 
much the history of the forces which produced modern 
bureaucratic power but the history of the attempts to 
control it" (J Kerr 1972 p 63).
The history of attempts to control the bureaucracy is a rich 
and active history that in its own way is as interesting as 
the attempts to control the parliament. Indeed, electoral 
(and constitutional) struggles for government can be seen as 
but one arena of struggle for control over the public 
bureaucracy. This chapter however focuses on the recent 
history of structural reform within the Australian Public 
Service.
My main contention is that the background for managerial 
reform in the 1980s can be found in the debates of the 1970s 
that took place in the context of the Coombs Royal 
Commission into Public Administration, and that these 
debates represent a decisive shift from the concerns of 
earlier reformers. This shift is illustrated by reference 
to the work of the Administrative Review Committee chaired 
by John Kerr in the early 1970s, and an analysis of some of 
the debates discussed in the Coombs Report. The chapter 
concludes by considering a number of documents that chart 
the implementation of managerial reform of the APS during 
the 1980s. Particular attention is paid throughout to 
issues concerning consumer consultation by the APS.
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Reform to strengthen legal rationality: The Kerr Review
The Kerr Committee reported to the Commonwealth in 1972, and 
led to the institution of the Administrative Review 
Tribunal. This review was carried out in a framework of 
legal rationality that owed much to Weber's notions of legal 
rationality, and can be thought of as pre-managerialist. It 
was followed by the Coombs Royal Commission on Government 
Administration which was perhaps the first managerialist 
review, at least in as much as many of the debates of the 
1980s over the introduction of managerialist reform sought 
to draw legitimacy from the Coombs report.
Kerr's committee took a legal view of public administration, 
asking who was making which decisions on what grounds. He 
concluded that, regarding the attempts to control 
bureaucratic power,
"there had been far too narrow an approach in Australia 
on the central point, namely, the modernization of 
procedures for effective legal challenge and the 
provision of an appeal on the merits from 
administrative decisions and from exercises of 
administrative discretion" (Kerr 1972 p 64).
Kerr's legal approach located the basis for the legitimacy 
of administrative decisions within constitutional, 
legislative and common law. He concluded his review with a 
recommendation to establish a court of administrative law to 
redress the sins of a Weberian bureaucracy:
"We do have a very real bureaucracy characterized by 
the well-known features listed by Weber. Parker 
[1955], having noted these features as being present in
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the Australian bureaucracy, has said that bureaucrats 
lean to the orthodox and conventional when working as 
part of a large organization and that this leads to the 
fiction of infallibility and to the besetting sin of 
secrecy. It is this fiction and this besetting sin 
which administrative review and the controls upon which 
it is based are designed to attack" (Kerr 1972 p 78- 
79) .
Kerr's review in a sense sought to get the best out of a 
bureaucracy conceptualised in Weberian terms. The central 
point of Kerr's proposed modernisation is that bureaucratic 
decisions be made on the merits of arguments that have force 
in the legal rationality of the court-room. He emphasises 
legal rationality as the basis for fair treatment of all by 
the bureaucracy, against expressions of personal privilege 
and partiality, tendencies that will always be found in 
bureaucracies but that can be balanced by external checks in 
the form of administrative appeal mechanisms.
From the point of view of the consumer of public services, 
Kerr's review emphasises the legal rights of citizenship as 
extending to the right of fair administrative decisions by 
the public bureaucracy. While he does not address issues of 
consumer consultation per Se, it could be argued that the 
institutionalisation of the right to appeal decisions 
creates pressure on bureaucrats to better understand those 
implicated in decisions, and to further this understanding 
through consultation. On the other hand, because of the 
emphasis on concern for individuals (either personal or 
corporate) of the Australian judicial system, lacking as it 
does any basis for class action, the proposal to make 
decisions reviewable may mitigate against consultation so as 
to reduce the grounds for charges of special consideration 
being made in particular cases.
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Offe, in his essay on social policy and the state, is 
critical of studies of social policy and administration 
guided purely by formal concepts, and sheets some of the 
responsibility for this to an over reliance on Weber's 
analysis of the democratic state:
"The methodological concept of democracy prepared by 
Weber, and later applied by Schumpeter, has made his 
work the high court of liberal democratic and pluralist 
theory: as Weber says, democracy is a 'state-technical' 
and particularly effective mechanism of generating 
order, but theory can predict none of its outcomes.
"This form of argument... first posits content as 
contingent (i.e., as dependent on the will of great 
individuals, on empirical processes of coalition and 
bargaining or, finally, upon the scientific-technical 
'force of circumstances') and subseguently disregards 
it theoretically" (Offe 1984 p 88-89)
Interestingly, Offe is able to identify the nub of Kerr's 
review, namely his concern to redress the "besetting sin" of 
secrecy and infallibility as a central feature of this type 
of work:
"(This) approach is typically interested in the 
'dictatorial element' that 'every bourgeois democracy 
inevitably bears within it'" (Offe 1984 p 88-89).
In the opening quote of this chapter from John Kerr, we can 
imagine his picture of the contingent evolution of 
bureaucracy on the one hand with valiant men using the law 
to control it on the other. Possibly, the same sort of 
picture of the contingent political arena being valiantly 
wrestled back onto a constitutionally intended track lay 
behind his decision as Governor General to dismiss the Prime
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Minister in 1975. What concerns us here however is that 
Kerr's report on government administration is the last major 
independent review that accepted the nature of the 
bureaucracy as contingent, ignored these contingencies in 
its proposals for reform, and sought to impose some sort of 
control through attention to due process.
Reform for social emancipation; The Coombs Report
The Coombs Commission took an altogether different approach. 
I reviewed in the last chapter the work of Peters and 
Waterman, who argued that excellence in large organisations 
is marked by strong cultures and pervasive values. The 
Coombs Commission laid the groundwork for a reinstauration 
of values in the APS in tandem with the implementation of 
managerial reform. This has had a profound effect on the 
nature of the bureaucratic culture of the APS. Up to Kerr, 
the key values were a Weberian concentration on fairness and 
eguality of treatment, coupled with a culture of legal 
authority. Since Coombs, and building on this, reform has 
sought to inculcate values of equity in the effect of state 
expenditures on social outcomes, coupled with a culture of 
open administration accountable to the public.
The Royal Commission on Government Administration headed by 
Dr H C Coombs was set up by the Whitlam Government in June 
1974. Coombs, perhaps Australia's best known public 
servant, needs little introduction (see Coombs 1981). He 
was assisted by Dr Peter Wilenski, until then Principal 
Private Secretary to Whitlam, who was appointed as Special 
Adviser to the Commission (Wilenski 1986 p 1). Wilenski was 
an important figure in the introduction of managerialism to 
the Australian Public Service as an academic commentator, 
through his review of the NSW Government Administration 
(Wilenski 1982), as Chair of the Public Service Board from
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1983 until its abolition as part of the machinery of 
government changes in 1987, and then as Secretary of the 
newly created megadepartment of Industry, Technology and 
Commerce until his appointment as Ambassador to the United 
Nations in 1988. His views are thus invaluable for 
interpreting the Coombs report and its subsequent influence.
Wilenski has developed a view of instrumental action and 
value rationality within the public service that can be used 
to understand the shift in conceptions of the bureaucracy 
from pre-managerialist to managerialist reform efforts, a 
shift clearly apparent in the Coombs report. Wilenski 
challenged the widely held view of the bureaucracy as being 
solely instrumental, that "Ministers make policy, public 
servants administer it" (Wilenski 1986 p 118). He comments 
that the wide acceptance of this view was strategically 
valuable for both politicians and bureaucrats:
"This was a convenient view for both politicians and 
public servants to foster. It provided the politician 
with the political credit for policy initiatives while 
occasionally allowing blame for individual 
administrative errors to fall upon anonymous public 
servants. It allowed the public servant to wield 
considerable political power in the policy-making 
process without being held accountable for it"
(Wilenski 1986 p 118).
The Whitlam government, and Wilenski, were self conscious 
about the experience of not being able to use the 
bureaucracy for the instrumental implementation of its 
policies. Wilenski's analysis of the fiction of the 
instrumental view of the administration addresses the 
question formulated by Offe about why governments are 
virtually incapable of effective intervention in society:
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"Why is the capacity of late capitalist societies for 
political regulation so slight and their capacity for 
'planned social change' so defective" (Offe 1984 p 35).
Offe's analysis is taken up in the chapter seven below. It 
needs to be noted that his answer to this question is very 
different to Wilenski's, with Offe being much more 
pessimistic about the possibilities for reform to alter the 
situation. Nevertheless, both their views stand in marked 
contrast to the commonly expressed view that the reason the 
administration did not implement the policies of the Whitlam 
government was because after years of implementing the 
policies of the Coalition government, it was full of people 
who did not support the new policy directions of Labour. 
Offe's argument addresses the structural demands of society 
external to the state apparatus that limit its options for 
action. Wilenski argues that the problem is one of the 
internal structure of the APS, but has little to do with the 
political affiliations of public servants. For example,
"The bureaucrat, oriented as he is to the middle or 
upper-class lifestyles, usually lacks knowledge about 
the lower class client's subculture... If he 
understands why clients act the way they do, he is 
likely to recognize that they have valid reasons for 
objecting to his conception of reality or, more 
specifically, to some of the bureaucratic regulations. 
Consequently, bureaucratic organizations tend to 
penalize those of their members who 'overidentify' with 
clients" (Report of the Coombs Commission quoted in 
Wilenski 1986 p 104).
Wilenski summarises his concern in a language of public 
service values emphasising democratic responsiveness at a 
number of levels:
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"The experience of the Whitlam years thus demonstrated 
the need for three separate types of possible public 
administration reform for future Labor governments: 
increase in the ability of the bureaucracy to accept 
and implement change; an increase in the ability of 
the bureaucracy to innovate for itself in the direction 
of social democracy; and a shift towards equity and 
compassion in the administration of ongoing programs" 
(Wilenski 1986 p 105).
This recipe seeks to revitalise the public service by 
emphasising a substantive democratic spirit within the 
bureaucracy, rather than an administrative role within a 
formal democratic state. The Coombs commission report 
itself called for enhanced responsiveness of the bureaucracy 
in more equivocal terms:
"The commission believes that the administration should 
serve a government dedicated to such change as 
competently and devotedly as one which aims to preserve 
the status quo or to achieve a more gradual rate of 
adaption (Coombs 1976 p 22).
This call is problematic as the structure of administration 
needed in each case may be different. Particular governments 
at any one time promote change in certain areas and support 
continuity in others. The more areas tackled concurrently 
the more the strain on the administrative and policy making 
procedures of the administration, and the more resources 
needed to cope with this. Thus an efficient public service 
for a conservative government may understandably lack the 
capacity to administer widespread change, similarly a public 
service oriented to widespread change may be costly and 
destabilising for a conservative government.
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It could be argued that the coalition government preceding 
Whitlam was not so much intent on preserving the status quo, 
as unable to decide what to do or give direction to the 
bureaucracy as a result of the focus on the leadership of 
the party following Menzies departure. If this scenario is 
correct, the bureaucracy of the early 1970s, without 
government direction for change, would have become oriented 
to preserving the status quo, which also has the advantage 
of reducing the demands for steerage from a disabled 
government. Once working with a new government with a 
mandate for reform, it found itself unable to advise on or 
implement such reform. Like any agency, individual or 
corporate, the public service may have suffered a mismatch 
between what it wished to do and what it could in fact 
achieve: the spirit may have been willing but the flesh was
weak.
The Coombs Report, by focussing on the values of the 
administration and their relation to the instrumental 
operation of the service, represents an important departure 
from the more rigidly legalistic and external focus of 
previous reports, including Kerr's, which did not seriously 
address questions of public service values themselves. My 
argument here is that the managerialist view of the 
bureaucracy, which underlies the Coombs Report and 
subsequent review documents, has a particular conception of 
the way the values of the bureaucracy are realised through 
its instrumental action, and that this differs in key 
respects from the conception of the relation between values 
and instrumental action found in the work of Weber and his 
interpreters with respect to Australian public 
administration.
In summary, there are two main aspects of the new managerial 
view. Firstly, the new managerialism has revalued the 
instrumental action of the public administration. It is
78
profoundly optimistic that a properly managed administration 
can effectively serve the public through implementing the 
will of the democratically elected government, and that good 
public administration per Se is itself good for society.
This runs deeper than the optimism of the human relations 
school because it addresses issues of legitimacy of the 
objectives of the bureaucracy through an ideology of 
participatory democracy.
Secondly, managerialism has changed the way in which public 
service values are operationalised. In many programs, the 
primary locus for the application of values such as equality 
of treatment has shifted from dealings of the bureaucracy 
with individuals to the setting of objectives for target 
groups. This shift is paralleled by a change in the 
contesting of public service decisions by service users from 
disputing decisions made about individuals, to discussions 
over programs between consumer advocates and public service 
managers; discussions that previously were seen to be the 
sole province of the parliamentary arena.
The shift in the operationalisation of public service values
The Coombs Report discusses in some detail the values found 
in the public service, in terms similar to Weber's 
discussion of them but noting their changing role given the 
expansion of public service activities. The elucidation and 
self conscious understanding of these values greatly 
facilitates opening up an active dialogue between 
bureaucrats and consumers in a way that influences public 
sector action. Coombs presents the argument as follows;
"Parliament and its control of the executive and its 
bureaucracy is [not] an adequate expression of the 
democratic rights of the community. Those who hold 
these attitudes advance the counter-principle of
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participation in the processes of government as the 
proper, or at least an important supplementary, 
expression of those rights" (Coombs 1976 p 13)
Coombs is articulating the call for public input to deciding 
what action the public service will pursue to be facilitated 
by the bureaucracy itself, independently to influence 
through the electoral process. He notes this explicitly, 
summarising that there is:
"a growing demand that the governed should participate 
in the work of the governors: that power should be more 
effectively and more widely shared. It is the power of 
the bureaucracy rather than that of Parliament or the 
government to which this demand is primarily 
directed... to the power that officials exercise as 
managers and administrators of programs, services and 
other activities where officials act to a significant 
degree in their own right but also as agents of the 
minister" (Coombs 1976 p 125-126).
He notes that as an adjunct to the greater intrusion into 
community life by the bureaucracy, this participation is 
already occurring in the social welfare field:
"in the field of social welfare, government policy and 
administration have had progressively greater impact on 
the lives of persons, families and communities and this 
has led to more frequent and systematic attempts to 
communicate directly with officials, sometimes by­
passing local members and ministers" (ibid).
In Coombs' view, the greater impact by the administration on 
the lives of people and communities is associated with the 
need to develop greater responsiveness between bureaucrats 
and the public that facilitates this participation:
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"This responsiveness may be reflected both in the 
'style' of administrative behaviour and in the content 
of decisions. On the one hand the official will be 
conscious of the need to perform his task in a more 
open style, to be accessible, to be a good listener, 
and to act as if he considered himself in part directly 
accountable to the community. On the other, it may 
lead him to give undue weight to effectively expressed 
interests at the cost of the interests of the 
inarticulate" (Coombs 1976 p 15).
When this call for responsiveness is applied to the 
provision of services to individuals, it fairly directly 
echoes the operation of the value of eguality found in 
Weber's conception of bureaucracy, resulting in fairness as 
an outcome. However, when this call for responsiveness is 
combined with the growth of program management and an 
orientation to interventions at the level of communities and 
groups, the operation of the value of equality undergoes an 
important shift so that the outcome is equity for the group, 
rather than fair treatment for the individual. In the 
1980s, this has been associated with a change in the central 
concern of senior public servants, always interested in the 
social impact of their department's activities, from policy 
advice to program management:
"The shift from a concern with process and regulation 
to a focus on outputs and resources is transforming the 
character of the APS (a change that is shared with 
public services elsewhere). For the senior public 
service the traditional emphasis on policy advice and 
administration had been replaced by one that seeks to 
elevate management to co-equal, if not greater, 
importance" (Halligan 1988 p 29).
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Weber's bureaucracy placed great store on and drew its 
strength from the value of equality. For Weber, equality of 
treatment of individuals by the bureaucracy underlies the 
legal authority of the state bureaucracy, and contributes to 
the superiority of bureaucratic domination over traditional 
authority. In the marketplace, equality of treatment 
underlies both the legitimacy and the practice of the 
regulation by the state of market exchanges of labour, goods 
and services that are such a pervasive determinant of social 
life in modernity; regulation that could never have been 
achieved through the application of traditional authority.
It has been argued that universalisation of rights and 
equality through citizenship underpins the capitalist mode 
of production (Turner 1986 p 132) .
In the private sphere of the lifeworld, bureaucratic 
authority has been slower to usurp traditional authority, 
but has operationalised the value of equality through the 
burgeoning processes of individuation of people for the 
purposes of collecting taxes from private income, providing 
benefits and services to households, and regulating personal 
(in the sense of non-commercial) activities such as driving 
cars or letting off fireworks.
Weberian bureaucratic action in both the public and the 
private sphere operationalise the value of equality with 
respect to individuals. The managerialist conception of 
bureaucracy incorporates a new mode of operationalisation of 
the value of equality. Specifically, social equity as a 
policy objective operationalises the value of equality with 
respect to communities and ascriptive ("target") groups.
This level of operationalisation is not found in Weber's 
description of bureaucracies. In Australia at least, there 
is as yet little recourse to courts of law for arbitration 
on equity matters. Nevertheless, it has been an important 
part of the managerial reform of the bureaucracy, crucial
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both in gaining the political support of the Labor 
government to introduce managerialist techniques, and for 
shaping the particular implementation of those techniques.
Consumer consultation and reform options
In line with its push to operationalise public service 
values at the level of the community, the Coombs commission 
gave a "high priority" (Coombs 1976 p 127) to examining the 
interaction between the community and the bureaucracy. In 
addition to analysing the written submissions it received on 
this topic, it commissioned community research from the 
Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS) and academic 
research from Sydney University.
On behalf of the commission, ACOSS undertook what came to be 
known as the "ParticipACTION" project (Coombs 1976 p 127), a 
series of public forums with consumers of government 
services. In analysing the consultations, the commission 
made a clear separation between on the one hand the public's 
desire to influence policy and on the other the problems of 
efficient, sensitive service delivery and face to face 
dealings between service staff and the public (Coombs 1976 p 
21) .
The direct consultations with the public were complemented 
with a survey and analysis of interest group access to the 
Commonwealth bureaucracy, carried out by Dr Trevor Matthews, 
then of the Dept of Government at the University of Sydney. 
Matthews defined interest groups as voluntary associations,
"having as one of their major functions the 
articulation of claims based on the interests or shared 
attitudes of their members. Many, in fact, are formed
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specifically to articulate political demands" (Matthews 
1976 p 332).
Matthews classifies Australian interest groups represented 
on Government advisory bodies into producer and non-producer 
groups. The former include union and business associations, 
as well as associations of public authorities and 
professionals. Non-producer groups include consumer, 
environmental, church, ethnic, youth and women's groups. 
Matthews' main finding was that of 243 interest groups 
represented on non-statutory advisory committees, 203 were 
producer groups. He comments
"there is massive over-representation of producers' 
groups - especially groups located in Melbourne, Sydney 
and Canberra - and a gross under-representation of all 
other groups on the advisory committees attached to 
Australian government departments. If committee places 
are considered, the over-representation is even more 
stark" (Matthews 1976 p 341).
What are we to make of this over-representation? The 
Departments of Manufacturing and Industry, Labour and 
Immigration, and Agriculture made extensive use of advisory 
committees, and between them used 151 groups, which "partly 
explains the over representation of producer groups" 
(Matthews 1976 p 341). It could be argued that the over­
representation of producer groups does not unduly effect 
policy outcomes because to a large extent the various 
producer groups balance each other out. A slightly 
different attempt to discount the preponderance of producer 
groups has been proposed in the corporatist literature, 
where it is suggested that consultative bodies mainly 
mediate producer interests, and that consumer interests are 
mediated in the competitive political arena:
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"If we find one form of interest mediation 
(corporatism) established in both England and Australia 
in one area of state activity (that affecting producer 
interests), but a different form (e.g. political 
competition) established in both countries in another 
(affecting consumer interests), then such evidence 
would support the hypothesis that it is the type of 
policy area (and hence the type of interests affected 
by state intervention) that is most important in 
determining the way in which intervention is 
accomplished" (Saunders 1985 p 153).
Saunders goes on to give a number of comparative examples in 
urban service provision from England and Australia that 
"strongly" supports this hypothesis (Ibid p 170). Matthews 
implicitly rejects this horses for courses approach, and not 
only on the basis of the privileged access to decision 
making processes that such arrangements facilitate. He 
notes that membership of representative advisory committees 
is often determined by
"the representation of those whose interests are 
affected by the relevant policies. There is, however, 
one set of 'affected interests' that are overlooked by 
most departments when appointing committee members - 
the interests of the public (e.g. in regard to 
environmental protection), the consumer, and the 
recipient of governmental welfare services... in the 
Department of Social Security, only five groups 
representing welfare clients had places [out of twenty] 
on its advisory committees. As Ernst [1974] shows, 
most associations of welfare recipients are 
dissatisfied at their exclusion from the processes of 
decision-making and policy-making." (Matthews 1976 p 
341) .
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Matthews notes that the ideal of participatory democracy, 
for which he draws on the work of Carole Pateman (1970), is 
hardly achieved by interest group representation on advisory 
committees:
"The giving of advice by an advisory group - even in 
cases where that group's views are truly representative 
of the views of its rank and file members - is a far 
cry from citizens (or people affected by a policy) 
having an equal share in the making of public policy." 
(Matthews 1976 p 142).
However, Matthews clearly sees this as a step in the right 
direction, and recommended that departments be urged to 
actively eliminate the bias against non-producer groups 
(Matthews 1976 p 343). This bias can be "conceived in terms 
of weak, poorly organised or underprivileged groups being 
kept away from the corporatist hearth" (Grant 1985 p 28). 
Precisely because they do not produce things for economic 
exchange, non-producer groups "lack the socio-economic 
leverage of producer groups" (Matthews 1976 p 344). Given 
the possibilities for "groups who are organised, active and 
persistent" (Dahl 1967 p 38, quoted in Matthews 1976 p 364) 
to lobby and influence government decisions, the 
impossibility for many consumer groups to make a substantial 
impact becomes clear:
"The problem is that many important interests are in 
fact unorganised and inactive, and lack determination 
and persistence; e.g. the aged, the poor, the 
chronically ill, Aborigines, and certain migrant 
groups. These interests tend to be ruled out of, or 
are only marginally included in the pluralist balancing 
process. This also applies to certain general 
interests (e.g. clean air, an aesthetic environment,
86
conservation, a good public transport system) that are 
poorly organised, if at all." (Matthews 1976 p 346).
Matthews identifies two factors that must be overcome if the 
lobbying potential of consumer groups is to be increased to 
a level where real impact on policies can be achieved. 
Firstly, the lack of resources, including both money and 
knowledge, of consumer interest groups is a problem:
"their frequently small and unstable memberships cause 
them to be chronically short of money; this in turn 
makes it difficult to undertake research, prepare 
technically competent submissions, travel to Canberra, 
engage the services of a professional lobbyist, or to 
develop a skilled secretariat. Many such groups - 
particularly of the poor - are also ignorant of the 
administrative system and do not have bureaucratic 
contacts in Canberra." (Matthews 1976 p 344)
In order to overcome this, he then recommended that such 
groups should be financially supported by the government in 
the public interest:
"Financial assistance should be given to citizens' 
groups that... represent certain interests deemed 
worthy of support; especially of the economically and 
socially deprived and of the public at large" (Matthews 
1976 p 364) .
The second problem is a lack of access consumer groups have 
to decision making processes, and their lack of political 
clout for demanding such access:
"the difficulties some groups have in seeking access 
are increased by the lack of sympathy on the part of 
departmental officials; especially if they perceive the
interest groups as having no political weight." 
(Matthews 1976 p 344).
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To overcome this, Matthews recommended that an explicit 
direction to consult be given by the government to the 
bureaucracy:
"Officials should be reguired actively to solicit the 
views of affected citizens who would otherwise be 
unrepresented." (Matthews 1976 p 364).
The Coombs Report itself notes that while governmental 
direction must play a part in improving consultation, the 
bureaucracy itself will help to shape this direction:
"In the end, the official must be guided by the weight 
his minister attaches to various forms of 
participation, but in turn it should be recognised that 
in making a judgment the minister will be influenced by 
departmental advice and that, in practice, much will be 
left to decisions by officials themselves." (Coombs 
1976 p 126).
I discussed the guestion of the political nature of the 
bureaucracy's role in consultation with Terry Slater, a 
senior executive in DCSH. He articulated the role of the 
official as follows, making explicit reference to the 
political nature of advice to government about likely 
outcomes of consumer consultation:
It is important that government officials be able to 
understand what the will of the government of the day 
is and be able to translate that into appropriate 
policies and appropriate practices and procedures...
And to be able to give good advice about the impact of 
those things. Now it is in that latter that you get a
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little closer to what is called political advice and in 
that sense, the power, the strength, the views, and the 
likely outcomes of discussions with advocates or 
lobbyists are quite crucial to judge” (Slater 
interview).
Slater's account is outcome oriented, noting that judgements 
about consumer lobby groups are crucial to judge for the 
development and implementation of policies. Coombs 
expresses this engagement between the bureaucracy and 
consumer groups in value terms, noting that the concern with 
political support and responsiveness is central to the 
transformation of the notion of accountability in a public 
administration that would become increasingly concerned with 
equity of outcomes:
"an official should see it as proper to be 'responsive' 
to those who seek to participate... behaving in effect 
as if his accountability to the minister required also, 
as does the minister's, an accountability directly to 
the community." (Coombs 1976 p 126-127).
Chapter five below discusses recent debate on this subject 
and concludes that a management commitment to consultation 
is necessary if the competing values of efficiency and 
equity are to be reconciled. The Coombs report hints at the 
final step necessary to make consultation worthwhile, namely 
actually responding to the demands of consumer advocacy in a 
way that is satisfactory to the advocates and directly 
accountable to them. However it does not overtly make this 
link, and has been criticised on this count:
"the Commission's response to likely charges of 
tokenism is feeble and misses the point.
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"You will not appease a Council of Social Service or a 
resident action group, or an environmental lobby merely 
by listening to them, or even, in the words of the 
report, by demonstrating 'a willingness to take full 
account of what has been said, to respond to it or to 
obtain ministerial responses in appropriate cases'. 
These courtesies are a pre-requisite for satisfactory 
communication; but they will not deflect claims for 
more power sharing." (Hazelhurst 1977 p 131-132).
The underlying basis for the tokenism Hazelhurst fears is 
that consultation for consultation's sake could lead merely 
to an open form of passing the buck as the main legitimate 
form of response. Within the ideal type of bureaucracy 
described by Coombs, in what amounts to a backing off from 
any serious challenge to the notion of the operational 
supremacy of parliamentary power over the bureaucracy, it 
remains the case that the buck may never stop.
Managerial reform in the 1980s
The Coombs report contains and provoked many debates about 
public service reform that were germane to the new 
managerialism. The remainder of the chapter examines 
several aspects of reform in the 1980s. Particular emphasis 
is given in the discussion to financial aspects of reform
The actual implementation of the new managerial reform in 
the 1980s can be seen as beginning with the Review of 
Commonwealth Administration chaired by J.B. Reid that 
reported to the Fraser Liberal Government in 1983 (Reid 
1983). This review recommended the continuing 
implementation of Coombs' proposal for decentralisation of 
budgetary control:
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"central agencies should place less emphasis on their 
detailed control activities and devote more of their 
energies to their role as a source of advice and 
guidance to departmental managers" (Reid 1983 p xvi).
This was to be progressed through the promotion of 
managerial reform by the central agencies. For example, it 
was recommended that the Public Service Board:
"should concentrate more on management improvement and 
review in its statutory role of promoting efficiency in 
management of departments" (ibid).
The private sector was identified as a source for innovation 
in management. Reid recognised the differences between 
public and private sectors including: the absence of
profitability as a bottom line in the public sector, 
although he noted that "some tasks are difficult to measure 
in both sectors" (ibid p 14); difficulties of priority 
setting given the political environment the public sector 
operated within; and problems of trying to measure much of 
the public sector's work (ibid p 14 - 15). The lessons to 
be learned from the private sector were more about 
management style than corporate accounting:
"[The] key thrusts of this Report which have their 
relationship to similarities in the private sector are 
the need for improved leadership... more devolution of 
managerial authority... increased cost 
consciousness... evaluation of performance against 
approved goals... [and] appropriate use of modern 
technology" (ibid p 15).
The Reid report specifically recommended the government 
introduce a Financial Management Improvement Plan 
(Recommendation 16(a) p xxiv) that was to be directed at
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financial management in the spending departments. The 
report recognised that during the decade to 1982 there had 
been an increase in scrutiny of expenditures, coupled with 
changes to the accounting and reporting practices of the 
central departments, notably the Department of Finance:
"[There has been] greatly increased scrutiny of the 
Administration - through a wide range of reviews 
including Parliamentary Committees, other inquiry 
mechanisms [and] the rapidly proliferating framework of 
administrative law" (ibid p xiv).
The proliferation of administrative law relates to the 
implementation of the Kerr review. Reid saw these changes 
to the practices of the central agencies, listed in Appendix 
four of his report, as adequate:
"The Commonwealth's efforts to upgrade its control, 
budgetary and financial systems are to be commended... 
we have no proposals for further change in those 
systems" (ibid p 62).
Reid clearly saw the spending departments as the main 
targets for reform:
"we are convinced there is a need for reform in the way 
in which financial management is carried on within 
departments (ibid).
A Financial Management Improvement Plan was to be piloted 
within two or three departments, with the Department of 
Finance taking a coordinating role (ibid p 73). This was 
dovetailed in the report with recommendations to introduce 
program budgeting, including program statements to be 
provided by departments and program appropriations to be 
provided in the budget (ibid p 63).
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Reid reported to Prime Minister Fraser in January 1983. 
Fraser lost government in the Federal election later that 
year. The incoming Hawke Labor government however endorsed 
many of the central thrusts of the Reid report in "Reforming 
the Australian Public Service - a statement of the 
Government's intentions" (RAPS) published in December 1983. 
This noted supportively that
"Action has been taken to develop the Review of 
Commonwealth Administration recommendation for a 
financial management improvement program" (Dawkins 1983 
p 30) .
Further, there was to be a move toward program budgetting on 
both the expenditure and the appropriation side of the 
budget (ibid). These proposals were actively pursued over 
the subseguent years. The introduction of program 
management was driven by the Department of Finance, which by 
1989 had
"progressively become less involved in detail and 
changed its financial management controls to promote 
greater responsibility for operating departments and 
greater incentives for managers" (Hawke 1989 p 10).
Finance shifted its emphasis from controlling line 
expenditures to controlling financial management structures, 
and through this to uncovering the outcomes peripheral 
department expenditure was directed towards. By December 
1988, Finance was able to report that half of the 18 
Commonwealth departments and three statutory authorities had 
achieved the following Financial Management Improvement 
Program and Program Budgeting indicators:
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- A corporate management and staffing structure with 
corporate plan;
- Program structure approved by their Minister, with 
program and subprogram descriptions, objectives, and 
performance indicators for efficiency and effectiveness 
linked to budget estimates; and
Organisation structures that reflect the program 
structure, with devolved control over expenditure 
(Dept of Finance 1988 p 19).
Another major aspect of reform was the shift toward flatter 
structures. This was first proposed for the APS by the 
Public Service Board under the chairmanship of Dr Wilenski, 
and was later to underpin the Machinery of Government 
changes introduced following the Hawke Government's re- 
election in 1987:
"The Public Service Board's original contribution to 
management improvement was the flatter structures 
project. It was inspired by the Government's reform 
program (although it was not proposed by RAPS). It 
represented an attempt at "pioneering organisational 
design development". Reducing the number of layers 
could also increase the span of control, but devolution 
was expected to assist with that. The evidence 
favouring flatter structures drew heavily upon the 
private sector" (Halligan 1988 p 49).
Reform and the framework for consumer consultation
An important aspect of the reforms is that consultation with 
citizens, consumers and consumer advocacy groups has to a 
large extent been brought within the program format.
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"Involve the providers and users of supported 
accommodation in giving advice on the priorities and 
management of the programme" (ibid p 127); and
"Involvement of relevant community organisations in the 
development of government policies and strategies, and 
in the management and delivery of AIDS-related 
services" (ibid p 137).
In contrast to the Labour Platform and the Coombs Report, 
the reports of the 1980s on the implementation of program 
management make virtually no reference to consumer 
consultation. However, this surfaces again in a range of 
Departmental reports and working documents. For example, 
the DCSH Management Plan 1988 - 1989 includes the following:
"coordinate the development of all major cross program 
issues such as "access and eguity" and "user rights" " 
as a "major direction" of its corporate management 
program;
"effective representation by national peak non­
government bodies, consumer and service provider groups 
in the welfare and housing sectors" as a performance 
indicator; and a
"Review of consultative processes - in particular the 
aged" as a "priority initiative" (DCSH 1988).
Further examples include the series of access and eguity 
reports produced by the Office of Multicultural Affairs in 
the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, the extensive 
consultation undertaken in the Cass review of Social 
Security, and the consultation process in the development of 
the National HIV/AIDS Strategy (AIDS White Paper) (DCSH 1989 
p 4 - 5).
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This chapter has traced the history of the introduction of 
managerialism into the APS. It began by examining the shift 
in the reform agenda from a tightening of controls over 
legal authority to a concern for the culture, values and 
organisational form of the APS. The Coombs Report marks the 
beginning of a reinstauration of values in the APS, 
including a revaluation of the instrumental potential of the 
APS, and a change in the operationalisation of the public 
service value of equality to encompass equity of social 
outcome as an objective of program expenditures. Coombs 
also focussed on the importance and practice of consumer 
consultation in reform of the APS.
The final part of the chapter briefly traced the 
implementation of managerial reform in the 1980s including 
the transfer of managerial styles from the private sector, 
the implementation of the Financial Management Improvement 
Plan and Program Budgeting, and the change towards flatter 
organisational structures. Although these reforms were not 
per se concerned with facilitating consumer consultation, 
they did recast the framework for consultation into program 
management terms. This has been reflected in the wording of 
the ALP Platform's commitment to consumer consultation and 
in various plans and reports in the major welfare areas of 
the APS. The next chapter examines the impact of these 
managerial reforms on the consumer advocacy groups who 
consult with the Commonwealth government.
Chapter 4
The transformation of consumer advocacy organisations
Community or consumer organisations ?
This is the last of three chapters reviewing managerial 
reform at the level of the organisation. The last two 
chapters have mentioned in passing the implications of 
various reform measures for consumer consultation. This 
chapter focuses on the impact of managerial reform on the 
organisation of community groups themselves.
A point to note at the outset is the tendency encouraged by 
managerialism to emphasise the consumer nature of community 
groups, who are seen as representing "consumers" of 
government funded welfare services, and are accorded 
legitimacy in the policy formulation process on that basis. 
Throughout this thesis I have used the terms community group 
and consumer advocacy group somewhat interchangably. What 
difference there is in the use of these two terms relates to 
on the one hand whether the discussion is focussing on a 
theoretical issue relating to consumer advocacy or community 
action, or on the other if the discussion is focussing on an 
historical entity which would refer to itself as either a 
community group or a consumer group.
Consumer advocacy organisations with a focus on government 
policy have thrived under Labor in the 1980s because of 
positive policies to encourage such groups. The down side 
of this is that the groups have very much the access to 
decision making processes allowed to them by government, and 
not a great deal more. The processes by which this access 
is opened up, channelled and restricted are many and varied. 
The central argument of this chapter is that in the 1980s, 
access has essentially been controlled by the methods that
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are available within the new managerial framework. While 
this is associated with some positive results in the actual 
lobbying power of consumer groups, it has also introduce 
tensions concerning their methods of representation and the 
nature of their constituencies. These tensions affect their 
operation in the political arena.
The first part of the chapter discusses the way the 
bureaucracy tends to create or encourage consumer groups in 
its own image. Financial controls characteristic of the new 
managerialism have been imposed on the consumer groups who 
receive government grants. The divisional and branch 
structure of several departments has been partially mirrored 
in the consumer organisations sector. The bureaucracy has 
taken clearly identifiable action to develop and streamline 
this state of affairs.
The second part of the chapter discusses managerialist 
reform within consumer organisations themselves.
Analytically we can distinguish two cross cutting directions 
of these reforms. Firstly, managerialism has transformed 
the funding, structure and operation of many organisations. 
Secondly, advocacy itself has frequently made use of a 
managerialist framework, with the initiative for this coming 
from both consumer and government representatives at various 
times.
The final part of the chapter discusses the implications for 
consumer advocacy groups of the argument mounted in the last 
chapter, that the managerialist discourse represents a 
change in the operationalisation of the value of equality 
by the bureaucracy in a way that emphasises equity of 
outcome for social groups through program expenditures. It 
is argued that consumer advocacy groups experience tensions 
in their relationship with the state. This tension arises 
from the different interpretations of representation found
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in the political arena, which operates on the basis of equal 
rights, and in the new managerial bureaucracy, which 
operates on the basis of equity of outcomes.
The organisation and funding of consumer groups
In the second half of the 1980s, Commonwealth government 
support for consumer organisations has been incorporated 
into a program format. As with the bulk of Commonwealth 
expenditures, funds provided to consumer groups are now 
identified as expenditures against particular programs. 
Funding can include expenditure from grant programs, 
consultancy funds or commissioned activities in support of 
specific projects of a government agency. Alternatively, 
funds may be provided directly to an organisation for its 
secretariat in recognition of the benefit to society of 
supporting that organisation. The majority of such grants 
are provided through the Community Organisations Support 
Program (COSP), a program of DCSH.
Correspondingly, the funds may be untied with respect to 
outcomes whilst remaining tied to particular secretariat 
expenditure such as salaries, rent and travel; or they may 
be tied to particular expected outcomes such as a research 
project, a community education project or the provision of 
particular services. There has been a gradual contraction 
of secretariat funding in the last few years, with grant 
increases failing to keep pace with inflation as an 
efficiency dividend was extracted from the funding, as it 
was across the board in the wake of the machinery of 
government changes. However this has been more than offset 
by increases in project funding. This can be interpreted as 
a trend to shift funding from the former untied grants to 
the latter type of tied funding. This shift is similar to 
the trend described in the German literature away from
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funding with agreements about accountability based on 
processes and toward "final programs" as the basis for 
funding (Offe 1984 p 110, discussed in chapter seven below).
In some cases this has resulted in a changed structure for 
the organisation, with the development of a smaller core of 
staff supported by the untied funds, and the addition of 
project staff with the tied funds, which are generally 
provided for a particular year. The Jenkins report on 
funding peak health and community organisations found that 
"single year funding hinders recruitment and retention of 
quality staff" (Jenkins 1991 p 56). These staff may be 
drawn from different sectors of the labour market: 
secretariat staff from the sector the organisation works 
within; project staff with expertise in project management 
from the professional sector. This can result in industrial 
tensions in organisations with a poor industrial relations 
record in situations where the good will has worn thin (an 
analogy could be drawn with trade union secretariats).
The new managerialism is also being taken up by 
organisations in the way they operate. Some of the larger 
organisations have already adopted many of the managerial 
techniques from the public sector, and are leading a climate 
change in that direction for non-government organisations. 
This change is being strongly encouraged by the bureaucracy 
and the Parliament. I asked the secretary of the House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Community Affairs 
(Jenkins' committee), Bjarne Nordin, about this during the 
committee's inquiry into funding peak organisations:
"PD: Have you noticed a strong handling of
managerial issues by the community organisations?
BN: That does vary. Some of the smaller
organisations obviously haven't thought very much about
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those kinds of issues yet, although they've been 
stimulated by this enquiry to start thinking along 
those lines. Some of the very large organisations have 
obviously thought a lot about that, and they were quite 
impressive.
PD: Do you think that the enquiry is going to be used
to further the introduction of managerialism into 
community organisations?
BN: I would think so, even if its not at the direct
instigation of the committee through its report. I 
think it's an inevitable development anyway because 
it's the way the climate's developing. I think that 
the department certainly expects that now, and that 
organisations are starting to realise that unless they 
move in that direction life's going to be made 
increasingly difficult for them." (Nordin interview).
Indeed, the Jenkins committee recommended that grants to 
secretariats conform to the financial management improvement 
plan:
"[Grants] should be subject to comprehensive annual 
accountability requirements... (including) assessment 
of success in meeting stated objectives in the form of 
outcome measures, and a forward plan." (Jenkins 1991 p 
69) .
Further, the Jenkins committee pointed to the value of the 
managerial framework as a basis for communication between 
funded organisations and the bureaucracy. Its formulation 
of this demonstrates the close relationship between the 
concepts of consultation and accountability:
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"Day to day relationships between the Department and 
organisations are important... DCSH has an obligation 
to consult and seek the views of funded organisations.
"Where communication does break down between 
organisations and the Department it is important to 
resolve such difficulties at an early stage. An 
appropriate early warning system may be the required 
documentation about an organisation's performance in 
meeting its stated objectives, which would be provided 
to the Department in the form of outcome measures on an 
annual basis." (Jenkins 1991 p 69-70).
The incorporation of consumer group funding into a program 
format has been paralleled by a transformation of the 
relations between consumer groups. These relations include 
their various demarcations about membership of subsidiary 
organisations, their cross membership arrangements, their 
service activities and above all what constitutes their 
subject matter for public comment and official consultation. 
There is a tendency for the various groups to come to 
reflect the structure of the bureaucracy itself. The match 
in the DCSH between various divisions and branches and their 
corresponding consumer organisation is particularly 
startling. The following list shows the name of the 
division or branch with its corresponding NGO (a listing of 
all community organisations funded by the DCSH can be found 
in the Jenkins report chapter one):
Housing division: Shelter 
Supported accommodation branch: NYCH 
Health care division: CHF
Disability Services branch: ACROD and DPI 
Aged care branch: ACOTA 
Children's services branch: AECA 
Drugs of dependence branch: ADFA 
AIDS branch: AFAO
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The Bureaucracy plays an active role in encouraging the 
development of this reflective structure in what amounts to 
a major exersise in political design. Offe, in his 
discussion of the attribution of public status to interest 
groups, notes that interest representation:
"tends to become predominantly a matter of 'political 
design' and thus, in part, a dependent rather than an 
independent variable in public policy making" (Offe 
1985 p 223).
In West Germany, the Christian Democratic Party even went so 
far as to proclaim in its platform that such political 
design work should be an important regulatory activity of 
the state:
"the democratic state is called upon to establish a 
framework regulating both the internal organization and 
the external activities of social groups" (quoted in 
Offe 1985 p 234).
Offe proposes that the reason for this lies in the need for 
the state to provide relevant policies and programs to 
maintain social stability and the legitimacy of the state, 
and the positive input community groups can make in the 
development of such policies:
"such representative organisations are absolutely 
indispensable for public policy, because they have a 
monopoly of information relevant for public policy and, 
most important, a substantial measure of control over 
their respective constituencies. Therefore they must 
be made integral components of the mechanisms through 
which public policy is formulated. Their potential
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positive function is as significant as their potential 
for obstruction" (Offe 1985 p 230).
An alternative formulation of the desire to control the 
potential for obstruction could be that government and 
bureaucracy foster managerial planning and accountability 
amongst community groups so as to restrict their autonomous 
operation, thus reducing their potential to disrupt the 
operation of the state. This would accord with the notion 
in systems theory that actors (including organisations) in 
complex systems seek to limit the uncertainty in the system 
- in this case the reactive potential of consumer 
organisations - so as to facilitate strategic goal 
achievement by the bureaucracy (for discussion of the drive 
to reduce uncertainty, see Touraine 1989 p 9 and Yeatman 
1990a p 155).
I discussed the issue of government control over advocacy 
groups through funding provision with Louise Sylvan, a 
director of the Australian Consumers Association, and former 
executive director of the Consumers Health Forum:
"PD: For consumer advocacy organisations, are there
any tensions due to receiving government funds and then 
trying to lobby the government? Do you compromise 
yourself?
LS: I don't know that we compromise ourselves. We
become more conscious about what we say. You weigh, 
you balance the costs and benefits of what you are 
about to say, in terms of the outcome that you want.
PD: In a situation where you are lobbying for a
particular issue, not for your own funding, does the 
fact that you are government funded come into that in a 
direct way?
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LS: I think I would actually put it the other way.
The government that is in power at any given time which 
is funding an organisation can behave improperly 
towards what is, in essence, a non party political 
group and it can demand support for something, some 
initiatives or battles that they are involved in, where 
the group might be extremely reluctant, and wouldn't 
do that normally. So I think there can be pressure of 
that kind which of course raises for the organisations 
some decision making issues.
But as to from the other side, if it really changes 
things when you are lobbying on a particular issue. I 
think not, in the more sophisticated organisations." 
(Sylvan interview).
In Australia, the explanation for the shaping of community 
advocacy groups by the government is I believe due to three 
main factors. Firstly the state has a need for input to 
policy formation processes, as noted by Offe. The 
government can closely control the level of impact an 
advocacy organisation has in this process. Secondly - and 
this may actually have more influence over the actual extent 
and structure of the financial support provided - the 
bureaucracy and the government have a genuine commitment to 
accountability for expenditure of public funds (a commitment 
fostered through fear of electoral backlash against 
perceived mismanagement of public monies). Thirdly, the 
pervasive influence of the managerial model of 
accountability has meant that it is the tool at hand when 
government and departments seek to impose such 
accountability. This has been implemented through the 
various government programs and this explains the mirror 
image between the intergroup relations and the bureaucratic 
program structure.
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From this reading, the intended effect of the imposition of 
the managerial framework for government support of community 
organisation, namely to improve public perceptions of 
accountability, probably occurs to a considerable extent. 
This explanation is consistent with the reference of the 
recent review of such arrangements to a parliamentary 
committee sensitive to such perceptions, rather than 
limiting it to the bureaucracy, which has less avenues 
available to it for swaying public perceptions. In 
addition, to the extent that the groups are consulted, 
public policy is probably made more workable and more 
relevant. The unintended effects of such changes, and the 
effects hoped for, but not planned for - for example on 
outcomes of programs, or on eliminating disruptive campaigns 
by the groups - are diverse and contingent.
The operation of consumer groups
Because the government has committed the bureaucracy to 
consultation, funding has been provided to consumer 
organisations to develop this form of representation in many 
policy development exercises. These include among many 
others the social security review conducted by the 
Department of Social Security headed by Bettina Cass during 
the late 1980s, the development of the National HIV/AIDS 
Strategy released in 1989, the reviews being carried out by 
into housing (the National Housing Strategy headed by 
Merideth Edwards) and health care (the National Health 
Strategy headed by Jenny Maklin) initiated in 1990, the 
review of the Home and Community Care Program carried out by 
Anna Yeatman (see DCSH 1988b) and the review of the 
therapeutic goods act that led to the new act being 
introduced in 1989 (see Sylvan interview). The Jenkins 
report found that "Consultation with these [peak health and
community] organisations has increased in recent years" 
(Jenkins 1991 p 4). The ACOTA submission noted that:
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"the consultation processes established and initiated 
by the Department of Community Services and Health have 
become increasingly extensive. From an uncertain and 
limited start, however, consultative processes have... 
generally led to informed policy and program 
development based on direct, relevant and immediate 
information." (Jenkins 1991 p 4).
This expansion of funding and consultation has been coupled 
with the introduction of managerialism into consumer 
organisations as discussed above. This has occurred through 
public service managers reguiring consumer organisations to 
use the terms and techniques of managerialism in their 
dealings with the public service. This has had the positive 
effect of forcing the organisations to articulate what they 
want to achieve and justify their actions against these 
goals, with the potential to jolt them out of patterns of 
action that have developed historically but without a clear 
purpose:
"What the new managers in the public sector have done 
is to require their way of thinking about how you 
manage tasks, how you manage programs, how you manage 
the whole of your work. It has required a 
sophisticated response from the consumer sector in 
precisely the same terms as is set by the managers in 
government. You set objectives, you do this and that, 
then you evaluate it.
It has a positive feature in that people do actually 
have to think about corporate objectives from a 
consumer perspective for their organisations, and then 
they have to think through how best to achieve those,
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or at least to debate how best to achieve those, and 
then translate that into money. Now from the point of 
view of actually evaluating success or failure in some 
of these areas, its actually positive to force a small 
community group, or even a big community group, to go 
through those sorts of exercises rather than digging 
holes in precisely the same spot as they would be wont 
to do without the imposition of defending the money 
they are given.” (Sylvan interview).
However, this requirement for planning imposed by the 
bureaucracy stifles the capacity of the organisation to 
react in situations that are important for it but not 
covered by the plan. Such reactions can be strait-jacketed 
by the terms of the plan:
"a lot of what these organisations do has a major 
reactive and unplanned component. What you end up 
doing, at least what I found I ended up doing from the 
CHF, was forcing those issues into a definitional 
framework which put them within the stated objectives. 
That is not that hard to do, but conceptually may be a 
straight jacket that isn't that useful in the long run.
"At the CHF we defined that an important objective for 
us was achieving our rational drug policy for 
Australia, which led to us producing the National Drug 
Policy document. And a whole lot of things which 
probably should have been under other headings of our 
work got stuck under that because that is where we 
could fit them, that is where we defended them. So it 
channels your thinking and not necessarily in a good 
way." (Sylvan interview).
The discussion so far has focussed on the way managerialism 
has influenced the operation of consumer groups. From the
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reverse point of view, consumer groups have adopted 
managerialist and economic rationalist rhetoric in their 
lobbying to change the operation of the government and 
bureaucracy. Louise Sylvan commented that during the 1990 
Federal election campaign,
"one had a body in the CHF arguing for a national 
health insurance system and arguing that on very 
conservative economic grounds. In fact that was one of 
the bases that it argued from because it was arguing to 
two conservative parties. One clear effect of the new 
managerialism is it has changed the politicians. As 
leaders we have now got economic managers and that has 
undoubtedly changed the way in which one debates an 
issue." (Sylvan interview).
Managerialism, and the dominance of economic rationalism in 
public sector debate more broadly, has changed the way that 
consumer groups present their case to government and the 
bureaucracy. However, it has also changed the type of case 
the consumer groups put to governments, to include a 
consumer oriented view within an economic analysis:
The CHF argued about Medicare and private insurance on 
the basis of an industry analysis... we argued about 
the inefficiency of the private sector, about the 
lobbying going on for a number of large U.S. 
corporations, and the costs to the efficiency of the 
private sector vis a vis its exports when they have a 
major private insurer attached to them. We argued 
all sorts of things that 10 years ago we never would 
have argued. You add to your "government has a 
responsibility to the poor people" case, you undertake 
analyses that are guite different from what we have 
done previously, and you actually do argue a different 
sort of case." (Sylvan interview).
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It would be simplistic to describe the new sort of case as 
merely an expression of economic rationalism. More 
accurately, it is an expression of a traditional orientation 
to social emancipation expressed in economic rationalist 
terms. This may be problematic, but is does not amount to a 
change in or denial of the social values espoused by the 
advocacy groups.
Politics, policy and representation
This chapter so far has examined the impact of managerialism 
on the organisation of the community sector involved in 
lobbying on welfare policy, and on the internal operation of 
these groups. This examination has required a discussion of 
more general issues about the interaction of the state and 
community groups. I have argued that the new managerialism 
has had a profound effect on consumer advocacy organisations 
in two main ways. Firstly, it has transformed the internal 
organisation of the groups and on their relations with each 
other and the bureaucracy, so that the consumer sector comes 
to mirror the program format of large tracts of the 
bureaucracy. Secondly, management techniques and the 
culture of economic management in the public sector have 
influenced the way these organisations operate, the way they 
conduct their advocacy and the type of things they concern 
themselves with.
I would like now to consider the implications for consumer 
advocacy of the change from equality to equity in public 
administration that was discussed in the previous chapter. 
The following discussion looks at the tensions faced by 
consumer advocacy organisations due to the various modes of 
representation they adopt as they participate in
Ill
governmental politics and the processes of public policy 
formation.
Consumer organisations have a traditional relationship to 
government and the parties competing for government. In 
Australia the groups have in general adopted a supportive 
stance toward the Labor party and have actively participated 
in policy development whilst it was in opposition. The 
Labor party in government has been more responsive to the 
organisations than the Liberal coalition in government 
before it, because it is more sympathetic to the review and 
development of welfare policy. Since the election of the 
Labor government in 1983 this has been reflected in a 
changed government attitude and responsiveness toward the 
groups. Louise Sylvan noted that with different parties in 
power,
"What does change is your level of impact depending on 
how that government sees that particular group... I 
think [ACOSS] have much more power in their lobbying 
when it is a Labor Government which might be said to be 
more sympathetic to welfare concerns than perhaps the 
Liberal Party has become. So they can be more 
effective under Labor, and are seen to be more 
effective, than they would be under an opposing 
government. Now that must influence the way a body 
reacts I would think, both publicly and with its 
funding submissions." (Sylvan interview).
The Labor party has made use of community based groups for 
policy development whilst in opposition and in government. 
One interesting debate that took place in the early 1980s in 
Australia was whether state funded welfare benefits should 
be provided universally, as was supposedly the case in 
Scandinavia, or be targeted to specific groups, through 
means testing or some other form of targetting. Groups such
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as ACOSS and the Brotherhood of St Lawrence weighed up the 
popular appeal, lack of stigmatisation and administrative 
simplicity of universal benefits against the smaller scale, 
more tightly controlled approach of targeted benefits.
These debates were replicated in Labor party forums, often 
with the same participants. This particular policy debate 
goes to the heart of the difference between policies based 
on equality of treatment and policies based on equity of 
outcome. The targeted, equity based approach was adopted by 
the Labor party, and has formed the basis for reform of 
social welfare in Australia since their election to 
government in 1983. It represents a major point of 
articulation between the socialist ideology of the Labor 
party and its recent enthusiasm for managerialism.
In health policy, the introduction of universal health 
insurance through the public purse (namely Medicare) and the 
removal of tax rebates for health insurance was also, 
somewhat paradoxically, a manifestation of the shift in 
welfare programs away from universal benefits toward 
equitably targeted benefits. The key to this paradox is 
that equity in health policy refers to the distribution of 
health services to those who are in need of treatment.
Those who do not need treatment do not receive Medicare 
benefits, just as in the targeted old age pension 
arrangements, those who do not need income support do not 
receive social security benefits.
The result of these developments during the 1980s has been 
the transformation of the structure of consumer advocacy 
groups toward organisations focussing on various target 
groups and on ascriptive characteristics of consumers. This 
reflects the way policy debates are framed in the public 
arena, related to the development of bureaucratic 
involvement in policy making processes from a principal 
concern with equality of treatment of citizens, to include
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goals of social equity through selective public sector 
action. This paradigm for policy debates has less to do 
with the dominance of economic rationalism as with the more 
pervasive shift in metaphors of social analysis toward a 
structural social perspective and away from an individualist 
perspective. The culture of equity based policy development 
works to incorporate representations of interests according 
to ascriptive analysis in the policy development process. 
Consumer groups are encouraged to represent in policy 
debates the interests or needs of various ascriptive 
categories of consumers.
In distinction to this, and irrespective of which particular 
party is in government, the mode of interaction with 
political parties is based on representing the concerns of 
voters. The politician evaluates the action of the group on 
the basis of the number of citizens represented and the 
likelihood of gaining their electoral support. For 
participation in the political processes of the democratic 
tradition, representation of interests is expected to be 
based on participatory processes. These processes are not 
easily compatible with the analytical representation 
encouraged for policy development. Indeed, if the 
recommendations of a consumer group commenting on a policy 
review become significant within the political arena, the 
standard line of attack is not to examine the reasons behind 
the recommendation, but to expose the limited role played by 
representative processes in the formulation of the 
recommendation. The Jenkins report addressed this problem 
by considering the accountability of consumer organisations 
- as I have argued above, accountability was a central 
concept in motivating the report - in relation to the 
authenticity of advice. It concluded that the key issue was 
open elections:
"The Department stated that it is not always clear 
exactly whom each organisation represents...
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"Accountability to members and constituents of funded 
organisations is of major concern to the Committee, 
especially for larger organisations with a 
representative role, which purport to act as a mediator 
between the Government and constituents in a particular 
sector. It is critical that such organisations 
genuinely represent their constituencies in order to be 
able to deliver authentic advice to Government.
"To a large extent, accountability to constituencies 
will depend on the structures and practices put in 
place for representativeness. The key issue is open 
elections. Other important mechanisms are involvement 
in policy making and reporting back" (Jenkins 1991 p 
44) .
In the following table I have set out two dimensions of the 
relationship that consumer organisations have with the 
state. The scheme is meant as an ideal type, with the 



















Table 2: Relationships of consumer organisations.
In summary, I am arguing that within the public bureaucracy, 
managerialism is associated with the larger trend whereby 
the concern for equality associated with political 
citizenship has developed into a concern with equity as 
achieving equality of outcomes. However the political arena 
of government, tied as it is to the voting electorate where 
all citizens' votes count equally, has not changed in this 
way. For consumer organisations with relationships to the 
state at both levels, both forms of representation have been 
developed:
"what those bodies tend to do is to try to get a 
sufficiently large membership base and communications 
structure with that membership base. Alongside this 
membership base is a consultative base. There is also 
a set of policies which are developed and written down, 
so there are policy books to which one can refer as 
stated policy of the organisation, and people can 
debate that at annual general meetings and that sort of 
thing" (Sylvan interview).
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The membership base participates in policy making processes 
such as annual general meetings, which set down a written 
framework for policy advocacy. However, the cut and thrust 
of advocacy itself requires far more detail and 
sophistication than such policies can contain, and much 
quicker response times than such forums are capable of. The 
consultative structure provides this detail and 
responsiveness:
"What has tended to happen in both AFCO and CHF and I 
believe ACOSS as well is that there are key designated 
people the director can ring to get a feel for whether 
they should respond and the nature of response. So I 
think that is the way the tension is resolved. And 
sometimes mistakes are made. People say things that 
the rest of the movement would not adhere to at the end 
of the day." (Sylvan interview)
In Marshall's terms, consumer advocacy groups face a tension 
over their mode of operation between expectations placed on 
them by the state for equality based representation as the 
implementation of political rights and equity based 
representation for the development of welfare rights.
Turner has pointed out that in relation to these two types 
of rights, the state has on the one hand, in relation to 
political and civil rights, encouraged the universalisation 
of citizenship, reducing the recognition of ascriptive 
characteristics; and on the other hand, in relation to 
welfare rights, encouraged the individuation of welfare 
consumers through a process of assigning increasing layers 
of ascriptive criteria:
"One consequence of the development of universalistic 
forms of citizenship has been the gradual liquidation 
of ascriptive definitions of the person since gender,
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age and ethnicity become progressively irrelevant for 
the continuity of capitalist production... At the same 
time in order to provide services on a universalistic 
basis the state intervenes in society and the result is 
a bureaucratic individuation of the individual” (Turner 
1986a p 132).
It is not necessary for Turner's argument that services be 
provided on a universalistic basis. The capitalist mode of 
production encourages the universalisation of people as 
labour power. Complementary to this, the state in its 
assignment of rights, and its social intervention to uphold 
them, also encourages the universalisation of citizenship. 
However, as a key contradiction, the provision of welfare 
services (supported by capital holders because of the 
economic and social stability they provide, and by citizens 
as potential beneficiaries) has led the state to install 
mechanisms of individuation, and to conduct policy debates 
about providing welfare benefits to various groups of people 
to whom it is able to ascribe individuating characteristics.
It is this contradiction that is reflected in the dual 
relationship the state has with consumer organisations, 
creating the tension where on the one hand the government 
expects them to utilise participative representational 
processes based on principles of political equality, and on 
the other the bureaucracy places pressure on them to 
represent the interests of ascriptive groups in equity 
driven policy processes.
To summarise, this chapter has reviewed the impact of 
managerialism on consumer advocacy groups. This impact can 
be found in their relationships to government and to each 
other, where the structure of these relationships has been 
moulded to reflect government program management structures. 
The impact can also be seen on their internal operation and
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on their lobbying activities, which now take careful account 
of the new managerial forms and techniques.
The groups' relationships with the bureaucracy and the 
government have developed somewhat separately, with the 
former being strongly influenced by managerial concerns with 
ascriptive interest representation for equitable policy 
development, and the latter retaining a political 
orientation to participative representation in a partisan 
democratic electoral framework. I have argued that these 
dual relationships reflect a central contradiction of the 
welfare state, that promotes universalisation of citizenship 
for work but ascriptive individuation of consumers for 
welfare.
This concludes the section of the thesis that has taken an 
organisational perspective on the relation between 
managerialism and consumer advocacy in the public sector.
It began by reviewing Weber's description of the way the 
value of equality underpinned the rule bound operation of 
the bureaucracy, through the disregard for individuals that 
marks the capitalist mode of production. The necessity for 
this type of operation was challenged by Parsons for not 
taking adequate account of the professionalisation and 
democratisation of social organisations? and by Mayo for not 
taking account of the spontaneous cooperation and creativity 
that can mark human relations within organisations. These 
challenges have provided a basis for the development of 
managerialism.
With the development of the welfare state, the 
operationalisation of the value of equality has been 
expanded from a concern for equality of treatment of 
individuals, to encompass a concern for the equity of 
outcome for social groups. Within a program management 
format, the welfare bureaucracy has worked to transform the
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organisation and operation of community advocacy groups to 
facilitate eguity based policy development. This has 
affected the type of refom these groups lobby for, the way 
they put their case and their internal forms of 
representation. This has caused tensions for the groups in 
their traditional relationship to party politics in the 
electoral contest for government.
SECTION III




The analysis of strategic action
The two chapters in this section are focussed at the level 
of the actor. They analyse the interaction of public sector 
managers and consumer advocates. Chapter five takes the 
perspective of the manager, and chapter six takes the 
perspective of the advocate. Each chapter has benefited 
from having been presented in a central, home ground forum 
of the actors concerned.
Both chapters develop an analysis that has a theoretical and 
a practical angle. Firstly, a central theoretical debate is 
reviewed to provide a reference point from which to 
understand action taken by managers (chapter five) and 
advocates (chapter six). Secondly, an analysis is developed 
of strategically important parts of the terrain of 
interaction between managers and advocates. This covers 
formal consumer consultation exercises and the usefulness of 
public policy skills (chapter five), and various 
opportunistic strategies employed by the community health 
movement in its dealings with the bureaucracy (chapter six).
Chapter five takes the viewpoint of the manager, in 
particular the senior executives in the welfare departments 
of the Australian Public Service, and discusses the 
management of formal consumer consultation with community 
groups. It commences by examining theoretical issues in the 
debate over the relation between the managerial values of 
efficiency and effectiveness, and program values of eguity 
and access. If we accept the pervasiveness of managerial 
forms of organisation within the APS, I argue that the 
reconciliation of these values of efficiency, effectiveness,
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equity and access can be achieved by the new managers making 
a commitment to equity and consultation. As was argued in 
the last section, the value of equity is closely related to 
the outcomes focus of program management within the welfare 
bureaucracy. Although this reconciliation sits fairly 
easily at the level of values it is problematic and under­
theorised at the level of practice. Scant reference to it 
can be found in managerialist texts.
This reconciliation calls for a review from the manager's 
perspective on the practical use of consumer consultation in 
public sector decision making, and the issues involved in 
actually managing consumer consultation. This review 
concludes that while various managerial techniques can 
facilitate such consultation, more traditional public 
service skills in the coordination of processes and in 
policy formulation also need to be deployed.
Chapter six takes the viewpoint of the consumer advocate.
It commences with an examination of some theoretical issues 
in the analysis of new social movements, and argues that 
this analysis is valuable for understanding community 
advocacy groups as long as it does not seek to present an 
overarching synthesis of the confluence of goals pursued by 
the various groups that can be considered part of the new 
social movements. This is illustrated by a brief comparison 
of the very different orientations of the community health 
movement, with its commitment to responsive health and 
welfare services, and the environment movement, with its 
distaste for human impacts.
The advocacy strategies of the two movements are also quite 
different. The environment movement has had great effect 
through legislative and regulative channels. Welfare 
advocacy is more oriented to state expenditures, and because 
of this needs to be more cognisant of the techniques of
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program management. Case studies are given that illustrate 
the unpredictable use of managerial strategies by community 
health groups, including performance evaluation, mobilising 
expert opinion and professional surveillance. The chapter 
concludes by considering the management review of a 
community health centre and highlights the opportunity for 
presenting the value commitments of the community health 
movement as a set of objectives to gain management support 
through program expenditures.
A management commitment to equity
A debate has run through the Australian Journal of The Royal 
Australian Institute of Public Administration about on the 
one hand the instrumental operation of the public service, 
with the emphasis on efficiency, effectiveness and letting 
the managers manage, and on the other hand the values of the 
public service, with the emphasis on fairness, access, 
eguity and participation. One side of this debate claims 
that the new managerialism supports these values by 
providing the focus on outcomes necessary to actually 
achieve better access, greater equity and more participation 
in fields where this is an objective of the government. 
Michael Keating articulates this viewpoint, stating that:
"the pursuit of social justice has been significantly 
enhanced through the introduction of program management 
and budgeting and the better evaluation of programs 
which it has encouraged... the concern for 
effectiveness is also a concern for equity" (Keating 
1989 p 129).
On the other side of the debate, the economic rationalism 
found in managerialism and the particular management tools 
it has imported from the private sector are seen as actually
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undermining these public service values. Anna Yeatman has 
summed this up as follows:
"in the current reconstitution of public bureaucracies 
to fit the economic rationalist model of government, 
the values of eguity and access have been 
residualised... They have been abandoned along with the 
discourses of citizenship and public service" (Yeatman 
1990b p 21).
As Yeatman points out, the concern for eguity and 
participation cannot be subsumed under a concern for 
effectiveness, and is not a central concern of program 
management technigues. However, there is a sense in which 
Keating can be right, in that if eguity and participation 
are a central concern of the manager, then program 
management can enhance the effective implementation of these 
concerns. If we accept this, the debate about whether the 
new managerialism in the APS promotes or undermines the 
values of eguity and access highlights the importance of a 
commitment on the part of management to the active 
participation of citizens in public service decision making.
The focus on outcomes has drawn managers of welfare programs 
to evaluate the realities of working with its target groups 
and at least consider the value of consultation for 
effective program implementation. The two way dependency 
between the public service and the public is expressed by 
Yeatman in her discussion of citizen involvement in 
government policy formation:
"The citizenry also has a significant relationship to 
these policies once they have assumed the specific 
features of programs... Not only is their cooperation 
reguired - a passive sense of citizen participation - 
but as citizens demand more of government services
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these services become dependent on the active 
participation of citizens in order to have their 
demands reflected in the service" (Yeatman 1990a p 51).
The arguments against consumer consultation are a pervasive 
part of everyday life in the public service. The demands of 
the bureaucratic form of administration, the fragmented and 
specialised nature of many issues, the constraints on time, 
the limitations of resources and the secrecy surrounding new 
policy development all weigh heavily against consultation. 
Ministers may take the view that consultation with interest 
groups would be obstrcutive to their reform agenda, 
particularly when services are being reduced. However, it 
is clear that in many areas of public administration the 
development of program management has facilitated 
consultation between the public service and consumer groups 
by defining concrete topics for discussion centring around 
programs that have been proposed or are in progress.
The rest of this chapter considers some of the theoretical 
and practical issues involved in managing consumer 
consultation to enhance the instrumental operation of the 
public service. The issues are considered within the 
climate of Commonwealth Labor Government support for 
consultation, the strength of Australia's consumer 
organisations and peak councils at the end of the 1980s, and 
the outcome oriented program management of the Australian 
Public Service. The chapter concludes by arguing that 
consultation also has reflexive benefits for the ethos and 
policy skills within the public service itself.
Consumer consultation and decision making
In attempting to formulate courses of action that may 
contribute to the public good, public administrators have 
always consulted with the public they serve. Of course the
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particular forms and extent of these consultations have been 
determined by the modes of administration and the social 
structures of the day.
Reviews of consumer consultation undertaken before the 
widespread introduction of the new managerialism emphasised 
the structure, roles and functions of the various 
consultative and advisory bodies set up by government, with 
particular concern for whether the representation on the 
bodies was fair and the procedures satisfactory. The Coombs 
Commission reviewed the structure and membership of all 
Commonwealth government advisory bodies, and analysed the 
interest group representation on these bodies. (Coombs 1976 
appendix 1L and 2D. These were discussed in chapter four 
above). Bailey assessed the workings of consultation 
through a review of 300 consultative arrangements between 
Commonwealth welfare departments and outside bodies (see 
Baily et al 1978 p 208 for summary list). These reviews 
played an important part in the scrutiny of public 
administration in the 1970s that formed the background for 
reform in the 1980s. It would be worthwhile repeating these 
empirical studies in the light of these reforms.
However, with the widespread adoption of the new 
managerialism, the ground is shifting under the feet of such 
consultative bodies for two reasons. Firstly, their 
importance is being overtaken by the growing strength and 
sophistication of non-government organisations representing 
both industry and consumers, and this has been encouraged by 
the Commonwealth government. These organisations, although 
frequently represented on government constituted advisory 
bodies, have no compunction in pursuing their concerns 
through other channels such as the parliament, the media and 
the bureaucracy, including departments other than the one 
responsible for the advisory body. Secondly, many areas of 
the bureaucracy now develop specially tailored consultation
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strategies for individual policy initiatives and program 
components. These strategies frequently marginalise the 
influence of previously constituted advisory bodies.
While the advent of managerialism has sought to focus 
attention on outcomes, this is achieved by the creative and 
strategic use of the processes available to the public 
administration for particular policy initiatives or program 
components. Consumer consultation can be incorporated into 
a wide range of decision making processes, from those 
involving the parliament and its committees, the cabinet and 
the budget cycle through to event planning and the delivery 
of services to end users. In essence, good management of 
consumer consultation seeks to inject the insight and 
realism of consumer advocates into the processes of policy 
formation and program implementation.
Consultation can of course be disruptive to policy 
development and program implementation. In particular, 
there is the risk that the manager will lose control of the 
process. Much of the skill in managing consultation is in 
not allowing the consultation to derail the policy process 
or the program. I discussed this with Terry Slater, a 
senior manager in the Department of Community Services and 
Health:
"you have got to be careful not to throw away the 
management responsibility and management flexibility... 
not to give someone the right of veto over the content 
or the direction of how it is being managed, unless you 
deliberately want to do that. So in framing the 
involvement of interested parties outside of the direct 
responsibility for implementation, one has to have it 
very clearly in mind what involvement you want from 
them" (Slater interview).
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One judgement that needs to be made is what amount of time 
can be assigned to consultation, and the extent of resources 
to be allocated for this to strike a balance between good 
consultation and effective policy development:
"You still [need] enough flexibility... to meet the 
different situations that you are trying to consult or 
to deal with in an advocacy sense. I have felt the 
trade-off between time and cost in managing that 
process. Which means you want a policy out at a 
particular time, say to go into the budget process, and 
I've felt that the consultation process is another step 
in what I term the critical path to achieve that work 
deadline and that work outcome. I've felt very much 
the trade-off in terms of whether to go ahead with a 
more elaborate or less elaborate or no consultation 
process" (Slater interview).
The question of who are the consumers and how can they be 
consulted with is a vexed one, particularly at higher levels 
of government dealing with large scale programs. It needs 
to be thought through in relation to each planned 
consultation and there are no formula answers. The peak 
councils or their state counterparts are available as a 
starting place to discuss this question with. These include 
long established organisations such as the Australian 
Council of Social Services (ACOSS) and the Australian 
Federation of Consumer Organisations (AFCO)? more recently 
established groups such as the Consumers Health Forum (CHF); 
and special interest groups such as the Australian 
Federation of AIDS Organisations (AFAO), the Federation of 
Ethnic Community Councils of Australia (FECCA) and the 
Australian Council On The Ageing (ACOTA). The Australian 
Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) can also be considered for 
this purpose. These groups can provide skilled advocates, 
can arrange contact with their member organisations and can
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arrange more direct “grass roots" consultations as 
appropriate. They can be an effective channel for accessing 
disadvantaged or stigmatised groups.
There are two debates concerning working with consumer 
organisations that should be mentioned. The first is the 
distinction between consumer and provider organisations. In 
some groups, e.g. ACOSS, the distinction is not made, but in 
other groups the distinction is a point of principle, 
sometimes signified by including the word "consumer" in 
their title, e.g. the Australian Federation of Consumer 
Organisations and the Consumers' Health Forum. The 
underlying sentiment of this debate is that the interests of 
providers and consumers are different, may conflict, and 
should not be confused. Although this difference can be 
overstated, sensitivities about the difference should be 
taken into account when deciding who to consult for a 
particular program.
The second debate is over whether a group receiving 
government funding can be considered truly autonomous. On 
the one hand, acceptance of government funding always 
carries with it the threat of the funding being cut, and 
there is the possibility that groups may distract themselves 
by picking up funding for projects they are not primarily 
committed to. On the other hand, business councils do not 
seem to worry about their reliance on the tax exemption that 
funds a considerable part of their contributions from 
members. In any case it can be argued that the principle 
qualities to be looked for in consultations are insight and 
commitment to the sector of the community of concern to the 
program, not administrative autonomy.
In addition to program planning exercises, consumer 
advocates can be used in program administration, for example 
on advisory groups for grants programs, or on task centred
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working groups. Some parts of the administration such as 
the Commonwealth Department of Community Services and Health 
have a standing ministerial directive to include consumer 
representations on relevant intradepartmental committees and 
working groups, although of course what is relevant is the 
subject of continuing debate. The inclusion of consumer 
advocates on interdepartmental or intergovernmental 
committees can bring a dose of reality to the deliberations 
and there may be advantages in suggesting this during the 
negotiations to set up these committees.
Perhaps the most common use of consumer consultation is in 
the evaluation of programs. This often takes the form of 
user surveys, and although these can be useful, more 
interactive forms of evaluation are a more creative source 
of ideas for improvement. Tensions may however arise 
between the rigid adherence to program objectives that will 
result in better evaluation, and flexibility of program 
objectives in response to consumer consultation. This 
tension is highlighted in evaluations that focuses solely on 
the strategies used to achieve objectives and ignore 
evaluation of the objectives themselves. To its credit, the 
Financial Management Improvement Plan handbook on Evaluating 
Government Programs draws attention to the ongoing revision 
of program objectives as an important focus of evaluation 
(DoF and APSB 1987 especially chapter two and figure A2).
Within any consultation itself, the advocates' hands cannot 
be tied and outcomes cannot be predicted. The manager needs 
to recognise that the concerns of the disadvantaged groups 
their programs are often directed at are not intuitively 
apparent to public servants no matter how public spirited. 
The loss of control and increase in uncertainty on the part 
of the manager associated with consultation should be more 
than offset by the increased desirability of program 
outcomes and support for program strategies. Management
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satisfaction in the public sector should come not from the 
extent of control and influence wielded, but from the 
quality of the results achieved for the public benefit.
Managing consumer consultations
Engagement in consumer consultation is based on a view of 
the public service agency as open to influence by the public 
it serves. This requires a degree of control over actions 
and a concern with outcomes that can be considerably 
enhanced by program management techniques, an attitude of 
openness and accessibility of decision making processes.
Managing consumer consultation also requires careful thought 
about structuring the channels of influence including formal 
consultation and informal contact. Compared with consulting 
other public sector agencies, consultation with consumers 
does not take place within common authority structures. In 
contrast to private sector consumer consultation, public 
sector consultation is framed by citizens' expectations of 
the public sector to act in their interests. The political 
nature of these consultations must be openly acknowledged.
Consumer consultation is fundamentally different to 
interdepartmental or intergovernmental consultation. 
Consulting with consumer groups is outside of the power and 
authority structures of the public administration and the 
parliament. There is not the shared understanding that at 
the end of the day there are defined roles and 
responsibilities that frame the discussion and its outcomes. 
The Health Advancement Division of DCSH has had considerable 
experience in both intergovernmental and consumer 
consultation, and I asked the divisional manager, Terry 
Slater, about the difference:
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"in any interdepartmental negotiations or with 
intradepartmental program negotiations, there is very 
much an organisation structure and a power structure, 
which, at the end of the day, whether it is invoked or 
not, is ever there...
"With consumer groups, or lobbyists, there isn't that 
understanding of where the group fits in and where they 
are coming from. So in discussions with advocates and 
outside bodies, it is not vastly different from 
discussions with private sector commercial firms. One 
has to understand what each party is seeking." (Slater 
interview).
Time must be taken to set out the expectations and agenda of 
both sides, and this may not be straightforward if either 
side lacks experience, or if complex political issues are 
involved:
"beforehand it is important that you understand what 
the group's agenda is and work out how that agenda 
might fit into the objectives of the program that you 
are seeking, and of course with the government of the 
day's desires. And the government of the day's desires 
may well be to have that group satisfied. So in fact 
the consultations may well be about determining the 
agenda of that consumer group." (Slater interview)
Clear understandings of the scope of the consultations need 
to be established at the outset (Bailey et al 1978 p 14,
25). To avoid unrealistic expectations, the manager can 
project a picture of their own position in the bureaucracy 
with acknowledgement of their areas of responsibility and 
autonomy, but a conservative estimate of their influence in 
other areas. It helps if all participants understand that 
in general the kinds of things that consumer groups want
changed are difficult for the public administration to 
address, often requiring intersectoral action and high 
levels of public participation to be achieved.
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As a rule, the closer to the grass roots providers and 
consumers, the less the formal negotiating skills. The 
manager's role in consultations is that of a facilitator, 
providing information and structure where appropriate 
without railroading the discussions to a predetermined 
conclusion. In a sense, through consultation the manager 
becomes a participant in community discussions, and these in 
turn can be brought into close relation to bureaucratic 
policy development and the machinations of government. The 
development of the National Women's Health Policy 
illustrates some of the dynamics of this process:
"the Women's Health Network had had a large input to a 
report which very much reflected their agenda but which 
we judged would have been difficult for the government 
of the day to consider because it didn't have either 
the polish, the breadth of view of the issues, or the 
wherewithal to get government support, particularly in 
terms of funding... there was considerable delicacy in 
ensuring that ownership was retained while shaping the 
document to produce the outcomes the government wanted 
in a way which would win Cabinet support.
I put in place, over and above the women's sub­
committee that AHMAC had set up, a departmental 
steering committee which I chaired and which had on it 
the chairperson of the women's sub-committee.
She was quite crucial, and her credibility of course 
was on the line - within the women's network, not 
within the department.
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With each succeeding draft as the departmental 
committee went through, any changes went back to be 
debated by the sub-committee of AHMAC so that they 
could see the changes. As you well know, towards the 
end with the Minister focusing on it, a very sharp 
thrust for that policy came out, and that was about 
community women's health centres, which in the original 
document hadn't assumed an importance or a focus... we 
then had to come back and re-focus the document.
Because of the goodwill and the trust and the 
understanding that had been built up, it went through 
with a minimum of fuss." (Slater interview).
This example illustrates the delicacy required for 
interpolating the realism of community advocates into hard 
edged new policy development. Ultimately, the policy and 
budget arena of the Commonwealth government operates with 
highly stylised texts and bizarre patterns of negotiation. 
Admitting the lay public to the processes involved requires 
a large amount of effort on the part of the bureaucracy. It 
presents an enormous technical challenge to management and 
is outside their experience with the processes of 
intragovernmental consultation.
Notwithstanding Mr Slater's comments above, public sector 
consultation with consumer groups is also fundamentally 
different from consultation between private sector agencies 
and consumers. In the private sector the pursuit of profit 
provides a clear reference point and the main competition is 
between providers. In the public sector there is no 
universal reference point and the main competition is 
between consumers, who often have expectations of the public 
sector based on traditions of public service and the rights 
of citizens. Put another way, public sector consultation 
should be about empowerment and reducing the disadvantages
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of those consulted with, not about making a profit from 
them.
Because the provision of public services is part of 
governmental politics, and because of the interrelations of 
party political agendas and consumer advocate agendas, 
public sector consultation with consumers is an inherently 
political activity. It involves careful balancing of 
competing groups and divergent interests, and a search for 
consensus based on the development of trust and 
understanding, creative discussion of possible courses of 
action, and a willingness to compromise. To effectively 
manage those dynamics and processes, managers must openly 
acknowledge the political nature of the consultation. This 
includes addressing the role of politicians in the 
discussions. For example, is the Minister to be involved by 
agreeing to the consultation plan, or by personally 
attending a consultation meeting? Are other politicians to 
be involved, including opposition spokespersons and members 
of parliamentary committees?
The politics of the consumer groups themselves are perhaps 
less weighty than those of the parliamentary arena, but they 
are complex nevertheless and marked by a shifting and 
amorphous character. Consumer advocates are rarely elected 
by consumers, but can usually mobilise considerable support 
for their positions if pressed. This is particularly true 
of office holders and employees of the national peak 
councils who generally have well developed links with the 
media. The manager involved in consultation should seek to 
understand the background of the consumer advocate and their 
relationship to the target group, just as they must 
understand their own place in the bureaucracy. The 
interests of the advocate need to be taken into account, and 
these personal interests are quite different from the 
interests they are advocating on behalf of:
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"There is a fine line, as you would know, between what 
is ideologically acceptable in a consensus sense to the 
group, and what could be important to leading members 
of the group - there is a difference because of other 
agendas. Leading members were the ones that needed to 
be targeted first, and got on side." (Slater interview)
Advocates may be elected office holders of small 
organisations, respected idealogues, committed time servers 
or charismatic community figures. An understanding of where 
advocates are coming from will help the manager interpret 
their position in discussions.
If possible consultation discussions should be kept 
concrete. In policy and planning discussions a focus on 
target groups and client needs often performs this function. 
It must be kept in mind however that the community rarely 
organises itself neatly around the ascriptive criteria used 
to define target groups. For example, if a program is to be 
directed at people with asthma, asthma self help groups 
cannot be ignored. However, it should be recognised that 
each person with asthma spends most of their time in their 
household, workplace or place of education and that their 
main support comes from their family and friends, not other 
people with asthma. This has been recognised by many in the 
self help movement, and underlies the preference for active 
signifiers such as "people with asthma" or "people living 
with AIDS" over passive forms such as "asthmatics" or "AIDS 
victims".
Problems of over intervention are particularly hard to 
identify and can be politically unpalatable to address, but 
there is no doubt that, as in the private sector, 
competition between public sector agencies is occurring for 
the privilege of providing services to clients.
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Consultation can highlight the wide ranging interactions of 
programs with other services, state and federal, public and 
private. In consultation about existing services or 
programs, a focus on the perceived problems of the service 
can identify overlaps and facilitate planning for remedial 
action. I have mentioned the possibility of conflict 
between providers and consumers of services. More 
freguently providers and consumers develop a co-dependency 
that can interfere with the critical evaluation of services. 
This often unconscious collusion can include tolerance of 
lax cost controls, inadeguate targeting of resources and 
provider acguiescence to client demands outside the 
intention of the program.
Consultation is based on a commitment to dialogue that can 
take the concerns of consumers to the heart of program 
administration. The establishment of this dialogue reguires 
trust (Bailey et al 1978 p 17), built up in a wider 
framework than the specific consultation itself. As in any 
interaction, cooperation with a consumer group is a two way 
street. The manager needs to consider this cooperation in a 
wider framework than the immediate consultation.
Consultation with a consumer group can itself promote 
community development as an intended or unintended (but 
desirable!) side effect. Support for consumer advocacy 
groups can include:
- Providing funding to cover the cost of consultation.
- Providing funding for infrastructure. Consumer 
organisational costs are relatively low, but the cost 
of accountabilty needs to be built in.
- Supporting organisational and personnel development. 
Strategies can include conference attendance, staff
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exchange and use of organisational consultants, 
although these latter may engender controversy.
- Funding research. This should take into account the 
research agenda of both the funding body and the 
recipient.
- Providing information on policy activities with the 
opportunity for informal input.
Successful consultation requires accessibility and 
commitment to feedback. One problem that may be encountered 
is that for a variety of reasons, including the time taken 
for decisions made through consultation to have an impact, 
consumer advocates are not good at communicating the result 
of consultations back to their constituencies. Louise 
Sylvan spoke about this in relation to the way peak councils 
are expert at translating the experiences of their 
constituents into generalised terms for policy debates, but 
are much less able to explain what policy decisions mean to 
the constituents:
"people relay their experience, they don't generalise 
to what that actually means in a policy form. There 
is a circle that goes on where the peak councils 
actually have to generalise that up so it has meaning 
in terms of national policy and national legislation. 
They then have to - and this is what they are very bad 
at doing - they then have to go back through that grass 
roots constituency to explain how what policy positions 
mean what in terms of what people want. They don't do 
that very well" (Sylvan interview).
A final point to make is that there are dangers if the 
decision to consult with consumer organisations is taken 
lightly. Consultation distracts from the core activities of
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the group, who may be disillusioned with there being little 
to show for previous consultative efforts. It is counter­
productive to engage in a mechanical consultative process so 
that government can say its policies have been developed in 
consultation and the full-time lobbyists can report to their 
clients that their voice was heard by government.
Consultation and public policy skills
I would like to conclude by discussing another debate from 
the pages of the AJPA concerning the nature and importance 
of policy in public sector management. The concern has 
arisen as the generic manager has been privileged over the 
subject expert in senior public service management. John 
Uhr has noted the decline of emphasis on policy skills in 
public service management training, and fears this aspect of 
public service may become ineffective:
"our quest for efficiencies of resource management 
might well lead to disturbing new levels of 
ineffectiveness in a vital end product of public policy 
- advice and evaluation of public policy" (Uhr 1987 p 
375) .
Peter Wilenski does not believe that this is a cause for 
concern "as yet" (Wilenski 1988 p217) but does outline his 
own concern about the interrelation between the instrumental 
operation of the public service and the implementation of 
public service values. He points out that in contrast to 
the instrumental view of the public service as "a neutral 
machine that mechanically put policy into effect", The new 
managers must go beyond the dichotomy of policy making and 
policy implementation. Failure to take this view could 
leave the new managerialism with an approach that is too 
instrumental and with the problem of insensitivity to the
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community that was identified by the Coombs Commission (see 
chapter three):
"[Progressive public administrators have] discarded the 
policy-administration dichotomy and begun to realise 
that each act of administration defines and refines 
"policy" and is itself "policy-making" activity. It 
requires the exercise of value judgements... The new 
managerialism for all its virtues may become unduly 
mechanistic and, like the old instrumentalism, may have 
an unconscious bias which will make it difficult for 
disadvantaged groups to deal with the bureaucracy, to 
obtain their fair share of programs" (Wilenski 1988 p 
217-218).
I have argued throughout this chapter that consumer 
consultation contributes to better policy and better 
administration in the interrelated sense of the terms spelt 
out by Wilenski, and that it provides a route of access for 
citizens, including disadvantaged groups, to influence the 
bureaucracy and the management of public sector programs. 
However this does not happen automatically. Management of 
consultation for maximum effectiveness requires a high level 
of traditional policy skills including:
- Conceptual clarity in presenting the issues for 
consultation and in documenting the understandings 
reached;
- accurate analysis of the consequences of programs and 
proposals under discussion;
- appreciation of linkages between items under 
discussion and their wider social context;
- political insight and a feel for the wider policy 
agenda.
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The techniques of the new managerialism can of course be 
extremely helpful in this, for example in using the 
Financial Management Improvement Plan accounting system to 
calculate resource implications, or using program statements 
of objectives and strategies as a framework for documenting 
understandings reached on what needs changing. Ensuring 
there is a good representation of people with a high level 
of policy skills in consultations can help avoid problems 
such as continually going over old ground, going off on 
unproductive tangents or the discontinuities that may be 
caused by turnover of participants. Many consumer advocates 
will themselves have considerable policy skills, and these 
can be utilised to good effect in consultations where a 
cooperative ethos has been established.
Consumer consultation is a particular area of activity for 
the public sector, with its own set of considerations, 
techniques, pitfalls and rewards. To be successful it 
requires senior management involvement if only because of 
its political character. I have tried to show that not only 
is consumer consultation compatible with the new 
managerialism, it stands to benefit from a variety of 
managerialist innovations. More importantly, it makes an 
important contribution to good public management. By 
highlighting equity issues and policy skills, a commitment 
to consumer consultation guards against some of the more 
serious potential problems raised by the new managerialism.
Chapter 6
The community health movement in the managerialist era
Is there a community health movement ?
This chapter discusses the community health field as a new 
social movement, comparing and contrasting it to the 
environment movement. It then discusses how the struggle 
for change of the community health movement can be pursued 
through cooperation with the government, taking into account 
the recent introduction of managerialism to public 
administration.
A great variety of community groups support and are involved 
with community health as a system of health service 
delivery. At the local level, most community health centres 
have a series of connections with community groups including 
self help groups of people with chronic illnesses, locally 
incorporated community service groups and organised groups 
of the elderly. There may also be direct community 
involvement in operating the community health centre. For 
example:
"Community health centres in Victoria emphasise 
community participation and empowerment and have been 
developed with an organisational framework comprising a 
locally elected committee of management" (Lyn 1990 p 1)
At a higher level of organisation, there is cross membership 
of state community health associations, councils of social 
service and church based councils. Participants and papers 
at national community health conferences illustrate the 
breadth of support from community and health consumer groups 
for community health (ACHA 1989, 1991).
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People who work in community health have a commitment that 
surprises people in other industries and refreshes people 
working in other parts of the health field. This 
commitment, directed to changing the pattern of health and 
welfare service delivery, is really noticeable, and has been 
sustained for nearly two decades in Australia. In 
comparison to the education field, it is much greater than 
the commitment found in most schools, and is similar to the 
commitment amongst the staff of alternative schools. It is 
a commitment to social change, and is quite different from 
the individual commitment to personal gain that often drives 
people in the private sector.
Because the community health sector is driven by commitment 
to social change, it is worthwhile thinking of it as a 
community health movement, with similarities to other new 
social movements such as the peace movement and the green 
movement, although the community health "movement” perhaps 
lacks the momentum to rest easily with such a grandiose tag. 
There are significant differences between the movements of 
course, and a theme of this chapter is to emphasise 
differences in analysis of new social movements. For 
example the activists of the community health movement are 
largely based in government funded agencies. However, these 
agencies often involve community members directly in their 
management, and have an unusual degree of independence from 
their source of funding, with payment sometimes being made 
by government grant rather than through operating payments. 
Because community health workers are actually employed to 
further the goals of the community health movement, their 
position in the public sector is analogous to that of the 
femocrat, who Yeatman describes as "oriented to social 
change" (Yeatman 1990a p 69) and whose "position is 
predicated on her professing a commitment to feminism" (ibid 
p 73 - 74). Although they may be employed by the state, 
community health workers and femocrats remain participants
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in the community health movement and the women's' movement 
respectively.
Analysing the new social movements
There is considerable merit in applying the analysis of new 
social movements to a review of the strategic terrain of 
consumer advocacy in Australia for two reasons. Firstly 
because of similarities in the character of involvement of 
people in community based advocacy organisations, for 
example in community health, and more familiar social 
movements such as the environment movement. Secondly, 
because the particular theoretical debates taking place over 
the analysis of the new social movements are themselves 
illuminating for a study of consumer advocacy from the 
strategic perspective of the advocate.
Touraine has sought to delineate the character of action 
taking place in a social movement as participation in 
"conflicts around the social control of the main cultural 
patterns" (Touraine 1985 p 760), where the participants 
define their identity as part of the movement, their 
opponents and the stake of the conflict. Commenting on the 
analysis of the anti nuclear movement, Papadakis summarises 
Touraine's definition:
"Whenever these struggles focus on community rather 
than modernization, opposition against specific nuclear 
power installations rather than on new ways of managing 
the economy, the nuclear industry rather than 
technocracy, fear rather than level headed analysis of 
social action, defensive rather than offensive 
struggles, grass roots fundamentalism rather than 
responsibility and crusades rather than strategies,
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they are distancing themselves from the goals of a 
modern social movement" (Papadakis 1989 p 238).
Papadakis seeks to draw a sharp distinction between analyses 
of new social movements based on the enlightenment ideal of 
society wide emancipation, and analyses based on the post 
structuralist view of a deeply fractured society rent by a 
diversity of struggles. Habermas for example adopts the 
former viewpoint as he "identifies the emancipatory 
potential of for instance, the feminist movement and its 
role as a carrier of universal values" (ibid p 244). The 
latter perspective is identified with Foucault, "who attacks 
any such attempt to create overarching and totalizing 
schemes for social relations" (ibid p 236).
Papadakis clearly takes a more fractious view of social 
movements, their actions and intentions than Touraine, who 
has sought to cast the new social movements in a role as the 
key bearers of social change, similar to and superseding 
Marx's characterisation of the working class as 
revolutionary. Papadakis identifies the anti-elitist 
character of the new social movements as a crucial element 
in this hopeful perspective. However, Touraine's 
requirement for a lofty self-understanding of action within 
social movements directs our attention to the leadership and 
decision making processes within the movements, and begs the 
question of why or how elitism is to be avoided if the 
transformative potential of the movements is to be 
actualised.
"The notion of the self-management of new social 
movements is contrasted [in Touraine] to the manner in 
which the older social movements (particularly the 
labour movement) have been turned into 'instruments of 
management or co-management'. None the less Touraine 
has not provided a convincing model for preventing the
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emergence of new structures of power and domination via 
an elite that seeks to impose its perception of the 
highest level of social struggle on the remainder of 
the community" (ibid p 242).
In contrast to the universalist orientation, Papadakis uses 
his knowledge of the Greens and the self help movement in 
West Germany to show the contingent and compromised nature 
of social movement activities. He argues that the self 
help movement, whose name alone seems to distance it from 
the universalist enlightenment ethos, has compromised and 
exploited itself as it sought to reconcile the desire for 
autonomy and the need for security:
"[The self help movement] has been buffeted between the 
search for autonomy and the need to secure financial 
support. Emphasis on the former has led to self 
exploitation by participants who work very long hours 
for low pay? emphasis on the latter has forced 
projects to turn to the state for support, 'to 
negotiate with the "devil"'" (ibid p 250).
What is the problem with talking to the state, of taking 
part in consultations, in accepting support? Quoting Arney 
and Bergen, Papadakis notes that
"Technologies of domination and control compel silence; 
technologies of monitoring and surveillance incite 
discourse" (ibid p 253).
The distinction between these two types of technologies is 
unclear; in many cases monitoring and surveillance are 
technologies of domination and control. However, if we 
accept that the expression of power provokes resistance to 
that expression, then attempts to compel silence will be 
resisted by speaking and publishing. Attempts to compel
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dialogue as the act of submission will be resisted by 
silence and a refusal to engage. At this point Papadakis 
notes Habermas' nervousness of the tactic of refusing what 
may be an emancipatory dialogue, fearing that "new social 
movements may often reject reason itself" (ibid p 224).
When the SPD developed a strategy of dialogue with the new 
social movements, the movements correctly identified the 
motive as the political survival of the SPD, having "all the 
charm of a trap door" (ibid p 247). Engaging in the 
dialogue would likely lead to a community group being used 
by the SPD for its own purposes:
"A green activist commented that 'among us dialogue is 
instantly associated with the danger of being bought 
off and corrupted. You assume a great deal of self- 
confidence if you believe that you cannot be 
instrumentalized by this" (ibid p 246).
This distrust of the "devil" is thus connected with the 
weakness of self-doubt, an aversion to the enabling aspects 
of dealing with the government because of the danger of 
strengthening its grip on the institutions of the state.
However, real struggles are rarely as adversarial as this 
would suggest, and governments and bureaucracies include 
many people sympathetic to the concerns of the new social 
movements. Through their influence, suspicion can be 
translated into genuine confusion around the intentions of 
the government. For example, the Christian Democrat 
government, through an intermediary organisation set up by a 
prominent academic, commenced funding self help groups who 
although initially suspicious were badly in need of funds.
At the same time, the government questioned the scope of 
control of the state, arguing in favour of small autonomous 
units for the delivery of welfare services. The Christian
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Democrats actually ran a political campaign along these 
lines:
"in favour of smaller, more transparent units of 
organization for the administration of welfare in which 
the highest levels of state authority would no longer 
have exclusive control and which, as far as possible, 
would enjoy a degree of autonomy" (Papadakis 1989 p 
248) .
By describing these types of developments in the 
relationship between governments and social movements, 
Papadakis uncovers fundamental problems for Touraine's 
characterisation of social movements as being a particular 
type of conflict with
"three components, which I identified long ago as the 
definition of the identity of the actor, the definition 
of the opponent, and the stakes, that is, the cultural 
totality which defines the field of conflict" (Touraine 
1985 p 760).
Because of a lack of self-confidence in understanding what 
they are trying to achieve, participants in the new social 
movements do not always show the clarity of self 
identification required by Touraine's definition. Because 
of the complex and sometimes contradictory actions and 
policies taken by governments, the "opponent" is not always 
easy to identify. Finally, because of the multiple 
orientations of social movements (to their own survival, to 
social change) what is at stake in particular struggles is 
not always clear or coherent.
To be fair to Touraine, it must be pointed out that he 
explicitly identifies his definition of social movements as 
a variant of an ideal type. "Social movement" is a notion
that is useful for the representation of social reality, 
rather than it being a direct description of reality:
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"The notion of social movement, like most notions in 
the social sciences, does not describe part of 
'reality' but is an element of a specific mode of 
constructing reality" (Touraine 1985 p 749)
The reality constructed is of course the concrete body of 
social theory, not the historical actions of the social 
movements themselves, although the former can inform the 
latter as Touraine and Papadakis have shown (for example, 
the Australian Wilderness Society distributes bumper 
stickers with the slogan "Subvert the dominant paradigm"). 
Touraine goes on to defend his particular approach to theory 
building through definition and comparison, by pointing out 
its value for enabling meaningful communication between 
social scientists as they construct this specific 
representation of social life:
"each social scientist must make clear the meaning of 
the words he or she uses, situating them in a more 
general intellectual frame of reference... The aim 
here is mot to separate and define various 
Weltanschauungen but, on the contrary, to integrate 
various approaches into a general representation of 
social life which gives some amount of autonomy to each 
approach. It is true that such an integrated and 
diversified view is itself related to specific 
"theories" and is not entirely objective. The problem, 
however, is not to pursue an abstract pure objectivity 
but to push back the limits of ideology and to make 
discussions among social scientists more useful" 
(Touraine 1985 p 749-750).
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Nevertheless, within this methodological framework, the post 
structuralist perspective of the complicated and fractious 
nature of social movements promoted by Papadakis has at 
least three clear advantages over the enlightenment 
perspective of Touraine for understanding the interaction of 
consumer groups with the public service. Firstly it 
encourages a diversified understanding of the various social 
movements themselves, for their own sake. The following 
comparison between the community health and environment 
movements is designed to show this diversity. Secondly, it 
encourages an emphasis on the particular aspects of issues 
based lobbying, and thirdly it supports a critical 
understanding of the dilemmas of cooperation and compromise 
that complicate these interactions. The final part of this 
chapter describes various strategies used by agencies in the 
community health movement to illustrate the nature of their 
lobbying and the way these dilemmas can be used to 
advantage.
Community health and the environment movement
The analysis of a particular social movement also needs to 
be broken down to various levels, and the actions and 
meanings that characterise the movement examined separately 
at each level:
"Any analytical approach to social movements implies 
their being broken down into different levels according 
to the system of social relationships involved on the 
action and the orientation which such an action 
assumes... Indeed, only by distinguishing the 
different levels and meanings of collective action will 
it be possible to understand the content of a movement 
which carries numerous and often contradictory 
requests" (Melucci 1981 p 174).
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The analytical levels chosen will always be somewhat 
arbitrary. For the purposes of this discussion, we can 
characterise new social movements along three dimensions: 
they show particular forms of internal organisation; they 
have cultural motivations and objectives; and they express 
political demands. The following discussion contrasts the 
environment movement and the community health movement in 
Australia along these dimensions.
The forms of internal organisation of the community health 
and the environment movements are similar. They emphasise 
autonomous collectives, consensus based decision making and 
strategies that encourage participation. Groups 
participating in the struggles of the movement are 
shamelessly opportunist. They are evangelical in seeking 
support; proselytise for the movement at all available 
opportunities; and seek to subvert resources within their 
sphere of influence to the struggle.
To understand the different patterns in cultural motivations 
and objectives between different social movements, it is 
helpful to explore the grammatical use of the term. "Social 
movement” can be used as a noun, meaning a social 
collectivity. However, following Touraine, "social 
movement" can also be used as a verb. He writes of the 
shift or the change in the social control of the main 
cultural patterns of society (Touraine 1985). Adopting this 
action perspective brings with it the problem of intended 
and unintended effects of action, with the former playing an 
important part in motivation and the latter a large part in 
actual outcomes. Regarding Touraine's specific formulation, 
it is doubtful that the main cultural patterns are in fact 
under anyone's control, whatever their intentions.
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Nonetheless, with this usage, people and groups can be 
thought of as participating in the struggle to bring about 
an intended social movement. The motivations and objectives 
of groups participating in the environment movement are 
based on concern for the natural world, whereas the 
underlying motivations of the community health movement are 
based on concern for the social world. The environment 
movement can be characterised as a shift from exploitation 
to preservation of the natural world, and a corresponding 
reordering of priorities for deciding on action with respect 
to the natural world that places sustainability as the 
dominant value and profitability as subordinate.
The community health movement in patterns of social control 
is quite different. It can be characterised as a shift from 
professional dominance and technological determination of 
interventions, to client choice and community control with 
experts playing an enabling role. This is paralleled by a 
reordering of resource allocation, from the 
institutionalisation of health resources in large quasi­
military or bureaucratic organisations, to resourcing 
community networks for personal support and health 
development (for discussion of the principles of community 
health, see ACHA 1986 and Fry 1989). These shifts require 
the cooperation and motivation of the wider community, of 
citizens from all walks of life. This is why community 
health work is evangelical and why lobbying power brokers 
and challenging existing authority is almost an everyday 
experience for many community health workers. This can be a 
problem even within community health centres, which 
challenge the preeminence of the medical profession:
"there has been a problem of doctors tending to regard 
nurses and other health workers as handmaidens, and not 
as equal members of the health team... Community 
participation in the management of some health centres
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is also a feature which doctors may find difficult to 
accept and work with" (Lennie et al 1990 p 2).
Although the shifts of the community health movement and the 
environment movements do not necessarily conflict, they are 
quite different kinds of shifts in quite different cultural 
patterns. This difference was made clear to many in the 
community health movement through the recent comments in the 
senate by respected environmental activists on the issue of 
immigration to Australia, where with reference to 
"sustainable lifestyles" they merely expressed the thinly 
veiled racism so prevalent in Australia, that those working 
for social reform in the community health movement find 
abhorrent.
It is clearly possible for participants in the community 
health and the environment movements in Australia to develop 
a mutual respect, to learn from each other and to support 
each other. For example, the community health movement has 
recently increased its activities in environmental health 
including activities around urban pollution (such as the 
Woolongong Healthy Cities project to clean up Lake Illawara) 
and through research into environmental health regulation 
such as the work of Jocelyn Auer in South Australia. 
Similarly, the environment movement has been called to 
tackle health issues. For example, the Minister for Health 
Services, Peter Staples, has outlined the importance for the 
environment movement in Australia to discuss people and 
their health as a complimentary concern to the postcard 
vision of environmental protection and the rhetoric of 
sustainable economic development (Staples 1991). There are 
signs that groups such as the Australian Conservation 
Foundation are already heading in this direction. 
Nevertheless, if the difficult and perhaps unpalatable focus 
of the community health movement is to be sustained, a
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separateness must be maintained from the environment 
movement.
Political action for community health in the managerialist 
era
I have argued so far that while the community health 
movement and the environment movement share particular forms 
of internal organisation, they have guite differnt cultural 
motivations and objectives. The third dimension for 
analysis of new social movements is their expression of 
political demands. This brings us to the nub of this 
chapter, of how advocates in the community health movement 
can work with the government in an era of public sector 
managerialism to bring about the move from professional 
control to community control of health, and from resourcing 
institutions to resourcing networks. In discussing 
particular strategies available, a number of difficulties 
and dilemmas, described earlier with reference to the work 
of Papadakis, will become apparent.
The political demands of the environment movement are 
generally calls for government regulation, whereas the 
political demands of the community health movement are 
generally calls for government programs providing services. 
This difference underlies the strategic importance for those 
working in the two movements to develop their own 
understanding of the managerialist changes in public 
administration.
In order to bring about the desired movement in government 
practices toward better protection of the environment, 
actors in the environment movement need an understanding of 
the shift from coercion to encouragement in regulative 
legislation (for a discussion of regulative strategies for
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environmental protection see Grabosky and Braithwaite 1986 
chapter three).
For actors in the community health movement to effectively 
lobby for the movement in government practices they desire, 
they need to understand the program management framework for 
decision making, the accounting practices of program 
budgeting, and the management orientation of senior 
executives. In the managerialist era, an understanding of 
these things is a prerequisite for "negotiating with the 
devil." They hold little charm for members of the community 
health movement, but once the decision to negotiate is taken 
an understanding of these things can be used to good effect.
To cite a particular set of managerial reforms, the 
Commonwealth Department of Finance has encouraged all 
Commonwealth departments to introduce a set of standardised 
accounts, discussed in chapter three above (Keating 1987a, 
1987b). These accounting practices enable scrutiny of 
financial activities within departments in much more detail 
than earlier practices allowed. This has been taken 
advantage of at four levels: firstly by each department
itself; secondly, by the departments of Finance and Prime 
Minister and Cabinet who systematically track and scrutinise 
all departments? thirdly, by parliamentarians through the 
Senate Estimates Committee, ministerial reports and answers 
to questions? and fourthly by the public through published 
reports and direct requests under the freedom of information 
act. Such information is a key source of information about 
government activities and is readily available to consumer 
advocates for analysis and preparation of their lobbying.
On another point, management training now emphasises 
corporate development and human relations skills through the 
Executive Development Scheme (EDS) for senior officers which 
operates as a feeder for the senior executive service, and
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the Senior Executive Management Program (SEMP) of ongoing 
training for senior executives. Yeatman has noted that this 
training weaves in feminist growth-movement ideas and values 
that in fact humanise managers and public service employment 
structures (Yeatman 1990a p 26). Many of these ideas and 
values are familiar to community health workers, and can 
form a common ground in consultations.
Because of its claim to be a discourse of technique rather 
than a discourse of legitimacy, managerialism is in a sense, 
directionless. Its techniques of program budgeting have 
been applied as readily to areas of expanding expenditure 
(such as the National HIV/AIDS strategy), cutting the fat 
(such as the work of the Efficiency Scrutiny Unit) or 
reducing services (for example through contracting out 
cleaning). However, managerialism is not of course value 
free. It embodies the ascetic and conservative values of 
economic rationalism: in the language of managerialism the
value of asceticism is expressed as the quest for 
efficiency; and the value of conservatism is expressed as 
the quest for accountabilty through the use of institutional 
authority to hold managers and service providers to prior 
objective agreements.
These values come into play when management decisions are 
made, when deciding how things should be done, and when 
comparing options. However these values are of little use 
in generating fresh ideas or stimulating social change. The 
ascetic, conservative values of managerialism are of little 
help when the order of the day is change. This is the 
contradiction of managerialism: its obsession is with 
outcomes, with having an impact, with making a difference? 
but its practice is with processes (efficiency) and with 
putting things in their proper place (accountability). Anna 
Yeatman has described this as a tension between the virtue
of technical flexibility and the vice of teleological 
promiscuity:
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"The technical flexibility, curiosity and openness of 
the professional public managers are extraordinary... 
The problem is that the technical orientation of public 
managers can be used for any set of value commitments. 
In this respect the professional managers are 
relatively indifferent to which ends their technical 
services are given. They are teleologically 
promiscuous." (Yeatman 1990a p 31).
Because of the contradiction of managerialism, the 
commitment of the community health movement is the ace in 
the hole in discussions between community health agencies 
and management. There is an important sense in which the 
funding of community health workers is an expression of 
support by the public administration for the values and 
commitment of the community health movement. In order to be 
effective, management needs to make substantive value 
commitments through supporting programs that will make a 
difference on the ground. In order to secure this support, 
the community health movement needs to engage in a dialogue 
that expresses their commitment to the cultural shifts 
toward public control over health care and networks of 
support in terms of the substantive effect of community 
health work in bringing these shifts about.
In the managerialist era, as discussed in chapter four, this 
dialogue finds greatest resonance with the bureaucracy if 
couched in managerialist terms. In the language of Dr 
Yeatman, actors in the community health movement who are 
teleologically commited need to be strategically promiscuous 
in pursuing their goals. I have noted above that this can 
be seen as preparation for negotiation with the devil, a 
risky business where the price of success may involve
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selling one's soul. But to not negotiate in these terms 
amounts to hiding the community health light under a bushel 
- to remain quiet about the commitment to change that is 
fundamental to the community health movement, and encourage 
the appearance of community health services as essentially 
similar to other mainstream agencies. The risk of this is 
obscurity as these competing mainstream interests squeeze 
community health out of the picture.
Dealing with the niceties: evaluation and the experts
In more specific terms there are dilemmas and difficulties 
for community organisations that are specifically due to the 
managerial framework. For example, since its inception in 
1985, the Australian Federation of AIDS Organisations has 
progressively made its budget submissions to the DCSH more 
and more managerialist in presentation (Talbot interview). 
This development was influenced by the placement of an 
officer of DCSH in the AFAO secretariat who was
"quite imbued with [managerial] developments in the 
public sector... he contributed quite a lot to the 
format of the final budget submission" (Talbot 
interview).
Program budgeting techniques struck a chord with senior 
officers of AFAO, and were cooperatively introduced with 
their funding department. Other aspects of managerialism 
were not so easily integrated. The following excerpt from 
my interview with the executive director of AFAO illustrates 
how the demand of managerialism for evaluation by 
performance indicators was dealt with:
"PD: One of the criticisms of the program format has
been that it encourages a commodification of services
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and activities in the sense that you have to provide 
things that you can count, to be well within the 
intentions of the program management rhetoric. Did you 
find that a problem?
WT: Well I was certainly aware of it as being a
problem.
PD: What is an example?
WT: How we are going to evaluate things always came
out as sort of an issue, which largely we avoided.
I think the irony was that the Commonwealth was as 
unable as we were to actually sort out what it meant by 
evaluation and what would be expected. It wasn't a 
matter of the Commonwealth saying "these are our strict 
guide-lines: you must distribute 526 brochures." They
weren't clear what they wanted in a sense." (Talbot 
interview).
One aspect of the interaction between community 
organisations and government administration that is a source 
of conflict is the strict grant conditions and evaluation 
requirements on project grants, imposed not just to keep 
expenditure accountable to the rationale for its release, 
but also to facilitate the observation of intended effects, 
both social and fiscal. The group may perceive these 
controls as an unnecessary imposition, that distances the 
doers from the funders? a distance bridged at times by the 
consumer advocate:
"I could certainly cite six specific projects where 
there was an evaluation component where we did not set 
up any performance indicators or things like that until 
after the project was well and truly finished. They 
were on our backs for a report so we made them up then.
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I mean basically the dynamic in community based 
organisations is that people, usually on an AIDS 
Council or whatever, see the need, they feel it 
pressing, and they saw AFAO's role was to get the money 
so they could do it. That was the basic dynamic. The 
niceties of evaluation and reporting and that sort of 
stuff was my problem to paper over after the event." 
(Talbot interview).
The AIDS field also illustrates how consumer groups can 
utilise the legitimacy of expert opinion to pursue their own 
demands for input to management. In a sense, "experts" can 
be coopted to support the values of community groups as they 
lobby government over particular points. This applies to 
strategic values such as the value of consultation:
"At the '86 National AIDS Conference DCSH bought this 
guy over from Boston called Dr Martin Hirsh [Director 
of Virology at Harvard University] who had been 
involved in some very early trials over there. In his 
keynote speech he stated that a central factor to 
assess was having a client group on the committee. So 
his speech was used for a period of months as a 
lobbying point: this eminent expert, who of course we 
had never heard of before, had advocated such and such 
a course of action." (Talbot interview).
Beating them at their own game: a strategy of surveillance
The World Health Organisation has also been 
opportunistically used by consumer groups for a number of 
issues. This has been the case for example with Maternity 
Alliance. This group was formed from a range of interested 
consumer groups in 1987 (Bastian 1989 p 239) and is itself a 
member of the CHF. The explanation for the formation of the
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group is couched in the consumer rhetoric of dissatisfaction 
and the search for alternatives:
"Consumer dissatisfaction with current [maternity] 
services is high, reflected in the movements for 
natural childbirth, family-centred maternity care, 
birth centres and home births" (Bastian 1989 p 239).
In articulating the directions for change sought by the 
Alliance, its organiser Hilda Bastian has relied on the 
formulations of various WHO documents, which combine their 
methods of surveillance with definitions of physical, social 
and mental well-being:
"Maternity alliance believes it is vitally important 
that Australia review its maternity services and 
institute a comprehensive system of perinatal 
surveillance as advocated by the World Health 
Organisation... without the data to be obtained from 
perinatal surveillance, individual women cannot make 
fully informed choices regarding their own and their 
infant's well-being" (ibid p 239).
While it appears on the surface that a program of 
technocratic surveillance would have little appeal to those 
dissatisfied with mainstream care, this approach is at least 
capable of standing up to the rejoinders of the medical 
profession. Strategically, it is a ready made rhetorical 
vehicle that gives robustness to the Alliance's battle to 
wrest some control over the development of maternity 
services from the medical profession.
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Heading them off at the pass: dealing with a management
review
The examples cited of AFAO and Maternity Alliance show the 
wiles and adaptability of consumer advocacy groups in the 
health field as they strategically negotiateng their way 
around the various elements forming the terrain of 
interaction with the bureaucracy in the managerialist era.
I now continue this theme in relation to a common situation 
for community agencies, namely a review by the bureaucracy. 
Narrabundah health centre in Canberra has been reviewed as 
part of an ACT-wide review of community health centres 
conducted in late 1990 under the rhetoric of better 
management of resources. Although press reports of the 
review noted that it had its eye on things such as the 
centres7 undercapitalised land, the review also gave the 
centres themselves the opportunity to defend their place in 
the community and suggest extensions to their role.
The defence of the centre needed to bring out the difference 
to the community that the centres make. This approach, 
based on the values of the community health movement 
discussed above, underpins the Community Health 
Accreditation and Standards Project (CHASP) of the 
Australian Community Health Association, who had reviewed 
Narrabundah health centre in early 1990. The CHASP review 
went beyond an enumeration of instances of service provision 
and gave an account of the community spirit the centre 
contributes to; the role of the centre in providing a focal 
point for community development? and the provision of 
accessible health services to the major groupings of 
Narrabundah's social landscape (Fry 1990).
The CHASP review, conducted by people who were themselves 
part of the community health movement, preempted the 
management review by the bureaucracy, and made it difficult
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for the latter review to substantially reinvestigate the 
operation of the centre with one exception: the CHASP
review had made recommendations about centre management. It 
found that:
"Most management functions (e.g. policy, planning, 
resources, staff recruitment) are clearly defined, work 
generally smoothly and take place at Branch level" (Fry 
1990 p 12).
Up to the time of the review, centre staff elected a team 
leader from amongst themselves. This person was given a 
slightly (15%) reduced clinical workload, chaired the staff 
meetings, and represented the centre in a variety of forums, 
mostly meetings with other parts of the ACT health service. 
They were not responsible for the work of other staff or any 
resources, and there was no pay increase for these duties.
In an attempt to support centre autonomy, the review 
recommended an increased management role for the team 
leader:
"If centre-based planning, co-ordination and 
multidisciplinary teamwork is to develop, the team 
leader role needs to be changed and developed" (ibid).
The existing management arrangements had a defensible 
history, reflecting for example the administrative 
separation of community nursing from other community health 
services, the separation of administrative tasks and 
clinical services, and the employment of a string of natural 
leaders in a variety of positions. However, it would be 
virtually impossible to increase the responsiveness of the 
centre to the community - a key recommendation of the CHASP 
review - without developing the leadership role.
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This provided ammunition for the management review. It was 
suggested that a simple way to improve leadership would be 
to create an appropriately remunerated position of centre 
director, selected openly on merit, with responsibility for 
the operation of the centre including staffing, the work 
program and the global budget of the centre. This was 
discussed at a planning day held by the centre (in which I 
participated), where it was felt that such a managerialist 
approach would be problematic because it went against the 
principles of teamwork, equal participation and consensus 
based decision making. The staff decided to continue to 
support an elected team leader, effectively leaving planning 
and policy decision making in the hands of the bureaucracy.
Again, this example shows the tensions in negotiating 
between various desired outcomes of the community health 
movement. In particular there is a dilemma between the 
desirability of styles of internal operation based on 
collective decision making over managerial forms of 
organisation, and the greater instrumental ability of the 
latter to respond to external community demands for service 
development. Such dilemmas cannot be resolved solely by 
reference to principle, and call for a creative, strategic 
response from those involved.
In this discussion I have sought to show how the objectives 
of the community health movement are not inherantly 
incompatible with the processes of managerialism, and to 
illustrate the inevitable development of strategic dilemmas. 
By conceiving of community health work as participation in a 
community health movement, the commitment to achieving 
social change can be an ace in the hole in dealings with 
public sector management, that is increasingly concerned 
with outcomes. A focus on valued achievements in the 
community can be the common ground that provides both the 
personal reward to the committed community health worker,
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and the continuing support of central management through the 
provision of resources and the authority to deploy them for 
the community's health. Nevertheless, the particular forms 
of managerialism present a variety of stumbling blocks that 
test the commitment, direction and strategic wiles of 
community health advocates.
This discussion concludes the section of the thesis that 
takes the perspective of the actor to analyse the impact of 
managerialism on consumer advocacy. These two chapters have 
provided a strategic analysis of the interaction between 
managers and consumer advocates that has highlighted the 
influence of managerialism on this interaction. My 
strategic intent with this section has been to theorise some 
of the dimensions of an interaction which is central to 
understanding the transformative effect of the 
managerialist discourse on the welfare state.
SECTION IV
THE CHANGING STATE OF WELFARE
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Chapter 7
Working the welfare system
The societal perspective
The two chapters in this section take a societal perspective 
to look at issues in the recent development of the welfare 
state illuminated by the intersection of managerialism and 
consumer advocacy. As with the preceding sections, which 
took in turn the perspectives of the organisation and of the 
actor, an analysis at the level of society can generate 
insights that are not deducible from other perspectives, and 
deals with phenomena that are not reducible to system level 
effects of phenomena observed at the level of the actor or 
the organisation.
The method of enquiry must also change in response to the 
perspective taken. The first section, focussing on 
organisations, sought to engage with the discourse of 
managerialism through a reading of some of its conceptual 
antecedents, its formative debates, its statements of 
intention to reform and its appearance in the working 
documents and preoccupations of the organisations concerned. 
The discourse of managerialism proved to be extremely 
tangible as text.
The second section, focussing on strategic action, sought to 
engage in debate and analysis with a variety of actors 
including public sector managers and community activists.
As I researched this section, these people actively took up 
my engagement and enthusiastically discussed their 
strategies and their understanding of the framework for 
action they operated within. Again, it was possible to 
engage directly with the subject of the research.
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This section is concerned with the social system. "The 
social system," and like notions, are metaphorical 
constructs to understand social realities, and they find 
their most systematic expression in the texts of academic 
social theory. The method of this section then is to engage 
with a series of theoretical notions about welfare services 
and the welfare state. This is not to suggest that the 
previous sections have been atheoretical - just that the 
interrogation of academic social theory was not their 
primary subject.
Chapter seven is concerned with the constitution and 
legitimacy of the welfare state. The chapter begins with 
T.H. Marshall's conception of democratic-welfare-capitalism. 
Central to this is his influential view of the welfare 
rights of citizens and the prospects for reform of society 
through the welfare state. This is followed by an 
interpretation of Lindblom's account of the circular 
interaction of public administration with businesses, 
applied to the circular interaction of the public 
administration and stakeholders in welfare services. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of Clause Offe's notion 
of contradiction in the welfare state, illustrating his 
diagnosis by reference to managerial reforms.
Chapter eight is concerned with the development of welfare 
services themselves, provisionally discussed in terms of a 
"welfare market". This discussion covers the 
decommodification of labour, welfare as a commodity, and the 




Marshall points out that many authors since the Second World 
War have not been able to describe Western society "without 
the help of a hyphen, either written or implied" (Marshall 
1981 p 124). He introduced the descriptive phrase 
"democratic-welfare-capitalism" (ibid). In this 
formulation, the hyphen links
"different and contrasted elements together to create a 
new entity whose character is a product of the 
combination, but not the fusion, of the components 
whose separate identities are preserved intact and are 
of equal contributory status... That is the model of 
'hyphenation' against which I suggest that we should 
view our post-war social system" (Marshall 1981 p 124- 
125) .
Marshall points out that this depiction has similarities to 
Daniel. Bell's description of society as comprising a 
polity, an economy and a culture, with a disjunction of the 
three realms such that they each have their own rhythms of 
change and their own norms (Bell 1976 p 10). Marshall's 
scheme is to be preferred over Bell's for analysis of the 
modern welfare state for two reasons. Firstly, because it 
is an analysis that describes more fragmented and disjointed 
arenas of social struggle and contest, in contrast to Bell's 
overarching polity as the principal arena of social contest.
Secondly, Marshall's theorising of the hyphen is to be 
preferred to Bell's disjunction because while Bell brought 
to the fore the contradictions between cultural trends and 
economic developments, these contradictions in a sense 
emerge passively from a culture based on hedonism and an 
economy based on scarcity: "they are the recurrent dilemmas 
of private vices and public interests, now writ large" (Bell
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1976 p 236). The dilemmas are a subsequent problem to the 
disjunction of realms, to be solved by mediation in the 
polity. Marshall, by theorising the 'hyphen' as the 
relation between welfare and capitalism (more than by his 
specific choice of categories), orients our attention to the 
interactive processes of this relationship between the 
elements of his system, from which tensions or synergies can 
arise with contingent results. While the specifics of 
Marshall's own analysis leave something to be desired for 
the topic at hand as I shall show, his orientation retains 
its usefulness.
Welfare rights and reformism
Correlated with each element of Marshall's hyphenated 
society is a type of right. Thus civil rights go with 
capitalism and political rights with democracy. Marshall's 
main contention is that the right to welfare can be added to 
this list in the post-war period, thus elevating welfare to 
equal status with democracy and capitalism as key 
descriptors of society. The test of this is found in the 
definition that for every right there must be a remedy. 
Although welfare rights do not have a legal remedy in the 
way that political and civil rights do, in Marshall's view, 
other remedies do perform the task quite satisfactorily:
"Such a remedy can exist in a 'welfare society'. It 
can exist if the public, the politicians and the 
administration fully accept the legitimacy of the 
claims, take them seriously and give them a high 
priority. Against this background operate various 
forces, latent and manifest, which constrain all those 
on whom the implementation of the claims depends to 
carry out their duties honestly, impartially, 
consistently and in accordance with the intentions of
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the legislation on which the service is based." 
(Marshall 1981 p 89).
"All those on whom the implementation of the claims depends" 
refers in large part to the public service, and the "various 
forces" at work will for Marshall in general tend to ensure 
the bureaucracy contributes positively to the development of 
a universal citizenry that can and does participate in 
economic, cultural and political life. This view is at 
variance with Weber's interpretation of the effects of a 
bureaucracy:
"Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; 
this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of 
civilization never before achieved." (Weber 1958 p 
182) .
What is at stake here is a different strategic reading of 
the possibilities of social change that depend on the action 
of the public administration, a difference at the centre of 
the debate over reformism. Turner has described the 
argument as follows:
"Marshall's view of citizenship... provides the 
opposite of Weber's pessimism since Marshall can be 
interpreted as saying that social violence has the 
potential for expanding the universalistic definition 
of the citizen via class confrontation, ethnic conflict 
and migratory transformations of society." (Turner 
1986a p 59-60).
While Turner is correct to identify in Marshall a 
counterpoint to Weber's pessimism, it seems to me that 
Marshall's optimism is based on his belief in the benevolent 
responsiveness of the government to the demands for welfare 
from the public in a society experiencing economic growth,
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and that he cannot be interpreted as basing it on the 
expected outcome of social conflict. Social rights,
Marshall notes,
"are not designed for the exercise of power at all. 
[Social rights] refers to individuals as consumers, not 
as actors. There is little that consumers can do 
except imitate Oliver Twist and 'ask for more', and the 
influence politicians can exert over the public by 
promising to give it is generally greater than the 
influence the citizens - or those who care about these 
things - can exercise over politicians by demanding 
it." (Marshall 1981 p 141).
This view of the passive consumer of welfare services, not 
properly an actor, and unable to do more than call on the 
benevolence of the government, enables us to capture little 
of the dynamic underlying the development of welfare 
services. Turning our attention to violent confrontation as 
Turner suggests would do little to help. However history 
has given Marshall some cause to be optimistic, and Turner 
is right to detect signs of struggle underlying the gains 
made through welfare reform.
It has been my contention throughout this thesis that 
insights into the recent development of the welfare state 
can be gleaned by examining struggles between the 
bureaucracy and non-government organisations, and this 
picture shows little sign of either intrinsic benevolence or 
violent confrontation. John Keane, like Marshall, theorises 
the development of welfare as a result of the struggles 
between the public administration and the public. Keane 
points out the way bureaucracies themselves provoke and 
respond to these struggles:
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"for Weber, "the renunciation of the struggle for 
democratic public life becomes imperative, only 
'passive democratisation' is possible"... Weber too 
readily assumed that always and everywhere politics is 
for most people an avocation; he therefore seriously 
misjudged the degree to which bureaucracies would 
catalyse power struggles.
"These struggles effect continuous readjustments within 
bureaucratic organizations" (Keane 1984 p 6).
However, Turner has argued that Weber's analysis of legal 
authority and bureaucracy does in fact rest on a conception 
of society as an arena for inter-group conflict precisely 
because the value neutrality of the bureaucracy precipitates 
power struggles over its activities as determined by law:
"In Weber's view, the emergence of distinctive 
occupational groups under the corporatist division of 
labour produces pressure groups which advance their 
economic claims by legal devices which are based on the 
particular circumstances of the groups rather than on 
formal principles of law. While in theory all 
individuals are equal before the law, special laws are 
enacted by reference to the peculiariities of each 
pressure group... The control of law-making procedures 
is thus part of the struggle between privileged and 
dispriviliged groups to maintain or to undermine the 
existing distributional system, a struggle which 
constantly brings into question the precarious 
legitimacy of the state... given the instability of 
the state's legitimacy in the absence of a consensus 
over absolute values, Weber regards modern society as 
an arena of group conflict" (Turner 1981 p360).
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This interpretation does not negate Keane's observation that 
the bureaucracy itself would be involved in such conflict, 
an involvement Weber's analysis did not consider. Chapter 
three above discussed Weber's lack of consideration of the 
impact of the democratic ethos on the operation of the 
bureaucracy itself. The remainder of this chapter discusses 
various mechanisms at play in the struggle to legitimate and 
control the welfare activities of the state. Firstly, I 
examine some of the reciprocal relations between the 
political system and welfare services, based on the analysis 
by Charles Lindblom of circularities of control in 
polyarchal market systems. Secondly, I consider the problem 
posed by Offe: why is the capacity of the modern state for
planned social change so slight ? This is central to his 
notion of contradictions of the welfare state. He contends 
that the main drive for administrative reform arises 
internally within the state apparatus as a response to these 
contradictions, which can reemerge at each point of the 
implementation of the reforms.
The control of government and markets
Lindblom in his analysis of politics and markets (Lindblom 
1977) offers an explicit analysis of the privileged 
influence of business over democratic governments that goes 
beyond a conspiracy theory or the cooperation of elites (for 
example, see Mills 1956 ch 12). He proposes a framework 
for understanding large scale social action in market 
oriented democracies, analyses the form of organisation of 
business and political parties, and describes the nature of 
the circular interaction between business and government.
His claim for the centrality and determining power of this 
interaction in western societies is great. Referring to 
Lindblom, Wilenski summarises:
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"the amount of change and redistribution compatible 
with a market system is limited... perhaps the most 
important [factor] is that in a private enterprise 
system or a mixed economy vital decisions on the size, 
nature, direction and location of investment (and thus 
on the well-being of society as a whole) remain in the 
hands of business. They must therefore retain, in 
relation to government, a privileged position"
(Wilenski 1986 p 22).
As a conseguence of this privileged relation of business to 
government, Lindblom concludes that in summary,
"existing polyarchies are not very democratic, that 
political debate in them is not very free, and that 
policy making in them is actually in the hands of 
persons who want to protect the privileges of business 
and property." (Lindblom 1977 p 168).
Whatever the veracity of these claims, Lindblom's analysis, 
like Offe's, is clearly undertaken in the spirit of showing 
why the effectiveness of government is so limited, and in 
particular why its identification and achievement of 
democratically selected goals is so problematic. It is the 
dimensions of this analysis and their relevance to the 
interaction of the public administration and welfare 
organisations that are of primary interest for this chapter.
Lindblom points out that in democratic market oriented 
societies, polyarchy and market are both systems of popular 
control. Popular control in markets operates through 
consumer preferences, whilst popular control in the 
polyarchy operates through the formation of volitions and 
patterns of leader-citizen interchange. Thus voting and 
consumption are both mechanisms of popular control, and many 
areas of social activity are subject to dual control:
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"Thus, a nation's railroads can be subjected to 
polyarchal control or market control - or, as in actual 
fact in many systems, to a combination of the two. In 
many countries, popular control over public schools is 
attempted almost entirely through polyarchy, leaving 
only private schools to be market controlled. Medical 
services are mixed" (Lindblom 1977 p 144).
Many areas of the operation of markets also involve 
government action, either in the provision of services 
themselves that compete for market share with privately 
provided services, for example in freight services, or in 
the provision of a framework for and underpinning of private 
market activity, as in hospital services in Australia where 
professional medical services are universally insured by the 
government and private hospital insurance is strongly 
regulated by the government. The concept of the market as 
'free' from government intervention is odd. As Weber 
observed, from antiquity the establishment of markets has 
been bound up with the control of violence, both locally and 
internationally. It has involved
"guaranties for the observance of market legality, 
especially the modes or means of payment or, in periods 
of interlocal insecurity, the norms may be aimed at 
guaranteeing the market peace... the intensive 
expansion of exchange relations has always gone 
together with a process of relative pacification...
The appropriation of goods through free, purely 
economically rational exchange... is the conceptual 
opposite of appropriation of goods by coercion of any 
kind, but especially physical coercion, the regulated 
exercise of which is the very constitutive element of 
the political community." (Weber 1978 p 639-640)
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Thus in Weber's view, government involvement in markets to 
resolve social conflicts is central to both political action 
and to the expansion of the market. The market depends on 
the guarantee of peace from the government, and this 
underwrites the intimate relation of markets and polyarchy 
in a similar fashion to the dependence of governments on 
markets for the well-being of society as a whole. In 
democratic states, there is thus an element of popular 
control over markets through the polyarchy, in addition to 
control through consumer purchasing. In Lindblom's view, 
popular control in polyarchy operates through the formation 
of volitions.
Political scientists of a positivist bent spend much time 
objectively assessing the preferences of citizens on a wide 
range of issues. Lindblom points out that while the concept 
of preferences works well to predict actual market activity, 
and is valuable in economic analysis, for political choices 
"preference is too simple a concept" (Lindblom 1977 p 135).
In markets, a consumer with a preference for say vanilla, 
can choose vanilla when they buy an ice-cream, and the 
relation between preference and choice is direct and 
convincing. In contrast to this, in the polyarchal 
political system participants are not faced with choices 
that reflect their preferences, and their choices are not 
reflected directly in government action. In politics, 
voters with a preference for say not getting involved in 
war, are not faced with a choice that directly reflects 
this; the choice may be between candidates whose policies 
are unclear on the issue. Even in a referendum held on 
whether or not to get involved in a war - an unlikely event 
- if the citizen casts a 'no' vote, the government may still 
go to war if enough other citizens cast a 'yes' vote.
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The lack of any direct or convincing connection between 
preferences, choices and outcomes undermines the usefulness 
of the concept of preferences for political analysis. 
Lindblom argues that the concept of volitions, particularly 
complex judgements and moral judgements, is more salient to 
political analysis. Volitions reflect decisions on matters 
after reflection, and involve preferences, analysis and 
moral judgements.
"When we substitute volitions for preferences, we 
consequently realize that polyarchy is a process that 
forms volitions as well as a process for making policy 
respond to them" (Lindblom 1977 p 136).
This analysis recognises the "centrality of two-way 
interchange" between leaders and citizens (Lindblom 1977 p 
137), and emphasises the importance of the formation of 
complex, widely agreed policies for action through a myriad 
of channels for discussion:
"What is required over many areas of potential conflict 
is the construction of "integrated" rather than 
compromised solutions. These can be reached by 
reconsidered volitions that reduce conflict because 
they are re-formed in the light of political conflict 
and seek to avoid it" (Lindblom 1977 p 137).
Circularity in the struggle over welfare
This aspect of Lindblom's work has some similarities to 
Parsons' highly stylised analysis, discussed in chapter two 
above, of the similarities of the double interchange between 
business and markets using money, and the double interchange 
of political elites and citizens via generalized exchange 
media. Schumpeter discussed the concept of the formation
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and character of volitions in his seminal work on capitalism 
and democracy. His analysis begins by rejecting ideas of the 
will of the people and the common good found in 
jurisprudence and utilitarianism, but allowed that
"a common will or public opinion of some sort may still 
be said to emerge from the infinitely complex jumble of 
individual and group-wise situations, volitions, 
influences, actions and reactions of the "democratic 
process"" (Schumpeter 1987 p 253).
In discussing the formation of volitions within the 
democratic process, Schumpeter contends that unless citizen 
participation was free from the influence of pressure 
groups, it could not be considered as input to democratic 
decision making processes:
"all this the model citizen would have to perform for 
himself and independently of pressure groups and 
propaganda, for volitions and inferences that are 
imposed upon the electorate obviously do not qualify 
for ultimate data of the democratic process"
(Schumpeter 1987 p 254).
Lindblom takes up Schumpeter's point of such influences 
interfering with the democratic character of society in his 
analysis of business influence on volitions. An 
understanding of how "pressure groups and propaganda" 
influence volitions is important for explaining how 
"democratic processes" work, and this is my purpose in 
considering Lindblom's analysis of this; However I do not 
wish to take up his or Schumpeter's concern that the 
operation of these processes in some way means society is 
not truly democratic.
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In Lindblom's view of western democracies, the two way 
interchange in the construction of integrated solutions 
favours organised associations of people. Businesses are 
already organized for market reasons, and can put this 
organization to good effect in the political process 
(Lindblom 1977 p 196) through a circular interchange with 
the institutions of the polyarchy - also organised - whereby 
volitions are formed, modified and adopted. Volitions are 
held by participants at all levels of polyarchal 
institutions, with different degrees of influence. Lindblom 
offers a description of patterns of the moulding of 
volitions and circularities in control between business and 
polyarchy. His description can be applied to circularities 
between consumer advocacy groups and government. Although 
the extent of control explained by this is much less than 
the overall control in polyarchy exercised by business, it 
is helpful in understanding a range of welfare debates. As 
can be seen in the discussion that follows, the formation of 
volitions is not a process under the control of any one 
organisation or sector. Nevertheless, the circularities do 
play an important part in shaping outcomes.
One pattern of circular control by organisations over 
volitions is through legitimating the privileged 
participation of the organisation in the processes of 
polyarchal government:
"businessmen try to legitimize the controls they 
exercise through their privileged position by 
persuading citizens that the controls are part of 
polyarchal politics... they try to associate private 
enterprise with political democracy and identify 
attacks on the former as attacks on the latter" 
(Lindblom 1977 p 203).
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Consumer advocacy organisations employ a similar strategy of 
legitimation by themselves providing welfare services, which 
may be directly or indirectly (e.g. through designation as a 
tax deductible charity) government funded. As providers of 
welfare, they develop a support base amongst their clients, 
and argue more widely that they are providing a necessary 
service for society. This legitimates their involvement in 
policy debates, and their experience can sharpen their 
arguments. Having a direct service delivery role can mean 
they are representing both consumers and providers of 
services. This may in some cases involve a conflict of 
interests that undermines their legitimacy in policy 
debates. However, as was argued in chapter five, this 
problem can be overstated, as it often is for strategic 
purposes by competing groups.
A second way organisations mould citizens' volitions is 
through debates on secondary issues. For business, these 
are issues that different corporations or associations of 
businesses are in disagreement over. Whilst agreeing on the 
main issue at hand, they competitively seek to persuade 
other organisations and the public to their view on the 
secondary issues while the consensus on the primary issue is 
taken for granted. Similarly, consumer organisations often 
conflict on particular policy issues, for example about how 
funding should be dispersed, whilst not disputing the 
overall level of funding sought. As is the case between 
private firms, these conflicts can be fairly pointed when 
the legitimacy of and support for the organisation itself is 
at stake.
In the disability area, a wide range of consumer 
organisations have developed based around the medical 
classification of the disabilities. The review of 
government support for these organisations, support which 
legitimates their involvement in policy debates, drew out
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some of this conflict (Jenkins 1991). Bjarne Nordin, 
secretary of the parliamentary committee that conducted the 
review, commented as follows:
"There's a whole range of different organisations 
representing different interest groups and different 
disability groups. Its a very contentious area because 
of the politically charged and emotionally charged 
nature of disabilities themselves, and also the vocal 
nature of a lot of representatives in that area.
They're becoming quite sophisticated at manoeuvring 
both within the bureaucratic environment and also 
within their own local environments. There is a lot of 
antagonism within the area about which particular 
organisation is more representative than another, and 
the relative amounts of funds that they get to 
represent what they see as being the direct concerns of 
the people whom they're supposed to be servicing." 
(Nordin interview).
The various disability organisations spend considerable 
energy on the secondary debate about their
representativeness and legitimacy. This over-shadows debate 
on the primary issue of the extent and nature of government 
support for people with disabilities, and the right of 
disabled people to be directly involved in shaping this 
support. What then is the effect of the secondary debate on 
the primary issue? The parliament through its review, is 
concerned with the question of how best to provide funds to 
progress the interests of people with disabilities as these 
are construed by the disability organisations, certain parts 
of the bureaucracy and the parliamentary committee. The 
actual amount of funding is not the issue in this case. But 
the way funding is provided to these organisations by a 
managerialist bureaucracy determines how it may be used, by
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tying it to the objectives of the governmental program from 
which funding is provided:
"Within an area like disability, very hard decisions 
have to be made about whether or not it's appropriate 
to fund organisations for national secretariats and for 
quite elaborate office infrastructures. There are 
debates about whether you should have separate 
secretariats or separate office premises for people 
with hearing disabilities and people with sight 
disabilities, or whether you should look at ways of 
providing funds through programs for client support, 
and perhaps have shared office or secretarial 
facilities for a number of organisations. That would 
be a better use I think of the resources that are 
required for those kinds of office activities, and 
which aren't really essential for providing the sort of 
client support on the ground that a lot of these 
organisations do." (Nordin interview).
The effect of such a shift from funding a secretariat to 
funding client services will be to reduce the resources at 
the disposal for the organisation to participate in the 
moulding of volitions. However the concurrent merging of 
secretariats will facilitate the development of integrated 
policy positions by the consumer organisations in the 
disability sector, and reduce conflict in the public arena 
between these organisations. Such a change will not so much 
stop different viewpoints being heard as stop them 
developing into fully fledged policy options to be floated 
in public.
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Diffused confusion and mammographic screening
The final pattern of circularity in volitions and policy I 
shall consider here is diffused confusion of the public. 
Polyarchal institutions and business, and I contend consumer 
organisations, all put out messages that
"confuse and deceive the public. The result is that, 
although people do not always do what leadership wants, 
they are incapable of knowing and protecting their own 
interests" (Lindblom 1977 p 219).
Diffused confusion is common in debates requiring complex 
scientific judgements as a basis for determining policy.
This is frequently seen in environmental debates where 
business and environment lobbies throw up scientific issues 
to confuse rather than clarify the issues concerned. 
Similarly the debate over mammographic screening for breast 
cancer has been plagued by confusion on all sides.
To understand this requires a brief examination of the 
purpose of mammographic screening and the evidence of 
benefit from such screening. The proposal to introduce a 
mammographic screening program is based on the assumption 
that having a bi-annual mammogram will result in better 
health - fewer deaths and less suffering - for the 
participants as a group. The best available evidence for 
this comes from two controlled trials of such a program in 
Sweden involving 177,000 women followed up for around seven 
years . The combined results of these trials show that 
screening saves one death from breast cancer for every 
15,000 women-years of participation (Schmidt 1990a).
However, this positive result, which has been translated 
into the target of reducing the death rate from breast 
cancer by 25% through an Australia wide mammographic 
screening program (Health targets and implementation
committee 1988 p 39), is only part of the story. The 
adverse effects of screening must also be considered:
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"The breast cancer screening problem is often reduced 
to one guestion: does screening and early intervention 
(mastectomy/lumpectomy) truly reduce the mortality from 
breast cancer? From a more comprehensive 
epidemiological point of view, however, the problem 
must include the question: do benefits outweigh the 
adverse effects" (Schmidt 1990a p 215).
Adverse effects include the detrimental effects of 
investigation by the mammogram itself, and by the clinical 
examination, needle biopsy and surgical biopsy of women who 
have (false) positive mammograms that do not turn out to be 
cancer. In one of the trials reviewed by Dr Schmidt, for 
every life saved from breast cancer there were two extra 
deaths from cardiovascular causes. However, because of the 
much lower incidence of breast cancer than cardiovascular 
disease and the limited size of the study group, the 
reduction in deaths from breast cancer was considered 
significant, while the increase in deaths from 
cardiovascular disease was not (Schmidt 1990b p 237). 
Furthermore, there is a documented, statistically 
significant increase in the suicide rate for people 
diagnosed as having breast cancer:
"This would mean that there is some increase of suicide 
in the screening group associated with the increase of 
diagnosed breast cancer" (Schmidt 1990b p 237)
Schmidt's review in the Journal of clinical epidemiology 
concludes:
"the net effect of mass breast cancer screening is 
questionable and appears to be rather detrimental. It
may be an error to recommend mass breast screening" 
(Schmidt 1990a p 215).
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Thus, although mammographic screening does reduce deaths 
from breast cancer, it is possible on the available evidence 
that it may increase deaths from other causes.
Nevertheless, based on the same data, expert bodies such as 
the Better Health Commission continue to focus only on 
reducing deaths from breast cancer, and have stated that:
"ideally every woman aged 40-45 should have a mammogram 
performed, and a further mammogram annually from the 
age of 50" (Better Health Commission 1986 vol 2 p 247).
The professionals' position was perhaps best expressed by Dr 
Michael Jones on behalf of the Royal Australasian College of 
Radiologists, the group with the most to gain from the 
implementation of screening mammography:
"At present, there are no vested interests in screening 
mammography... The impetus for mammography screening 
comes only from the health benefits it promises"
(Sydney Morning Herald 13/1/1990).
Two caveats have been put forward which allow policy 
flexibility on the issue, without challenging the "ideal". 
The first is about resources: cost (estimated at $124 
million in 1986) and lack of trained personnel are offered 
as reasons for partial implementation (Better Health 
Commission 1986 vol 2 p 247). The second caveat is that 
mammographic screening should be introduced and monitored so 
as to ensure maximum effectiveness and to minimise costs. 
This was the focus of the national evaluation of breast 
cancer screening pilot projects (AHMAC 1990 p 13). That 
evaluation has not collected data on the adverse health 
effects on the screened population apart from the number of
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procedures performed directly as a result of the follow up 
of positive screens. Further, the evaluation confuses the 
costs and benefits of mammographic screening by claiming 
that the unnecessary anxiety provoked by the promotion of 
mammograms for women whose mammogram turns out to be 
negative, is actually a source of significant benefit:
"The mortality savings from each screening round 
accrues to less than 1% of women screened, the true 
positive group. The numerically more significant 
benefit is the value of any reassurance women gain in 
receiving a negative result from the screening process. 
This accrues to women in the true negative group [90- 
95%]. (AHMAC 1990 p 43).
This situation on the professional side of debates and 
actions over mammography, which makes confused use of 
available scientific evidence, set the scene for lobbying 
from consumer groups that ignored the underlying issue of 
net health benefits. Instead, their lobbying accused the 
government of putting women's lives at risk whilst saving 
money by not introducing a large scale screening program:
"there are women's groups pushing for mammography 
screening, saying that if the issue was cancer of the 
penis or testicles there would be faster decisions 
made" (Norman Swann, SMH 10/1/1990).
This pressure was summarised in the National Women's Health 
Policy, prepared in consultation with the Consumer's Health 
Forum, the Australian Women's Health Network and the 
Australian Council of Trade Unions, as follows:
"While acknowledging the need for an evaluation of a 
national screening program, submissions to the National 
Women's Health Policy have emphasised the need to
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immediately increase public awareness and education on 
screening programs... [This] should focus on 
availability and access to screening, education about 
preventive benefits and increased awareness about what 
to expect from screening." (DCSH 1989 p 36).
The government responded to public pressure to introduce 
screening:
"In the lead up to the March 1990 federal election, the 
Australian Labour Party promised that, if re-elected, 
it would introduce a National Early Breast Cancer 
Detection Program offering mamraographic screening to 
women aged 40 years and above" (AHMAC 1990 p 13).
Norman Swann, a leading commentator and himself a specialist 
physician, posed the following question to highlight the 
absurdity of it all:
"What would you say about a government that introduced 
a medical test, the worth of which scientists 
increasingly doubted... for which up to 350,000 women 
who have nothing wrong will require repeat tests and 
even surgery ... Would you say this is an enlightened 
government, a government that cares for women? Or 
would you say it's daft?" (Norman Swann, SMH 
10/1/1990).
My argument here is that the introduction of this policy 
came about as a result of intensive lobbying of government 
by the professions involved and women's interest groups, 
facilitated by a consultative policy making process. This 
lobbying took place against a background of diffused 
confusion amongst the public, misled by the professions 
interpreting the evidence about mammographic screening, and 
misled by consumer lobbyists focussing on cost as a reason
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for delay in implementing the program, rather than on the 
health benefits and costs.
Contradictions of the welfare state
The above discussion of Lindblom's work has focussed on the 
legitimating influence of non-government organisations over 
the development of state welfare, and has described the way 
actors external to the bureaucracy achieve a limited measure 
of control over government policy by influencing the 
formation of volitions. I now turn to the work of Claus 
Offe to discuss the internal pressures for policy innovation 
that develop within the welfare state. Offe theorises the 
interconnections between democracy, capitalism and welfare 
in a way that emphasises the contradictions and crises that 
arise. His explanations of social change give prominence to 
developments related to these contradictions and crises.
The picture that develops does not show much evidence of 
intentional control over the development of welfare. It is 
discussed here to provide a critique of emancipatory reform 
as the ethos of managerialism.
Offe's study of the welfare state begins by asking why the 
ability to produce intended changes in society is so 
limited:
"Why [is] the capacity of late capitalist societies for 
political regulation so slight and their capacity for 
'planned social change' so defective... [Offe's study] 
examines the interventionist, welfare state regulatory 
strategies of late capitalist societies not from the 
stand-point of how their effectiveness could be 
increased but rather from that of why their 
effectiveness is - in spite of all attempts at 
improvement - so limited." (Offe 1984 p 35).
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Contrary to Marshall's view of the benevolent and relatively 
late establishment of welfare services by the state as a 
manifestation of the expansion of citizenship rights, Offe 
holds that such services have been an essential development 
for the establishment of the modern labour market as the 
dominant form of labour exchange:
"a precondition of the constitution of a class of wage 
labourers is the political institutionalization - and 
not merely the de facto maintenance - of various 
categories of non-wage-labourers" (Offe 1984 p 95).
Thus the provision of welfare does not reduce the motivation 
of people to work as wage labourers; the establishment of 
publicly funded training, childcare, healthcare and 
rehabilitation actually works to enable participation in the 
labour force. It is not a question of motivations, but of 
options, and these are regulated by the state:
"When, and for how long, individuals remain outside the 
labour market, the decision whether someone is too old, 
sick, young, disabled, or has a valid claim to be part 
of the education system or to social provision must be 
left neither to individual needs nor to the momentary 
chances of subsistence outside the market. These 
choices must be positively regulated through 
politically defined criteria, for otherwise there would 
be incalculable tendencies for wage-labourers to evade 
their function." (Offe 1984 p 95).
These tendencies are one source of tension, one point of 
conflict in the relation between the provision of welfare 
a^nd participation in society. Offe's argument extends 
beyond income support and can be applied across the range of 
welfare services, all of which have some relation to the
191
central conflicts of the labour market. From this 
perspective, the struggle over welfare is about 
participation of citizens in the wider society, and on the 
other about gaining control over the provision of these 
services so that they are directed to the social needs of 
service users rather than the systematic requirements of the 
labour market. The position of consumer advocates can be 
read as seeking to gain such control, and to put the 
participation in the market economy on a more favourable 
footing for their constituency, not per se to direct a 
larger slice of public expenditure their way. An example of 
this is the call by the Australian Community Health 
Association for a national primary care program to be 
created by amalgamating a number of existing programs, with 
the aim of developing alternatives to primary health care 
delivered through the private sector, and shifting the locus 
of care from hospitals to the community (ACHA 1986 p 111- 
112). Such a program need not require increased state 
resources, but would deploy health expenditure in a way more 
ammenable to control by community members.
A major difficulty for the public administration stems from 
the contradictory demands that can legitimately be made on 
it by the working class given their prevailing political 
rights, and by the capital accumulation process to the 
extent that its exigencies are foreseeable:
"the explanation of social policy must indeed take into 
account... the political processing of both class 
conflict and the crises of the accumulation process.
As the reaction to both these sets of problems, social 
policy development can never deal with these problems 
consistently. The solution to one set of problems in 
no way coincides with the solution to the other; they 
are mutually contradictory." (Offe 1984 p 103-104).
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Offe contends that those contradictory demands on the 
administration result in policy innovations being developed 
and assessed in terms of the way they are compatible with 
both sets of demands. These innovations arise in reaction 
to compatibility problems of the internal structure of the 
administration, oriented as it is to demands for welfare and 
economic growth:
"State policy innovations do not 'serve' the needs or 
exigencies of any particular social group or class, but 
instead react to the internal structural problems of 
the welfare state apparatus." (Offe 1984 p 105).
The changes from implementing these innovations then affect 
the services provided in ways quite different to what may 
have been demanded, although these demands may have been 
satisfied and will certainly be affected along the way:
"There is no such thing as an administrative reform 
that is nothing but an administrative reform; it always 
entails changes in the quality of the available 
services, their accessibility to clients, the 
composition of the clientele, and so on" (Offe 1984 p 
107) .
Offe goes on to describe the strategic common denominators 
of policy innovations that seek to solve the compatibility 
problem. Two that are particularly relevant to the 
intersection of managerialism and consumer advocacy are the 
strategy of prevention; and the shift from conditional to 
final programmes. I shall now discuss each of these with 
reference to Australian empirical material.
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The strategy of prevention
The strategy of prevention is based on
"enhancing the effectiveness of social policy by 
relying increasingly on preventive (instead of 
retrospective, 'curative') problem-solving strategies" 
(Offe 1984 p 109).
Innovations based on these strategies will be familiar to 
all observers of welfare administration. Prevention forms a 
large part of the rationale of, and the justification used 
to gain government funding, of the National Better Health 
Program (NBHP, a commonwealth-state program for health 
promotion); Worksafe Australia (a tripartite commission for 
occupational health and safety); the Community Youth Support 
Scheme (CYSS, now defunct); and the National HIV/AIDS 
Strategy. These programs address the compatibility problem 
by promising on the one hand to reduce net costs to the 
state by intervening "at the earliest point in the 
development of the problem" (Offe 1984 p 109) for which the 
state will face claims on it at some point; and on the other 
to improve social conditions, reduce morbidity, avoid social 
disintegration (of for example youth {CYSS} or the aged 
{NBHP}) and so on.
But to return to Offe's original question, how successful 
can these strategies be? He makes the point, well 
recognised but rarely stated in policy circles, that 
reductions in state outlays are not usually realised by 
preventive programs. For example the global cost of health 
interventions is determined much more by the supply of 
professionals and services and their "latitude to set 
prices" (Offe 1984 p 109) than by the morbidity profile or 
timing of intervention. Similarly the adoption by the 
administration of a strategy of prevention hardly guarantees
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the gains promised for the target group. This is because in 
most cases the state is not in control of enough independent 
social variables to actually produce the intended outcome:
"state policy simply does not command the requisite 
social 'media of control' necessary for guaranteeing a 
preventive outcome. These is why the 'success' of 
social policy is determined by the conflictual 
'strategies of utilization' of the various social 
classes and groups involved" (Offe 1984 p 109-110).
To the disconnection of fiscal success and social success 
inherent in welfare programs, we can add a third element, 
namely the disconnection of political success. As discussed 
in chapter two above, management has three tasks: accounting 
for the process, entrepreneurship, and ensuring political 
support. In public sector management, these translate to 
fiscal responsibility, innovation in welfare interventions, 
and ensuring positive political impact.
The disconnection and conflict between the quest for 
innovation and the political impact of programs can be 
clearly seen in the Commonwealth funding of community based 
AIDS education. This type of preventive government 
intervention depends for its impact on being taken up by 
groups and agencies embedded deeply in the community, having 
extensive contact with the people most at risk from the 
problems the program seeks to prevent. However the demands 
arising from the political management of the program can 
inhibit the operation of the group organising activity 
within the community. This in turn can have implications 
for the financial efficiency and accountability of program 
funds. This was illustrated by Warren Talbot, former 
executive director of AFAO, in response to a question I put 
to him about the political dimensions of his interaction 
with the government administration:
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"for the Youth Education Project we did some tram ad's 
in Melbourne which were basically just designed to tell 
young lesbians and gay men where to go for counselling 
and support. It didn't mention AIDS. Less than two 
days before they were to appear on the trams - actually 
they were already on the trams but that is a different 
story - I got a phone call at 7 o'clock on a Friday 
afternoon from Terry Slater - none of our money - he 
said "our" money - none of the Commonwealth's money is 
to be used. So that sort of conflict was always there 
in terms of the message and what money could be used, 
was this in agreement with the Grant conditions, was it 
a legitimate use of AIDS money or not. That was a 
constant source of conflict.
"In that particular case that Slater felt that the 
advertisement on a tram telling young gay men to phone 
for counselling, without any mention of AIDS, was 
politically unacceptable. He saw it as his job to 
police that fairly strongly. There was a lot of that 
going on. At the end of the day in most dramatic terms 
they wouldn't fund a project that they saw as being 
politically unacceptable, or they would fund them and 
you would haggle and negotiate over content. There are 
all these auditors inquiries showing the massive delays 
to do with money. The most common point of delay was 
where we'd get the text ready for something and it 
would be submitted to DCSH, and it would be held up.
The youth project just didn't go anywhere, it took 
months and months sitting around the branch because 
they just weren't quite sure politically what was 
acceptable or not" (Talbot interview).
The essential point I seek to draw from this story is that
the tensions and conflicts between community needs, fiscal
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expectations and political imperatives, that drives the 
development of new initiatives by the administration, are 
not resolved by the mere establishment of a program, no 
matter how elegantly the "compatibility problem" is solved 
on paper. These tensions reemerge at each point of decision 
making and resource allocation in the implementation of the 
program. The exigencies in the sphere of operation of the 
program operate to disconnect intention from action at each 
of these points, with unpredictable impacts on program 
effectiveness.
The strategy of final programs
Program management itself can be considered a strategy of 
rationalization in Offe' terms, as one of the "efforts to 
render social policy more effective by replacing conditional 
with final programmes" (Offe 1984 p 110). The emphasis on 
outcomes brought by managerialism to public administration 
encourages final programs which aim to bring about desired 
outcomes, over conditional programs, which aim to provide 
program benefits in cases where certain specified conditions 
are met and through this bring about desired outcomes. As 
with the strategy of prevention, the strategy of final 
programmes has great scope for solving the internal 
consistency problems of the state, by giving it greater 
control over the effects of programs and greater autonomy 
over resource allocation decisions:
"In this type of innovation, the reference to internal 
state consistency problems is also evident: a
relaxation of rigid legal forms facilitates the 
dismissal of claims whose satisfaction is not 
considered 'appropriate' in the light of concrete 
circumstances, while the binding power of precepts can 
be softened if the fiscal consequences of their
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implementation (like unemployment and the lowering of 
the tax yield) seem too serious" (Offe 1984 p 110).
However, the adoption of an orientation to final programs 
itself creates new tensions. Essentially it heightens the 
expectation in the struggles between the state and various 
social interests for the state to actually manage to achieve 
specified outcomes, but does not reduce the variety of, or 
the conflicts between the various outcomes desired:
"Of course, what has been judged appropriate, 
desirable, necessary, etc., and accordingly recognized 
as grounds for a decision by the administration and the 
courts typically depends both directly and indirectly 
upon the balance of power between social interests and 
their respective ability to threaten and sanction"
(Offe 1984 p 110).
The balance in the influence of competing interests on 
government action can itself be tilted by adopting 
management techniques such as a focus on outcomes. Louise 
Sylvan, a director of the Australian Consumers Association, 
has argued that with the introduction of managerialism to 
the Australian public sector, there was an associated 
adoption of the business sector preference for small 
government, which now sits as an undercurrent in public 
sector management. This undermines the confidence of public 
sector managers in the value of public sector interventions, 
which has contributed to the general tension between 
responding to calls on the government to provide services 
and the fiscal pressure to keep government spending as low 
as possible.
"as we adopted those private sector norms and ways of 
running programs, I think we've also adopted something 
else and it sits in an undercurrent and that's maybe
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why there is so much tension in the government. By 
definition in the private sector, and now [inherent] in 
the public sector, in the way we manage the economy, 
growth is good and it needs to be exponential: we need 
to have overall growth in GDP, preferably in private 
sector GDP rather than public sector GDP. What we 
haven't realised is that when you have more affluent 
societies, when you have societies that are growing, 
people's demand for goods and services provided by the 
private sector is equally matched by demands for goods 
provided by the public sector. So that growth of a 
requirement for consumer goods is matched as well by a 
growth in demand for education, better roads, in all of 
the things that are provided by the public sector. But 
at the same time in terms of what is considered to be 
appropriate in small government, you take away the 
legitimacy and the ability of the public sector to 
actually respond to that. Something else could have 
happened when you adopted the private sector norms, 
namely a legitimation of the delivery of public sector 
goods in an efficient way. But that didn't happen at 
all, and its set up an impossible tension.” (Sylvan 
interview).
The lack of realisation that growth in demand for private 
sector goods is matched by growth in demand for public 
sector goods is accentuated if we consider public sector 
services. The relation of the provision of human services 
to the rest of the economy - primary and secondary industry, 
and the financial and other services related to the 
production and marketing of the products of industry - are 
not understood in any widely agreed framework:
"The good old assumptions of the economic model of 
rationalist man hold only with great difficulty. With 
services in fact its even harder to make the arguments,
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and I suppose that's part of the problem. What 
government does is by and large deliver services, and 
we don't understand that very well." (Sylvan 
interview).
Offe believes that one thing contributing to this lack of 
understanding results from the fact that most public 
services are not distributed through the use of market 
pricing, not withstanding the use of fees for services. For 
public sector endeavours such as hospitals, transport 
systems, housing authorities and prisons,
"the prevailing allocating mechanism is not sale but 
such things as legal claims, compulsory rules, 
acknowledged need or simply rights to free use. It is 
therefore not surprising that one of the most 
controversial and unresolved issues in the fields of 
liberal public economics and political science concerns 
the mechanism of production and distribution of 'public 
goods' that could be substituted for the market 
exchange mechanism that is inapplicable in the realm of 
public production" (Offe 1984 p 127).
It is not just liberal theory that is confused over the 
production and distribution of public sector production and 
there is more at stake than the exchange mechanism. I shall 
consider this in more detail in the next chapter through a 
critique of the central metaphors of market analysis in 
liberal economics - commodity, profit and equity - in their 
application to the development of welfare services.
I would like to recap this chapter's discussion of central 
issues to do with managerialism and consumer advocacy in 
sociological theories of the welfare state. The first part 
of the chapter discussed Marshall's ideas about the 
expansion of citizenship to encompass claims to welfare as a
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right, and his view that this was an essentially 
emancipatory development stemming from the impartiality of 
the public administration and the recognition of the 
legitimacy of claims to welfare by democratically elected 
governments.
Turner saw this as an important theoretical development from 
the pessimism of Weber's analysis of the influence of the 
state bureaucracy on society; a development legitimating the 
potential of reformism for social emancipation. However, 
Turner failed to see the essentially passive nature of 
Marshall's analysis of welfare rights, which casts citizens 
as consumers of welfare rather than as political actors. 
Keane's criticism of Weber, that he failed to foresee the 
extent to which bureaucracies catalyse power struggles, also 
applies to Marshall's analysis of the development of 
welfare. However, such active struggles can be understood 
within Marshall's metaphor of the hyphen as an actively 
constituted articulation between welfare services and the 
democratic-capitalist state.
The remainder of the chapter discussed aspects of these 
active struggles, commencing with Lindblom's analysis of the 
formation of volitions as an actual site of these 
constitutive struggles. Lindblom emphasised the advantage 
of business organisation in his analysis of circularities of 
control over the formation of volitions. An analysis of 
circular mechanisms of control in the formation of welfare 
policy showed how these mechanisms could be translated from 
analysing business to analysing community organisations, and 
also showed how the undue influence of entrenched private 
sector interests remains an important factor in these policy 
debates.
Offe's work was discussed to outline aspects of the 
structure of the welfare state showing how the institutions
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of government are related in contradictory and contingent 
ways to society more broadly, including the labour market. 
From this perspective, policy initiatives arise as 
internally generated solutions to resolve these 
contradictions, but the tensions they are designed to 
overcome reemerge at each point of their implementation in 
the state's dealing with non-government groups.
This analysis at the level of the social system shows the 
limited sense in which welfare policy can be said to be 
under any agency's control, and the limitations for any 
direct relation between policy goals and historical 
developments. The next chapter takes a wider view of welfare 
services in society to explore the metaphor of the market 
for understanding the development of welfare services. This 
development has proved to be only very partially explained 
by the "open hand" of welfare policy. Is it illuminated 
better through an understanding of the ways of the "hidden 
hand" of the welfare market ?
Chapter 8
The welfare market ?
Is there a welfare market ?
This chapter examines issues of the exchange of services 
between providers and consumers in what is provisionally 
called the welfare market. These issues are discussed in 
the terms of market analysis including the commodity form, 
productivity, profit and eguity.
After briefly exploring the use of the term "welfare 
market," the discussion considers Esping-Andersen's 
reflections on the relation of welfare to decommodification 
in labour markets. This is followed by considering Offe's 
contention that welfare services cannot themselves be 
commodities, do not directly participate in the commodity 
exchange nexus, and thus do not contribute to economic 
productivity. I conclude the investigation of the commodity 
form in relation to welfare by examining Considine's claim 
that managerialism has led to a commodification of welfare 
service provision by the state.
The discussion goes on to consider the involvement of the 
private sector in welfare, where profit operates as the key 
distributive principle for the development of the welfare 
market. The chapter concludes by considering the way equity 
in social outcomes operates as a key principle for 
government involvement in the development of welfare markets 
as both service provider and market regulator. The new 
managerialism and consumer advocacy play a part in the 
working out of each of these principles in the development 
of the welfare market.
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In what follows, "welfare market" refers to both welfare and 
market in their broad sense. Welfare refers to what are 
mainly services, essentially based around people in their 
private lives, including their readiness for work and their 
participation in community life and culture. To misuse a 
phrase from the World Health Organisation, welfare services 
are directed at people's physical, emotional and social 
well-being. In Habermas' terms, they are services whose 
primary use and meaning is to be found within the lifeworld. 
Welfare includes healthcare, education, income support, 
welfare services in the sense of services provided by 
welfare agencies, community services, housing, recreation 
and so on. Exact definition is not important in the broad 
outline of what follows? it is more important in debate over 
market dynamics in specific segments of the welfare market, 
in which case specificity is not usually difficult.
Use of the term "market" is more problematic. It will be 
used to denote a broad area of activity based around 
exchange, specifically the provision and consumption of 
welfare services. This frequently takes place without 
pricing or monetary exchange, without competition or choice, 
and without profit. However, these are secondary analytical 
features of markets, not necessary conditions to be met 
before the term can be used. While monetary exchange may 
not take place at the point of welfare service delivery, as 
is frequently the case in service markets (for example, 
maintenance contracts), it has usually taken place at some 
point in relation to the provision of the service. It could 
be argued that although the provision of government funds is 
determined by political decisions that have not involved 
pricing, the administration of the funds will usually 
require possible service components to be priced. Many 
markets do not feature competition, for example if there is 
an anti-competitive agreement or a monopoly supplier, in 
which case there may not be consumer choice. Finally, many
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non-profit organisations supply various product and service 
markets.
One of the more powerful arguments for theorising a welfare 
market as a sui generis arena for competing actors, that 
include government agencies pursuing their program 
objectives, is that the government and its agencies 
themselves conceive of such a terrain when planning their 
strategies. Given this, the use of the metaphor of the 
welfare market can help in an analysis of such strategies.
An aspect of Marshall's analysis is his insight that public 
welfare services and private sector services are engaged in 
similar activities. In the post war period,
"it became possible to see that the welfare sector and 
the mixed economy were engaged in the same task, of 
meeting the needs and demands of consumers throughout 
the nation, but that they were using different methods. 
The hyphenated society can succeed - by which I mean 
survive without drifting towards a state of anomie - 
only if it recognises that both the welfare sector and 
the mixed economy are contributing to the creation of 
welfare in the broad, non-technical sense of the word." 
(Marshall 1981 p 131).
Whilst acknowledging that the study of the mix of private 
and public involvement in welfare "faces formidable 
obstacles" (Esping-Andersen 1990 p 81), Esping-Andersen's 
recent work on welfare capitalism supports both the 
contention that private and public enterprise is involved in 
welfare, and that the relationship between them is crucial 
for western society:
"In all advanced countries we find some blend of 
private and public welfare provision, and it is in this
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relationship that we will uncover some of the most 
important structural properties of welfare states” 
(Esping-Andersen 1990 p 79).
The analysis of markets, including the welfare market, must 
as a central problem deal with the involvement of multiple 
actors, individual and corporate, on both the provider and 
consumer sides of the set of exchange relationships that 
constitutes the market. The implication in both Marshall 
and Esping-Andersen's work is that the position and 
operation of government and private actors on the supply 
side of the welfare market is a crucial reflection on 
society as a whole.
One approach to help understand the relation of public and 
private welfare provision was discussed in the last chapter. 
Lindblom's analysis of the relation between business and 
government, identifying a number of circularities of control 
between them, was extended to discuss the involvement of 
consumer groups in the formation of political volitions that 
could powerfully influence the development of the welfare 
market. This exercise was a micro-analysis of mechanisms 
that influence the development of welfare services. This 
chapter deals with a larger scale analysis by examining the 
operation of two principles at work in the development of 
welfare markets, namely profitability (for the private 
sector) and social equity (for the government).
Before embarking on this I shall consider the problem of the 
commodity form in relation to welfare services. The 
theoretical terrain for a discussion of commodification in 
relation to welfare markets is complex, however the 
arguments I wish to make are fairly straight forward. I 
shall consider commodification from three perspectives.
These are: firstly, Esping-Andersen's summary of the
teleological argument that developments in welfare markets
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occur so as to assist the decommodification of workers in 
labour markets; secondly, Offe's argument that because of 
the centrality of the labour market, it is an error to 
consider welfare services as commodities at all? and 
thirdly, Considine's argument that the introduction of 
managerialism into the public sector is resulting in a 
commodification of welfare services.
Welfare and the decommodification of labour
The labour market is at the centre of the relations of 
production in a capitalist society. In Marx's analysis, the 
purchase of labour as a commodity by the owners of the means 
of production is necessary for value to be added to all 
other commodities. The subsequent exchange of the product 
enables the accumulation of capital;
"In order to be able to extract value from the 
consumption of a commodity, our friend, Moneybags, must 
be so lucky as to find, within the sphere of 
circulation, in the market, a commodity, whose use- 
value possesses the peculiar property of being a source 
of value, whose actual consumption, therefore, is 
itself an embodiment of labour, and consequently, a 
creation of value" (Marx 1954 p 164)
Labour as a commodity is different from other commodities. 
Firstly, in Marx's theory of value, the consumption of 
labour is the principle source of value, and so demand for 
labour is fundamentally different to the demand for 
commodities that lose value as they are consumed. Secondly, 
its supply and exchange are fundamentally different to other 
commodities because of the survival needs of workers:
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"Workers are not commodities like others because they 
must survive and reproduce themselves and the society 
they live in... labor is unable to withhold itself for 
long without recourse to alternative means of 
subsistence" (Esping-Andersen 1990 p 37)
The commodification of labour power has occurred in the 
welfare market as it has in other industries. It is 
possible to trace the transition of the organisation of the 
labour-power deployed in the provision of welfare from pre­
commodified arrangements in the family, church or manor, to 
the modern professional. However, because this thesis 
focuses on welfare services from the perspectives of the 
interaction of the consumer advocate and the program 
manager, I have chosen not to discuss the history of the 
welfare worker.
As discussed in the last chapter, the assumption by the 
state of responsibility for welfare and the emaciation of 
welfare provision through other sources has been associated 
with the very development of the labour market, through what 
Offe terms "active proletarianization" (Offe 1984 p 92).
This is a key interaction between the labour market and the 
welfare market:
"The blossoming of capitalism came with the withering 
away of 'pre-commodified' social protection. When the 
satisfaction of human wants came to imply the purchase 
of conmodities, the issue of purchasing-power and 
income distribution became salient. When, however, 
labor power also became a commodity, peoples' rights to 
survive outside the market are at stake. It is this 
which constitutes the single most conflictual issue in 
social policy" (Esping-Andersen 1990 p 35).
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Thus, in Esping-Andersen's view, the comimodif ication of 
labour, facilitated by "the withering aw*ay of pre­
commodified social protection," sets off struggles over 
welfare for those who are or who may becsome outside the 
labour market. Esping-Andersen gives an account of why both 
liberalism and socialism supported the development of 
welfare.
In both sets of arguments the development of welfare is 
understood as the result of the struggle between the 
interests of labour, the interests of capital and the 
institutions of the state, under various regimes of control.
Liberalism's support of welfare
For liberalism, the commodification of labour gives rise to 
an ethical dilemma between on the one hand the belief in the 
emancipatory value of the market, and on the other the 
knowledge that the market is unable to adleguately solve the 
welfare problems of society. In the raw model of the 
liberal good society,
"the market is emancipatory, the best possible shell 
for self reliance and industriousness. If not 
interfered with, its self-regulatory mechanisms will 
ensure that all who want to work will be employed, and 
thus be able to secure their own welfare" (Esping - 
Andersen 1990 p 42).
Although this model does not recognise inv/oluntary 
unemployment as defined by Keynes (Keynes 1936 ch 2), it is 
tempered by a recognition that some people of course cannot 
participate in the labour market, and that: foresight and 
thrift cannot cover all catastrophes. To some extent these 
exigencies can be ameliorated by pre-capitalist sources of 
social welfare such as the family or church, but the 
development of capitalist social relations; undermines the
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welfare capacity of these institutions. Liberalism 
recognised the association between the commodification of 
labour and widespread ill health and destitution, and 
further recognised that these were not conducive to imperial 
military activity or industrial development.
Two solutions were found to this dilemma that could be 
reconciled with the ethical logic of liberalism. Firstly, 
if a distinction is accepted between those who can 
participate in the labour market and those who cannot, the 
government can legitimately provide welfare to the latter:
"Titmuss's concept of the residual, or marginal welfare 
state tries to capture exactly this property of the 
liberal paradigm; namely, that public obligation enters 
only where the market fails: the commodity-logic is 
supreme" (Esping-Andersen 1990 p 43).
The second solution developed out of the liberal 
encouragement of contractual, actuarial welfare insurance 
arrangements:
"Once liberalism came to accept the principle of 
unionism, it was also perfectly capable of extending 
the idea of individual insurance to collectively 
bargained social benefits... If built on an actuarial 
basis, it also retains the pure exchange nexus of 
welfare. And, as Graebner has argued, old-age pensions 
even came to be regarded by the business community as a 
means to make the labor market more flexible: with
pensions, employers could - at other's expense - rid 
themselves of the older, less efficient workers. Even 
the idea of compulsory social insurance could be 
accommodated to the liberal dogma. For, if some groups 
were to be covered and others not, the result would be 
unfair competition" (Esping-Andersen 1990 p 44)
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Esping-Andersen's account of the liberal accommodation of 
state provided welfare ignores a major feature within 
liberal thought. The desire to limit state activity comes 
not just from a belief that markets better serve the public 
good. There was also positive opposition to state activity 
based on the fear of a drift towards totalitarianism, and 
the incompetence and inefficiency of government planning. 
Paul Smyth has documented these features of Australian 
liberal thought in the early post war years. To some extent 
this crystallised around the work of the Austrian political 
economist Hayek:
"an Australian edition [of Hayek's The road to serfdom] 
had been made available shortly before the 1944 
'Powers' referendum... followed up by a second cheap 
edition" (Smyth 1989 p 5).
However, discussion on Hayek's work centred on
"Hayek's political theory that the extension of 
government planning would lead to the corruption of the 
Rule of Law producing a new despotism, rather than his 
related economic arguments for the rehabilitation of 
the free market" (Smyth 1989 p 5-6)
There was also discussion in Australia during this period of 
concern among British writers of "significant failures of 
post-war British planning experiments" (Smyth 1989 p 16).
The journal of the conservative, Melbourne based Institute 
of Public Affairs (IPA) took up the debate:
"The [IPA] Review hoped that such a critique would 
prove more damaging than Hayek's more philosophical 
reflections on the nature of freedom... it was now
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argued, experience had shown that too much planning 
could jeopardise progress" (Smyth 1989 p 16).
However, the consideration of these criticisms of the state 
lead Smyth to a similar conclusion about the accommodation 
of liberal thought to state provided welfare to that found 
in Esping-Andersen's account of liberal ethical logic, as 
long as it didn't expand too far. This position was 
elaborated in Australia by the IPA and D.B. Copland, a 
dominant figure in Australian economics with views in 
keeping with the Liberal and Country parties (Smyth 1989 p 
17). Copland and the IPA pioneered a
"'new liberalism' which avoided the critical extremes 
of the Hayeks and accommodated itself to the planning 
imperative by proposing a sufficient degree of 
government intervention to ensure high employment and 
social services but within a predominantly free 
enterprise economy" (Smyth 1989 p 19).
Socialism's support for welfare
The development of support from liberalism for the 
development of the welfare state has its counterpart in 
socialism. Esping-Andersen contends that while liberalism 
supported limited decommodification of labour subordinated 
to the overall logic of commodification, the gist of 
socialism's support for decommodification is because it 
emancipates workers from market dependency. The central 
dilemma here is that the principal effect of 
decommodification is to strengthen the position of workers 
in the labour market, encouraging participation and thus 
entrenching market exchange of labour. In the socialist 
analysis,
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"social policy was janus-faced: it may very well be a 
means to prop up and save the capitalist system, but at 
the same time it is also a foreign body, threatening to 
emasculate the rule of capital. Armed with this kind 
of analysis, socialism could also defend the gradualist 
strategy against the more apocalyptic scenario 
presented in revolutionary communist dogma. Where the 
latter believed that the roots of revolution lay in 
crisis and collapse, the reformists realized that the 
human misery that crises bred would only weaken the 
socialist project... It was through this strategic 
realignment that socialism eventually embraced the 
welfare state for its long-term project" (Esping- 
Andersen 1990 p 45).
I discussed in the previous chapter Offe's analysis that 
state control over welfare was essential for the active 
proletarianization of the labour force. Esping-Andersen 
argues that the support of socialism for government provided 
welfare rested on a different understanding:
"Where the fully developed socialist paradigm is 
pursued, it should, in principle, facilitate a de­
proletarianization of the worker's status: the
worker's relationship to work will begin to approximate 
what privileged strata (such as the civil service) had 
enjoyed for decades and even centuries" (Esping- 
Andersen 1990 p 47).
Both the liberal and socialist accommodations of the 
expansion of welfare in terms of their ethical schemes or 
political objectives are extremely dubious if applied as 
historical explanations for the development of welfare 
markets. The analysis that welfare strengthens the position 
of workers in the labour market may explain socialists' 
support for the expansion of welfare, but it does not
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explain the expansion itself. Similarly liberal support for 
private pension arrangements may explain why their proposals 
for government pension schemes incorporate actuarial 
mechanisms, but this is likely to play only a part in the 
development of particular policies, even if the scheme does 
turn out to include an actuarial accounting mechanism.
In summary, analyses of welfare based on developments within 
socialism or liberalism tend to describe developments in 
welfare markets as though they happened as a result of the 
analytical position of socialists or liberals. In this 
view, the analysis of welfare markets is subordinated to a 
political analysis. Many of the dynamics of welfare market 
development are overlooked if it is understood 
teleologically as a result of the political developments. 
This brings us back to the central question of this chapter, 
namely how useful are the metaphors of the market in 
understanding the development of welfare, particularly 
relating to the impact of managerialism and consumer 
advocacy?
Welfare services and the commodity form
In the discussion of Esping-Andersen's work, I have been 
concerned to question the historical logic of approaches 
that suggest the development of welfare can be explained in 
direct relation to the decommodification of labour. In 
contrast to this approach, Offe has raised the question of 
the decommodification of welfare itself. His separation of 
welfare services from the commodity nexus serves two related 
purposes in his theory of the welfare state. Firstly, it is 
the site of a structural contradiction of late capitalism, 
because "the commodity form presupposes the growth of state 
organized forms of production that are exempt from the 
commodity form" (Offe 1984 p 127). Secondly, it allows him
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to posit an explanation of the site of recent social 
conflict, namely conflict over welfare matters, because they 
"represent the most advanced forms of erosion of the 
commodity form within capitalist exchange relationships 
themselves" (Offe 1984 p 128).
The structural contradiction that arises because of the 
reliance of the commodity nexus on welfare is based on 
Offe's claim that welfare services are "organizations whose 
mode of operation is no longer subject to the commodity 
form" (Offe 1984 p 127). He makes it clear that this is 
because welfare services are not exchanged for profit in the 
same way as true commodities. He begins his demonstration 
on this point by divorcing it from consideration of the 
labour market for welfare workers or the labour market for 
consumers of welfare, so as to focus on welfare services per 
se:
"This can be demonstrated in the case of teachers. 
Although it is true that their labour power is 
exchanged for wages, it is not true that the immediate 
purpose is to produce commodities for profit on the 
market (which is the case in capitalist enterprises). 
The purpose of the labour is, rather, to produce the 
use-values (knowledge, skills etc.) which put workers 
in a position to actually sell their labour power on 
the market. Schools do not sell their 'products', 
although they help to maintain and improve the 
salebility of those commodities (labour power) which 
are the recipients of their 'products'. The 'products' 
of the work of teachers are distributed through 
channels different from those of exchange." (Offe 1984 
p 127) .
Two things should be noted about Offe's chosen example that
undermine its theoretical value for his argument. Firstly,
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education can be provided privately for profit, and such 
institutions often display a very similar form to government 
provided services, particularly in regard to the properties 
Offe discusses. Secondly, the work of school teachers has 
another relation to the labour market to that of educating 
students to their advantage in the market. Teachers also 
provide child minding that enables the parents to go to 
work. Childcare for pre-school age children and after 
school hours care are provided on a similar basis to any 
other human service. The surveillance function of schools is 
brought into sharp relief by policies of compulsory 
schooling and debates over the irrelevance of the school 
curriculum to workforce participation.
Offe states that his argument about decommodification also 
applies to services provided in hospitals and prisons, but 
it could equally apply to a chef in a restaurant, whose 
"product" is eaten and thus not further distributed, or 
indeed to the work of an accountant of a consulting firm who 
restructures the books of a client. In this case, the 
"product", the restructured books, whilst having use-value, 
are clearly not "distributed through channels of exchange".
A theoretically related problem to Offe's rejection of 
welfare services as commodities is the lack of recognition 
of welfare services as productive. This may well relate to 
the differences between products and services, with the 
relation between products and productivity much more 
apparent (etymologically at least) than the productivity of 
services. If however we take a more abstract approach and 
examine the gain to society, or some aspect of it, the 
productive nature of services can readily be understood, 
even if it may be more difficult to disaggregate than in the 
exchange of physical products. Commenting on selected 
liberal and Marxist accounts of the financing of public 
services, Barry Hindess writes:
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"the general argument is vitiated by the assumption 
that goods and services not produced as commodities 
(e.g. in education or the NHS) make no productive 
contribution to society. This results in the treatment 
of many government programmes as essentially 
unproductive? that is, as a drain on society's 
resources. There are, of course, some public services 
of this kind... [However] it is difficult to defend the 
claim that the overall effect of free public education 
and medical services is to reduce the productive 
capacity of society. There may indeed be problems over 
the financing of public expenditure, but the analysis 
is not helped by the suggestion that services that are 
not marketed offer no productive return" (Hindess 1987 
P 64).
If we understand the productiveness of government programmes 
in this debate as meaning that there is a gainful relation 
between government provided services and other activities, 
that expenditure by society on welfare offers advantages for 
the operation of the rest of society, then Hindess is 
suggesting that the analysis of government expenditure must 
take these reciprocal benefits into account.
If the exchange of welfare services is in many ways like 
other services, and if welfare contributes to the sum of 
social productivity both in itself and through its effects 
on other areas of economic endeavour, why does Offe not 
admit their commodity status? My general contention here is 
that Offe's reason for describing welfare services as not 
being commodities is flimsy. It can be understood in his 
work as a move required to provide "a possible source of 
conflicts and destabilizing developments" (Offe 1984 p 127) 
in the capitalist state. Specifically, Offe has posited the 
decommodification for welfare services as the explanation of
the site of the major social conflicts and political 
struggles in western states, at least during the 1960s:
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"it is evident that the major social conflicts and 
political struggles that took place in America and 
Western Europe did not take place within the exchange 
relationships between labour and capital. Instead, 
they occurred as conflicts over the control of the 
organizations of social production that serve the 
commodity form without themselves being part of the 
commodity nexus. Conflicts in schools, universities, 
prisons, military organizations, housing authorities 
and hospitals are cases in point” (Offe 1984 p 128).
Instead of positing decommodification as both the reason 
social conflicts between capital and labour have not 
occurred, and why struggles over welfare have, it is likely 
that these two things are disconnected (see Giddens 1981 p 
229). The decline of overt, populist industrial conflict 
may mark the increased organisation of labour and the 
institutionalisation of state sanctioned processes for 
delineating and resolving disputes between labour and 
capital. As quite separate processes, the increasing 
intrusion of welfare services into people's private lives, 
driven by policy making processes beyond their control and 
poorly responsive to their own perceptions of their needs, 
provokes conflict over the nature of the welfare services 
themselves, not because they "represent the most advanced 
forms of the erosion of the commodity form”.
This could include conflict in educational institutions over 
class sizes or assessment procedures? conflict in health 
services over access (e.g. a rural community seeking to keep 
its hospital) or consent to procedures (such as 
electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), or AIDS testing); or 
conflict over a welfare services' interventions in domestic
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violence or suspected child abuse. John Keane has come 
close to delineating this type of conflict (although he also 
links it to the reduction of industrial conflict by claiming 
that conflict in welfare is made possible as the 
"immediately dangerous consequences for the stability of the 
oligopoly sector of production are reduced” (Keane 1984 p 
89), as though there were only a certain amount of conflict 
to go around the various possible sites):
"More and more decisions on key political issues are 
the consequences of an arcane and highly inaccessible 
process of negotiation among commanding elites within 
the spheres of state and society. As state-sanctioned 
policies draw closer and closer to the lives of 
ordinary citizens, political decision making moves 
beyond their immediate control" (Keane 1984 p 89).
This creates tensions between the increasing involvement of 
people with welfare services and their decreasing control 
over those services. No distinction is necessary here 
between government and privately provided services: 
struggles over ECT in the treatment of mental illness have 
occurred in both sectors? there have been struggles over 
the concealment by private companies of evidence of damage 
caused by intra-uterine devices; and rebellions of students 
and parents against the disciplinary policies of private 
schools. Keane concludes:
"This strife, whose frequent opposition to 
administrative procedures no longer directly assumes 
the form of class struggle, evidences the fact that, 
under late capitalist conditions, "markets and 
administration cannot satisfy a whole series of 
collective needs"" (Keane 1984 p 89).
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My argument here is that Offe's claim that welfare services 
must be distinguished from commodities is a red herring for 
an investigation into the development of welfare services. 
More seriously it leaves him open to the charge that he sees 
the struggle over welfare as resulting primarily from 
tensions that arise from production and exchange outside of 
the welfare area, and that he assigns only a secondary role 
to explanations based on tensions arising in direct relation 
to welfare services. In later work on the growth of the 
service sector, Offe has pre-empted criticism along this 
line by dropping the notion of the decommodification of 
services and posing the following as a central question for 
the explanation of the development of services in late 
capitalism:
"What role is played by the demand of customers and 
clients in shaping the quality and quantity of services 
provided through markets or political decision-making 
processes, and to what extent is the development of 
these services determined by such demand patterns?" 
(Offe 1985 p 128) .
In order to attempt an answer to this question in relation 
to welfare services, we need to explore how consumer demand, 
including its expression through consumer advocacy, affects 
the operation of the principles of profit and social equity 
as these influence the development of welfare markets.
To summarise, from the individual perspective welfare 
services frequently do not involve pricing and monetary 
exchange at the point of service. However this does not 
disqualify them from being considered as a market. This 
view has a number of advantages from the system perspective: 
the cost of welfare services can be calculated in monetary 
terms and thus allow comparisons with other sectors of the 
economy; there are a range of productive interchanges
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between welfare and other markets; and in aggregate they 
have important fiscal consequences for the economy overall.
Profit in welfare markets
In virtually all areas of welfare, entrepreneurial 
investment for profit plays some role in the production and 
exchange of services. Two aspects of the introduction of 
the new managerialism into the public sector are important 
for this investment. Firstly the commodification of welfare 
services encouraged by managerialism is necessary for 
investment accounting methods. Secondly the split of 
activity between the public and the private sectors can be 
altered, and managerial techniques can play an important 
part in this.
Entrepreneurial investment for profit relies on accounting 
methods that define outcomes of investment as products that 
can be ascribed costs and exchange values in monetary terms. 
The commodification of welfare services in this accounting 
sense is a precondition for the integration of the 
production and exchange of services into the cash nexus, 
enabling investment of capital for profit in welfare 
services. This rationale for investment can be applied just 
as well in public sector and non-profit organisations as it 
can in for-profit enterprise.
Mark Considine has argued that the introduction of private 
sector management techniques into the public sector has 
resulted in the conceptualisation of the outputs of 
government agencies as "product-like entities" (Considine 
1988 p 7), and that this analogy has far reaching 
implications:
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"They are often given a cost-value and placed within a 
real or imagined market. In many cases this product 
regimen also attempts to establish a price per 
"product" and to recover the costs of production by 
charging participants who are then defined as 
consumers" (Considine 1988 p 7).
The conceptual placement of such public sector products in 
an imagined, idealized market may be part of a policy 
overhaul to facilitate private sector consideration of 
investment in the competitive provision of similar services, 
if the idealized market approximates reality closely enough 
and the public sector does not have an insurmountable 
competitive advantage. This could be seen for example in 
tertiary education, where the establishment of Australia's 
first private university accompanied the managerialist 
reform of the public universities (DEET 1989).
Considine expresses concern that adopting the product format 
may have negative consequences for public sector agencies:
"the concept of identified, segregated programs and 
products describing defined organisational activity is 
an administrative fiction made necessary by the desire 
for increased control, not by any inherent 
characteristic of public activities themselves. This 
fiction contains several dangers. First it raises 
misleading expectations about the means by which 
organisations can control important internal and 
external relationships. In addition it encourages 
artificial distinctions between activities and values 
inside the department or division" (Considine 1988 p 
12) .
These concerns would apply equally to private sector welfare 
services, where they are not negated by an overriding
222
concern to pursue profit. Misleading expectations may well 
develop about the mechanisms that "control external 
relationships" by the use of competitive market metaphors 
which recast citizens as consumers. For example, a paper on 
health care markets published by the Consumers' Health Forum 
points out that rational choice by consumers based on 
comparative performance of providers presupposes knowledge 
that is not generally available:
"The output of the health care industry is so 
heterogeneous that it is difficult even for researchers 
or funding agencies, let alone individual consumers, to 
evaluate comparative performance. This lack of 
knowledge is compounded by the dependency engendered in 
the supplier/consumer relationship... It is notable 
that people are reducing their "basic" insurance cover, 
(the cover that gives "choice of doctor" in public 
hospitals) even faster than they are abandoning 
insurance generally" (McAuley 1988 p 21).
In addition to a lack of perceivable product 
differentiation, often consumers do not have price signals 
to base choices on:
"few people pay for medical care at the point of 
consumption without being entitled to reimbursement of 
part or all of their outlays and, in the presence of 
third party payers [private or public] who make such 
reimbursements, patients are seldom deterred by costs" 
(Sax 1990 p 149).
These are practical objections to conceptualising the demand 
side of the exchange of welfare services in terms of 
competitive market models at the level of the atomised 
exchange of services throughout the community. At another 
level, the government as the third party payer can be viewed
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as the consumer of services supplied by private agencies. 
From this perspective, a different set of market dynamics 
are at work, between a larger central consumer and many 
diverse peripheral producers. An analogous situation exists 
in the relationship between large vehicle builders and their 
many component suppliers in the Australian car industry (see 
for example Marceau and Jureidini 1989), and indeed analysis 
of the health industry complex has been proposed along these 
lines (Marceau and Greig 1990 personal communication).
An example may clarify the type of dynamics that can be 
found between the government as consumer and private firms. 
Through the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, the Commonwealth 
Government purchases drugs called for by a doctor's 
prescription, from the manufacturer of the drug. It 
supplies the drug itself, dispensed by a pharmacist, as a 
benefit to the patient. The government thus acts in the 
pharmaceutical market as a very large and powerful consumer. 
This plays an important function in exchanges with 
pharmaceutical companies, themselves large, financially 
powerful and with monopoly rights to manufacture certain 
products conferred by the patent system. A publication of 
the Consumers' Health Forum discusses aspects of this 
exchange:
"For most pharmaceuticals, once the sunk costs [of 
research, development and registration] have been met, 
the unit or run-on costs are extremely low. The holder 
of the patent can therefore charge up to or down to 
what the market will bear. It is not unusual to see 
spreads of 5:1 in the ratio of highest to lowest price 
of the same drug in different national markets. The 
manufacturer can sell at a huge range of prices, and 
still make some contribution to profit even in the 
lowest-priced markets... This is not to argue against 
the patent system. It is an effective way to fund
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pharmaceutical research. But, given the fact that it 
carries benefits of monopolization, it needs to be 
offset by price control, such as can only be exercised 
by a strong buyer or regulator in the market place” 
(Consumers' Health Forum 1989 p 31-32).
This example shows how analysis of exchange for profit in 
welfare market segments must take into account features not 
often found in idealised accounts of markets. These 
features include monetary exchange that may not be at the 
point of service usage; considerations of pricing and 
profit taking within a highly political context? where the 
supplier holds an absolute monopoly over the product; and 
where the consumer may be able to legally regulate the 
exchange. Chapter three above described how, since the 
introduction of the new managerialism, consumer advocacy 
groups are now lobbying government in terms of the market 
dynamics, and the CHF paper on pharmaceuticals is an example 
of this.
The government of course also acts as a supplier of welfare 
services, and the split between public and private provision 
of welfare has important implications for investment 
decisions based on financial gain for both the private and 
public sectors.
The application of the product format in a government 
provided service may be a forerunner to privatizing the 
service, and may for example be used to set the terms of a 
contract for a private agency to provide the service on 
behalf of the government. In general, a shift in the 
balance from public to private welfare relies on private 
sector initiative in a framework set by government action 
involving regulated compulsion and/or on the opening up of 
opportunities for profitable investment in welfare services.
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The privatisation of welfare in Britain has been reviewed by 
Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby. They argue that the involvement 
of the state in private welfare forms the basis of an 
analysis of state welfare policies:
"Private welfare has always formed the arena in which 
the manoeuvres of state social policy may be traced 
out" (Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby 1987 p 13).
They propose that the widespread role of government in 
welfare provision since the Second World War is now 
diminishing, with encouragement to expand private sector 
welfare. They have documented:
"an expansion of [government] support for private and 
occupational provision in the areas of pensions, sick- 
pay, owner-occupied housing, assistance with private 
school fees and the encouragement of private medical 
practice" (Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby 1987 p 6).
They argue that this shift toward private welfare crosses 
party lines, has support across the spectrum of social 
theorists, and has provoked less conflict than proposals to 
privatize state owned industries. They offer an explanation 
for this consensus in terms of the shift in the popular 
ethos away from collectivism and the disenchantment of 
social theorists with the welfare state:
"Two developments may explain the move towards 
acceptance of a substantial private sector. These 
factors are, first, the long-term shift in social ethos 
away from the collectivism which nourished the welfare 
state and towards greater valuation of the private in 
all spheres of social life; second, the development of 
a new consensus in social policy theory which centres 
on a radical disenchantment with state welfare. Both
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these developments are arguably of more significance 
than a prudential psephology driven by a shrewd 
assessment of the current balance between desire for 
tax cuts and the valuation of the social wage" 
(Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby 1987 p 14-15).
This diagnosis is relevant in the broad sense to Australia 
notwithstanding the government has been Labor for much of 
the 1980s, in contrast to the Conservative domination of 
Westminster. Papadakis' final point on the insignificance 
of the simple trade off between taxation and welfare 
spending can be seen clearly in Australia. The Accord 
between the government and the Australian Council of Trade 
Unions has allowed wage restraint to be traded off between 
tax cuts and the social wage so that for example in the 
renegotiation of the accord in 1988 and 1989, improved 
provision of child care was linked to tax cuts (not tax 
increases) and wage restraint in a calculation judged to 
maintain the real standard of living, including the social 
wage.
The Australian Labor Party Platform recognises the role of 
private welfare, albeit in the negative:
MHuman services should as far as possible be provided 
by the public sector and, where appropriate, in 
conjunction with non-profit organisations" (ALP 1988 p 
123) .
Against this platform background, the Labor government 
during the 1980s has encouraged private welfare in pensions, 
higher education, childcare and health . The May 1989 
economic statement from the treasurer instituted compulsory 
employer funding of superannuation for a wide range of 
employees with the aim of reducing government pension 
provision in the long term. The 1989 White paper on higher
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education outlined government support for profit-driven 
expansion of tertiary education, especially for overseas 
students. The 1990 budget provided a subsidy for children 
to attend private childcare. The Health Insurance 
Commission reports that the number of people with adequate 
insurance cover for treatment in private hospitals - private 
supplementary hospital insurance, as opposed to private 
basic hospital insurance which is adequate for private 
medical care in public hospitals - has steadily increased 
since the introduction of Medicare from 30% to 39.6%
(Willcox 1991 p 28).
I am not claiming here that there has been a net shift of 
welfare provision from the public to the private sector in 
Australia during the last few years. My purpose in 
documenting some of the support by the state for private 
sector welfare provision is to underline the need to 
consider action by both private and public agencies in any 
account of the operation of profit as a principle of 
development in welfare markets. The new managerialism in 
the public sector has facilitated this. To summarise, 
government agencies contribute to the development of profit 
driven expansion in welfare markets in the following ways: 
through the introduction of the product format for 
government provided welfare services as a possible 
forerunner to privatisation? through their direct 
negotiation with suppliers in the welfare market in their 
role as large third party payers; and through the 
development of policies to benefit private operators in the 
welfare market.
Social equity through welfare markets
The support for private sector welfare from a democratic 
socialist government has been justified by a shift in focus
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from state welfare outputs to a focus on social welfare 
outcomes - expressed as a social justice strategy - that 
result from the combined effects of state and private 
outputs. Brian Howe, then federal minister for social 
security, captured this in his reinterperetation of the 
conceptual basis of social justice in a strategic framework:
"Social justice does not equal social expenditure or 
even social welfare or indeed the welfare state.
Social justice is about the struggle to achieve a 
fairer society in which people realize their 
citizenship by gaining a fairer share in the 
distribution of economic, social and political 
resources... Inevitably all areas of public policy 
have a connection to the issues of equity and fairness, 
and encourage us to feel our rights as citizens are 
being promoted or not" (Howe 1988 p 1).
This leads us to consider equity as a major principle 
underlying the development of welfare markets. Chapter 
three discussed this concept as a change in the 
operationalisation of the public service value of equality, 
which Weber has described as underlying the widespread 
application of bureaucratic power. I argued that the shift 
from implementation at the level of the individual to 
implementation at the level of community accompanied the 
shift away from processes toward outcomes that marks the new 
managerialism. I now consider some implications of the 
application of the principle of equity by government in the 
development of the welfare market.
As I have alluded to above, the constellation of concepts 
about monetary investment, profit and market choices, 
developed as operational concepts for use in capitalist 
endeavour, have been taken up and applied to the operation 
of politics and government by many authors including
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Schumpeter, Parsons and Lindblom. This transfer of 
metaphors underlies much of the work of rational choice 
theorists explaining political developments ( see "The 
rational choice approach to social behaviour" Hindess 1988 
ch 2). Lindblom has attempted to transfer concepts of 
participatory democracy the other way, from their origin as 
operational concepts in government, to using them for 
understanding markets, albeit in a way that questions the 
validity of such an approach (see "Polyarchal and market 
controls" Lindblom 1977 ch 11). Continuing this approach, 
the following discussion shows how concepts of equity, 
developed in relation to the administration of government 
programs, can be used to understand the development of 
welfare markets.
The discussion begins by considering the use of equity in 
welfare market policies by government. This is shown to be 
a highly political process due to the tensions that arise 
between the principles of equity and profit as governments 
attempt to coerce private welfare providers and as 
government agencies themselves operate in the welfare 
market. This is followed by discussion of the widespread 
use of ascriptive categories by both managers and consumer 
advocates in the application of the principle of equity. I 
argue that the passivity of ascriptive categorisation poses 
problems for the implementation of ideals of community 
participation and social justice, and does not allow 
adequate capture of the struggles being intersected by 
equity based policy initiatives. This can weaken the 
political judgements necessary for policy implementation. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the different 
characteristics of equity and profit as distributive 
principles, and the divergent meaning of equity for 
different types of welfare services.
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Governments, including ministers and managers, seek to 
influence markets to achieve their goals, and an analysis of 
their programs must take this into account. The federal 
Labor government of the 1980s has sought to use its mandate 
to govern, to make major plays in a wide range of markets so 
as to give citizens a "fairer share in the distribution of 
economic, social and political resources”. In particular, 
under the rhetoric of its social justice strategy, the 
government is seeking to bring about developments in the 
welfare market to bring about better equity of social 
outcome.
In relation to Offe's question about the inability of 
governments to effectively implement their policies, the 
development of strategies for influencing markets gives them 
wide scope for effect. However, government agencies face 
the enormous problems any agency has in trying to bring 
about changes in the fundamentals of a particular market to 
achieve its goals. Governments develop market strategies 
for pursuing social equity that take account of the existing 
market. In profitable areas of the market with a high 
volume of private investment, regulation for social equity 
can have good effect. At the unprofitable end of the market 
with lower volumes or absent private investment, direct 
public investment will be more effective. Equity and 
profit interact as distributive principles in welfare 
markets and I shall now discuss some of the tensions of this 
interaction.
The volume of non-government monetary exchange in different 
areas of the market affects the value of strategies 
available to the government. In the higher volume areas of 
the welfare market, the profit principle for investment and 
exchange decisions operates powerfully for the actors 
involved. Private hospitals, private schools, life 
insurance arrangements and popular sporting events all
231
attract wealthy investors and service providers (including 
'non-profit' organisations), all seeking to profit through 
exploiting the value of their capital in these endeavours.
The government can exert considerable leverage in these 
lucrative areas through actions that require little 
financial outlay. One such strategy is to promote the 
development of these areas through market research and 
charismatic appeal to potential investors and consumers.
The Government has for example promoted the provision of 
higher education as a lucrative foreign exchange earner. It 
has summarised its achievements in this program as follows:
"As well as the valuable economic contribution the 
Overseas Student Program is making to Australia, there 
have been immense social, cultural and economic 
benefits flowing through to Australian students, 
educational institutions and the entire community.
While Australia has recently strengthened its overseas 
student aid program, it has also tapped into what is a 
burgeoning demand worldwide for educational services, 
courses and expertise" (Dawkins and Duncan 1989 p 82).
The document quoted from is thinly veiled re-election 
propaganda and no figures are provided to back up the claims 
of economic significance, however the government's strategic 
intention to promote the expansion of education services for 
paying overseas students is clear enough. The passage shows 
some ambiguity over whether the program is equity driven or 
profit driven. Similar approaches have found support in the 
health field, where concern has been raised that government 
support for profit driven expansion of services will 
inequitably divert resources from where they are socially 
needed:
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"The excess capacity in the private sector of the 
Australian hospital system is partly responsible for 
the enthusiasm shown recently for attracting foreign 
patients... Even though Austrade helps to promote 
Australia abroad as a centre for medical services, in 
the hope that large export earnings could be generated 
through combined hospital and tourism deals, concerns 
about equity have been voiced. Fears are expressed 
that through a concentration on the lucrative end of 
the market, resources will be diverted from the public 
system" (Sax 1990 p 79).
These fears are about the diversion of public resources 
toward for profit activities, and have the potential to lead 
to an electoral backlash if the public system is perceived 
to be run down in favour of providing services to the 
wealthy from overseas. Rather than invest itself, it may be 
politically safer for government to regulate the 
transactions in the area. This can be done for example to 
give effect to principles of fairness in competitive 
endeavour and market exchanges, or through regulation of the 
structure of accounting and cost allocation in the area. As 
tensions between equity and profit arise in these plays, the 
government can argue that it has a mandate to set the rules 
to reduce exploitation of or ensure better provision for 
disadvantaged groups, thus legitimately undermining market 
profitability, and retaining its popular support if it has 
accurately judged the mandate. An example of this is the 
regulation of private health insurance to impose community 
risk rating of premium holders as opposed to individual risk 
rating. This means insurers must charge the same premium to 
everyone in the community, regardless of their individual 
likelihood to call on the fund based on age, sex or physical 
condition (for a discussion of this see the section 
"Concepts of equity" in Sax 1990 p 53-58) .
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What of situations where there is little in the way of 
private enterprise in a service area or market segment the 
government wishes to encourage ? This question is crucial 
for welfare economics:
"Arrow (1963) in a seminal essay on the welfare 
ecomnomics of medical care, put the case that when the 
market fails, society will recognise the gap and devise 
social institutions to bridge it" (Sax 1990 p 56).
Where the government does take the step of itself providing 
services in welfare markets, it may have better access to 
regulatory strategies, and it may have a wide range of 
sister agencies in the same administration to call on.
These may at times constitute specific market advantages for 
some strategic intents. For example, most Australian state 
governments, in their efforts to deter people from smoking 
tobacco, have on the one hand undertaken anti smoking 
campaigns, and on the other restricted the promotion of 
tobacco. The Commonwealth government has legislated to ban 
tobacco advertising on television (from 1976) and in the 
print media (from 1991), and also funded large budget multi- 
media campaigns against smoking.
The failure of equity in welfare market policies
The collision of the principles of profit and equity is a 
major source of tension for government activity in markets, 
with a variety of factors possibly leading to a loss of 
electoral support for the government. This can become quite 
acute where the government aims to take a profit, where the 
business community may feel it has lost out if the 
government does make a profit, and tax-payers feel they have 
lost out if the investment risk leads to a loss. Further 
problems result from the wide difference between the norms
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of what is legal according to the judicial system for 
business dealings, and what is ethically acceptable to the 
electorate for government actions in the market.
I turn now to the debate on whether state welfare is 
equitabl in the sense that it redistributes resources from 
the wealthy to the poor. Le Grand has shown that in the UK 
at least, higher income strata receive more government funds 
per head from government expenditures on health, education 
and housing, the latter mainly through tax relief (Le Grand 
1982 p 126-127). A higher rate of government spending per 
person in a particular strata does not of course mean that 
the government spends more money on this strata in absolute 
terms; this depends as well on actual numbers of people 
assisted, and in several of Le Grand's examples he 
acknowledges the more limited access to programs of people 
in higher strata (e.g. rent allowances p 89, concessionary 
fares p 107).
Le Grand's work shows that wherever possible, that is 
wherever eligible for a benefit, the better off will exploit 
the potential benefit more fully, and that this seriously 
undermines the redistributional effect of programs with wide 
access. As Hindess has pointed out, this is compounded by 
the likelihood of inappropriate expenditure for the lower 
strata, so that benefit in terms of outcomes in improved 
housing quality, or health, are less per unit expenditure 
for these people (Hindess 1987 p 98). A possible reason for 
this difficulty in delivering equity through government 
programs is the middle class affinity of the public 
administration, that can be countered through consumer 
consultation (see chapter three above for Wilenski's views 
on this).
It is important to note that in welfare the lucrative end of 
the market does not necessarily correlate with a higher
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socio-economic status of the consumer. Servicing the poor 
may well be more lucrative than servicing the rich, 
particularly if government subsidy is involved.
One aspect of the use of equity as a principle in government 
welfare programs is the widespread use of ascriptive 
criteria to delineate the group to be targeted in the quest 
for an equitable dimension to the program. The elderly, 
people of non English speaking background, people of lower 
socio-economic status, Aborigines, women and men have all 
been targeted in the name of promoting equity.
Consumer advocates also lobby on behalf of ascriptive 
groups, and as discussed in chapter four above government 
funding of community based organisations is often centred on 
ascriptive criteria. The problem that communities do not 
themselves function on the basis of ascriptive groupings was 
discussed in chapter five. My main argument is that the 
analytical conception of society in strategic planning as 
comprising overlapping ascriptive groups takes too passive a 
view of these "targets,” and is largely inadequate for 
capturing the creative processes of community formation and 
reformation through which people live their lives. These 
active processes are the locus for analysis of community 
participation and social justice. Thus strategic planning 
analyses that do not capture these processes will not be 
able to address the participatory or social justice 
implications of their plans.
A more fundamental problem with the concept of equity as a 
distributive principle in markets comes about because of the 
diversity of what a policy of equity actually implies in 
relation to different segments of the welfare market.
Equity in health services implies that services are 
distributed an the basis of who is sick, not on the basis of 
who can afford it. Equity in tertiary education means that
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services are distributed to those who are most talented, not 
on the basis of socio-economic background. Equity in income 
support means that support is distributed to the poor, not 
equally to all. Unlike the principle of profit, equity does 
not allow comparisons to be made in the extent of equity 
achieved across various segments of the market.
Of course, there have been many studies that show 
associations and causal links between poverty, ill-health, 
low educational attainment and paucity of community 
structures and services. Such associations can be useful 
for developing integrated programs in the welfare market, 
but they are of little use in comparing value between 
programs proposed in different segments of the welfare 
market.
Just as the principle of equity fails to integrate 
experience across different segments of the welfare market, 
it fails to integrate the experience of the manager or 
service provider in their acting for the agency and their 
acting for themselves. The principle of profit can achieve 
such an integration through devices like commissions on 
turnover and performance bonuses based on profit making. In 
these situations, the manager who makes money for the firm 
makes money for herself. Equity does not work like this.
The manager responsible for providing equitable public 
housing would probably never be eligible for housing 
assistance. The manager who delivers equitable health 
services to the sick poor may have private health insurance. 
Performance based pay arrangements based on delivering 
services equitably offer financial rewards that increase the 
inequality between the manager and the target group. This 
underlies the stark differences between managing for profit 
and managing for equity, particularly in terms of strategy 
formulation and resource allocation (Bower 1983 p 85).
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In summary, profit and equity act as key principles for 
investment, exchange and distribution of services in welfare 
markets. They operate in different proportion in different 
areas of the market. I have outlined various tensions and 
contrasts in the operation of the two principles to 
illuminate the dynamics of the welfare market. Issues for 
management and issues of consumer advocacy can be analysed 
in relation to the operation of these principles. However, 
the principles do not guide the development of the market as 
a hidden hand. Rather, they are central to the thinking and 
strategic analyses of large scale actors in the market, and 
an understanding of this helps to map out the struggles 






EQUITY. STRUGGLE AND SOCIAL THEORY
.Themes
This final chapter draws out some recurrent themes of the 
thesis. In a sense, this goes against the analytical 
structure of my investigations, which has been directed to 
showing the substantially different issues and relationships 
that arise at different points of articulation between 
managerialism and consumer advocacy in the welfare state. 
However, I have also aimed to reflect a set of more general 
concerns about equity, about struggle at the boundaries of 
the state and about the role of sociology in all this.
Most of the preceding chapters discussed equity in one way 
or another. The emergence of the concern for social equity 
from the legal rational value of equality has been bound up 
with managerialism and the shift of focus from processes to 
outcomes, greater emphasis on targeting of welfare programs 
and support for consumer consultation. These three related 
developments can be called the equity complex. The concern 
for equity of social outcomes is a distinctive 
operationalisation of the value of equality. While equity 
and other expressions of equality are easily reconcilable as 
values, there can be conflict between their respective 
realisation. Furthermore, the realisation of equity shows 
the features of self cancellation that concerned Weber in 
his analysis of equality.
The chapter then discusses the way action by the state 
almost inevitably crystalises conflict and provokes 
struggle. The terrain of these struggles cannot be 
contained in the formal arenas of contest defined by state 
institutions. Managerial reform and the rise of consumer
240
advocacy have affected the way such conflicts emerge. These 
struggles are a principle locus of participation in the 
affairs of the state and a principle source of innovation in 
policy formation and implementation. The interactions 
between public service managers and consumer advocates allow 
us to observe a variety of boundary phenomenon of the 
welfare state. These include the separation of government 
and non-government agencies, the process of enfranchisement 
taking place across this gap but outside the formal 
constitutional channels, and the cross over of practices 
between public and private sectors.
The chapter concludes by reflecting on the way the concepts 
and categories of sociology and economics play a part in 
these struggles, in the reconstruction of the boundaries of 
the state and in the operationalisation of public service 
values. The interaction between social theory and 
administration is speculative and reflexive. Such concepts 
emerge in managerialist texts and in the work of community 
groups. This is not necessarily emancipatory. In 
particular, ascriptive quantification of program objectives 
and categorical definition of service components can be 
quite unhelpful in promoting community development.
The Equity Complex
The relationship between the state and its citizens 
undergoes continual reformation. An important theme of this 
thesis has been that a key value of this relationship, 
namely equality of treatment, has undergone a major 
development. I shall now summarise my argument that the 
operationalisation of the value of equality has developed in 
the 1980s from a concern with the equality of treatment of 
individuals central to Weber's description of the operation 
of bureaucracy, to encompass a concern for equity of outcome
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for various social groups. Firstly I shall rehearse Weber's 
description of equality. Secondly, I shall describe the 
complex of administrative reforms that underpin the 
emergence of equity. These include accountability for 
outcomes, targeting of welfare programs and consumer 
consultation. Thirdly I shall discuss the relationship 
between equality and equity, and the potential for conflict 
that can arise through their respective operationalisation. 
Finally, I return to Weber's diagnosis that the value of 
equality, a key strength of bureaucratic authority, contains 
the seed of its self cancellation. I argue that the value 
of equity also suffers from this paradox.
Weber described the way equality underlies legal authority. 
In both the exercise and legitimation of legal authority the 
principle of equality before the law extends to the action 
of the state administration. Thus, the impersonal rule of 
law permeates the processes of the bureaucracy. This has 
been fundamental to the development of the bureaucratic 
organisation and is a source of its technical superiority 
over the looser forms of organisation characteristic of 
traditional and charismatic authority structures.
The operationalisation of the value of equality as described 
by Weber was crucial to the development of business and 
markets. Traditional authority was able to provide the 
peace and stability necessary for markets to develop to a 
point. The use of legal authority to regulate exchange, 
combined with the predictability conferred by the rule bound 
operation of the bureaucracy and the even handedness derived 
from the value of equality all served to allow a much more 
sophisticated development of a wide range of markets.
While Weber described the extension of technical command by 
the bureaucracy as requiring perceptions of fairness and 
equality of treatment, he also drew attention to the
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struggles for advantage waged in relation to the legislative 
command of the bureaucracy. Because the state bureaucracy 
is not intrinsically committed to any particular course of 
action or set of values, in practice it gives support to 
groups who have been able to secure advantages through 
legislative means.
The development of welfare services as a central focus of 
state activity since World War Two marks in part the playing 
out of democratic claims to a share of society's wealth by 
disadvantaged groups. In Australia, through an analysis of 
the Coombs commission, of subsequent reviews and of the 
reform measures implemented since the election of the 
Federal Labor government in 1983, a complex of three related 
developments can be distiled that has enabled the extension 
of the value of equality to apply to groups in society. We 
can call this the equity complex.
This reformation of values can be seen as an example of 
Peters and Waterman's interesting suggestion, discussed in 
chapter two above, that the key role of top management is to 
manage the values of the organisation. The Coombs 
Commission into reform of the Australian Public Sector was 
particularly concerned with the reform of public sector 
values and their operationalisation.
The three elements of the equity complex can be summarised 
as follows. Firstly, the managerialist emphasis on outcomes 
rather than processes required the development of 
accountability for outcomes. The new managers could no 
longer be content with ensuring due process was followed or 
that policy development was broadly in line with the 
government of the day's desires. Expenditures now needed to 
be justified with reference to their intended social impact. 
Arguably, this has had more impact on the way programs are
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conceived and supported than on social outcomes per se (see 
Le Grand 1976).
Secondly, debates in the welfare sector and the federal 
Labor party about universal versus targeted welfare programs 
came down decisively in favour of the latter. One result of 
this has been the burgeoning application of ascriptive 
analysis of the population to policy debates as the 
definitions of target groups were expanded and refined. 
Another important result was the elaboration of concepts of 
social equity in various welfare areas. Programs were 
equitable if they sought to reduce unfair inequalities of 
social outcome or opportunity. Policies were inequitable if 
they increased the advantage of the better off. These 
analyses of equity effects form a basis for judging the 
desirability of the various policy options.
The third general development was the expanded role of 
consultation with consumer groups in policy formulation and 
program implementation. This is not merely to help direct 
the benevolence of the state, as Marshall's analysis of 
welfare rights would have. Consultation is critical in 
framing services that will be taken up and effect outcomes. 
Consultation helps to delineate consumers so that services 
and benefits can be more closely targeted to those intended. 
Consultation helps identify strategies that appeal to target 
groups. Consultation helps predict effects of 
interventions. Consultation actively driven by the 
bureaucracy can help avoid the inequities inherent in 
passively awaiting community representations and reduce the 
chances that the more articulate sectors of the community 
will be favoured.
Like due process for the treatment of individuals by an 
administrative body, consultation promotes perceptions of 
fairness in the treatment of community groups. From a
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purely technical point of view, building consumer 
consultation into the "critical path" (Slater interview) of 
program management processes is an innovation consonant with 
the new managerialism's private sector origins that 
emphasise openness to customer input into product 
development.
The equity complex marks a synergy in the new managerialist 
public service between a focus on outcomes, management 
commitment to consumer consultation and equity as a key 
distributive principle for public welfare services. The 
equity complex embodies the value of equality. However, it 
makes no sense talking about the values of an organisation 
in isolation from their realisation. Even though equity 
and other more individual applications of equality are 
readily compatible as values, conflicts can arise in their 
respective realisation. For example, programs directed at 
reducing inequalities of social conditions in aboriginal 
communities are routinely criticised for being unfair to 
white Australians not entitled to equal benefits.
At a more abstract level, the welfare ideology of the new 
right argues that all welfare expenditure be in the form of 
transfer payments, with the individual beneficiary left to 
make decisions over how they spend the cash. The advantage 
of this approach is that it brings the efficiency of free 
market resource allocation to bear on the development of 
welfare services, whilst promoting equality of individual 
treatment. Equity is eschewed: outcomes should not be
planned by government; targetting creates inefficient 
distortions; and consumer consultation is replaced by 
consumer choice.
In modified form, this ideology underlies various welfare 
proposals of the federal Liberal party. For example, it is 
proposed that funding for higher education be changed from
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direct funding to institutions to indirect funding via 
scholarships awarded on academic merit to prospective 
students and redeemable at any accredited institution 
(Liberal and National Parties 1991 p 48). This approach 
will tend to favour established institutions, and 
institutions in better off areas with higher tertiary 
education participation rates, thus reinforcing the 
inequities currently found in higher education.
Institutions funded under the equity driven higher education 
policies of the Labor government, such as the nascent 
University of Western Sydney, will lose out as market forces 
reduce their funding base in favour of the more prestigious 
institutions. In this example, the differece in political 
support for equality and equity based approaches highlights 
the capacity for conflict in plans for their respective 
realisation.
The operation and values of the bureaucracy have changed 
markedly from the picture painted by Weber. Where does this 
leave his pessimistic concern that the value of equality, 
for all its positive and enabling aspects, also contains the 
negative and damaging potential for dehumanisation and 
repression of the spirit? My argument is that the 
developments associated with the equity complex leave things 
just as prone to this paradox.
Chapter two above discussed Weber's model of authority 
types. The inverse relation between the scope of authority 
and the personal input to the use of authority holds in the 
extension of equality from its application to individuals 
(based on the law) to its application as equity to community 
groups, (based on governmental/bureaucratic policy 
processes). At this level, charismatic led policy 
development is rare, and constrained in efforts to achieve 
the formation of volitions by the influence of interested 
groups - business, bureaucratic or consumer. Most commonly
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in the modern state, charisma has been routinised. It is 
born through association with power, nurtured carefully and 
brought out on politically determined occasions.
Equity based programs can be highly problematic. For 
example, equitable access to tertiary health care 
strengthens the hand of specialist medical practitioners. 
Although the communities serviced gain the undoubted and 
desirable benefits to health provided by specialised medical 
care, they also face the loss of control, personal ignominy 
and high cost of financing this intrusion of one of 
society's most powerful groups into their lives.
Similarly, expanded access to post school education has 
transformed the labour market, with increased credential 
requirements restricting job opportunities for graduates and 
non graduates alike. There is little doubt this development 
has been connected with improved bargaining power and 
industrial conditions for workers. Paradoxically, this is 
at the cost in many cases of prolonged exposure to one of 
the strongest surviving remnants of bourgeois culture and 
values, in the universities, and extreme forms of 
occupational closure. In health and welfare there has been 
a training led burgeoning of "allied" health and welfare 
professions, with enforceable registration requirements, 
that subsume the human aspects of care to a patchily 
grounded technologism. From the consumer's point of view, 
the resulting merry go round of multi-disciplinary care can 
be bewildering and disempowering. From the worker's point 
of view, Weber's original diagnosis of the internal 
bureaucratic pressures on people to be specialists without 
spirit and sensualists without heart (Weber 1958 p 182) 
finds an uncanny resonance in the machinations of the large 
health care institution.
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Struggle and the boundaries of the state
The following discussion draws together a perspective on 
struggle and the development of the state. The state's role 
in maintaining order and struggles over the constitutional 
control of the state have received extensive discussion in 
the sociological and political science literature. The 
struggle between the bureaucracy and society is less well 
theorised, but has been brought into view in this thesis by 
considering the development of managerialism and of consumer 
advocacy in the 1980s. Analysis of the interaction of these 
two developments is analysis of struggles at the boundary 
between government and nongovernment organisations.
The state itself has its origins in ensuring peace for 
market activities. The term free trade implies a lack of 
coercion on either party in the exchange of goods and 
services. The special set of circumstances necessary to 
provide for this type of interaction depend on 
constitutional activities of the state in providing peaceful 
territory, criteria for inclusion and exclusion in the 
domain of the market and impartially enforcing the peace in 
the market. These activities require the deployment of 
violence and control over the means of violence.
Weber described the modern bureaucracy as developing out of 
the rise of legal authority. However, "in the absence of a 
consensus over absolute values, Weber regards modern society 
as an arena of group conflict" (Turner 81 p 360) . For 
Weber, the struggles to legitimately control the bureaucracy 
are unfettered by any broad consensus over values, and have 
been channelled by the organs of legal authority into 
struggles for the right to government through democratic 
parliamentary processes in Australia and struggles over 
particular acts of government which favour one or other 
sectional interest.
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Parsons contended that Weber underestimated the importance 
of the democratic revolution qua the development of 
bureaucracy, but himself failed to recognise the 
implications of the democratic revolution for the operation 
of the bureaucracy. Nevertheless, Parsons' model of the 
double interchange applied to the state bureaucracy 
highlights the importance of consultation for the political 
system. Yeatman and Offe have noted the need for such 
consultations if program development and delivery are to be 
effective for the agency. Mayo and the human relations 
school have influenced the communications structures within 
bureaucracies in a way that makes communication with non­
government groups easier, and later work such as that by 
Peters and Waterman emphasise the importance of a customer 
orientation as a key value in excellent organisations.
Throughout this thesis I have attempted to show the place of 
struggle in the development of the welfare state, and to 
point up the changing forms and locations of struggle as 
managerialism was taken up by the Australian Public Service 
in the 1980s. In part, I chose to examine the interaction 
between managerialism and consumer advocacy to give the best 
chance of exposing the changing terrain of struggles that 
shape the welfare state.
The struggles provoked by bureaucratic action are a prime 
source of creativity, ideas and innovation that shape 
welfare programs during their conception, implementation and 
evaluation. Analyses of the state and society that theorise 
space for such struggles have an inherent explanatory 
strength because they can take account of this shaping.
This perspective has been captured in the work of John Keane 
and, as I argued in chapter seven, can be read into 
Marshall's framework of the democratic-capitalist-welfare
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state if Marshall's passive view of the development of 
welfare rights is rejected.
Managerialist techniques have been described as being 
primarily directed at reducing uncertainty in the sphere of 
action of the manager, that is, at determining outcomes.
The new managerialism can be understood as a set of 
technologies for avoiding conflict in the deployment of 
bureaucratic power. However, the desire to determine 
reality for others is always already bound up with the 
speculative working out of the ideas through which the 
desire is expressed, and the historical context within which 
the determination is sought. The reaction of the proposed 
consumer will always have to be taken into account.
The accountability structures within programs may channel 
and frame struggles with funded organisations such as 
Australia's peak consumer organisations, but rather than 
reduce the uncertainty of their actions this merely creates 
a new set of possibilities for action by these 
organisations. The seeds of resistance are everywhere - 
resistance that has its origins in the requirement of state 
welfare programs for compliance by their beneficiaries. In 
my critique of managerialism, I have sought to show how 
struggles re-emerge at each point in resistance to the 
exercise of authority.
Managerial reform of the public sector has also transformed 
the relationship between government and service providers, 
although a discussion of this is beyond the scope of my 
thesis. I have been concerned however, to show the way 
organisation theory and management reform measures readily 
cross the boundary between private and public sectors.
Weber specifically eschewed any rigid analytical distinction 
between public and private bureaucracies. Drucker noted the
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inroads of a management approach to the heart of the Federal 
administration in the United States since World War Two.
Management innovation can spread both ways. The Reid report 
recommended an overhaul of financial management in the 
Australian Public Sector using a blueprint (the Financial 
Management Improvement Plan) derived from private sector 
experience. Similarly, the move to flatter organisational 
structures instigated by the Public Service Board under 
Wilenski's direction took up models developed in the private 
sector and championed by the human relations school. Going 
the other way, the increased interest in private sector 
management circles in the politics of a firm's controlling 
investment should draw private sector management's attention 
to the lessons to be learnt from the fairly open political 
involvement of public sector managers.
The fluidity and extent of government interaction with 
consumer groups at the end of the 1980s marks a sharp 
contrast to the picture in the 1970s (see Bailey et al 1978, 
and Mathews, 1976). Then, groups representing consumer 
interests had limited access to bureaucratic processes via 
minority representation on formally constituted advisory 
bodies dominated by producer interest, and were 
comparatively poorly organised to achieve influence through 
the public political arena.
The Coombs report articulated calls for increased public 
participation in a reform agenda that stood as the high 
court of public service values for much of the reform of the 
Australian Public Service in the 1980s. Since its election 
in 1983, the Federal Labor government has substantially 
increased funding for non-government groups and encouraged 
their advocacy role. Freedom of information legislation and 
the particular form of implementation of program management 
have provided these groups with unprecedented access to
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information and the policy formation processes of the 
bureaucracy. Significant progress has been made toward more 
open government.
These developments have entailed an expansion of the 
boundaries of the state, opening up a series of arenas of 
conflict and struggle which are a significant problem for 
the new managers of the government administration. The 
expanded boundary is also somewhat ambiguous. Government 
funded non-government groups play an important role in the 
policy processes of the administration. They also play a 
role in the practical enfranchisement of the community, but 
at arm's length from the government administration. As 
discussed in Chapter Four, this distanciation allows the 
administration room to manage the structure of consumer 
advocacy and to manipulate the formation of complex 
integrated policy positions, or volitions in Lindblom's 
terms, through the provision of access and resources to the 
various groups competing for influence.
The interaction of government and non-government agencies 
delineates one of the boundaries of the state. I have been 
particularly interested in the consultative interactions 
where the government agency is more or less consciously open 
to influence through this interaction. As Terry Slater 
observed, consumer consultation crosses the discontinuity at 
the limit of the authority and control structures of the 
bureaucracy (Slater interview). At its best, it articulates 
internal policy debates with community concerns through the 
non-government advocacy groups and has a valuable impact on 
state welfare programs. At its worst, it reinforces the 
aporetic experience of participants trapped within or 
without the authority structures of the bureaucracy and 
contributes to the immanent steerage crisis of the state. 
Whatever the outcome, an analysis of the extent and nature
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of consultation gives an insight into a key set of 
constitutive struggles of the welfare state.
The speculative interaction of social theory and 
administrative action
For me, one of the most valuable aspects of undertaking this 
thesis has been to trace the reflexive development of social 
theoretical concepts in interaction with their subjects.
The analysis of bureaucracies and of welfare policies 
developed in sociological circles have clearly incorporated 
material drawn from the self understanding of bureaucrats, 
welfare service providers and community based lobby groups. 
Conversely, these actors have a certain familiarity with 
sociological categories and analytical approaches.
It would be foolish to attempt to enumerate or classify the 
interchange between sociology and administration. However, 
we can broadly characterise this interchange as a 
speculative process. By this I mean that in their uptake, 
specific concepts are assigned a provisional status in the 
new discourse subject to creative transformations that 
change their meaning. Speculation of this type propels the 
development of tactics in struggles over state activity, and 
indeed underlies the very positing of the boundaries of the 
state and the creation of an arena of contest that this 
entails.
The speculative nature of the interaction between social 
theory and administration can be seen in the genealogy of 
concepts taken up from the work of Max Weber and Elton Mayo; 
in the ascriptive categorisation of target groups for 
welfare programs; and in the growing use of concepts from 
market economics in the welfare field. I shall now
253
summarise these examples as they have appeared in the body 
of the thesis.
The development of the state bureaucracy has been profoundly 
affected by Weber's analysis. Offe described Weber's work 
as "the high court of appeal" for liberal reform of the 
administration. I have argued that more recently, reform of 
the bureaucracy based on human relations theory and shifts 
in the mission of the administration based on notions of 
equity, also owe a debt to Weber's work, albeit as 
developments from his analysis or negative reactions to it 
rather than as a strengthening of the legal rational 
underpinnings of administration that directed liberal reform 
efforts.
The speculative development of ideas about charisma in 
relation to the organisation was discussed in Chapter Two. 
Weber opposed the creative promise of charismatic authority 
to the dehumanising operation of the bureaucracy. Peters 
and Waterman expressed this opposition metonymically.
Rather than recognising Weber's pessimistic view about the 
ascendency of the bureaucratic form leaving charismatic 
leadership as the only faint hope to break its dominance, 
they claimed Weber had "pooh poohed" the notion of 
charismatic leadership (Peters and Waterman 1982 p 5). In 
their own view, charismatic leadership within large 
organisations is the key to productivity. Within this 
managerial approach, the deployment of charisma, far from 
being a fundamental challenge to the authority of the 
bureaucratic form, has become a management tool for 
capturing greater commitment by workers to the goals of the 
organisation however these have been legitimated.
Elton Mayo's humanist goals for organisational development 
were based on a faith in human cooperation as inherently 
productive. In this view, a widening of the span of control
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of each layer in the management hierarchy would lead to 
reduced authoritarian controls over worker units and allow 
increased spontaneous cooperation between workers, with 
subsequent gains in productivity. The implementation of 
flatter structures in the Australian Public Service occurred 
contemporaneously with the introduction of program 
budgeting. The implementation of flatter structures 
required the transformation of the relationship between 
senior executives and the agencies they were responsible 
for. This transformation however, was as much driven by the 
requirement to account for work done in the program format 
dictated by the Financial Management Improvement Plan, as by 
the human relations techniques reflected in the Senior 
Executive Management Program and the Executive Development 
Scheme. The resultant speculative integration of managerial 
techniques has become the dominant authority pattern in the 
Australian Public Service at the end of the 1980s.
Actors in the tactical battles over policy formation and 
implementation, both managers and consumer advocates, make 
conscious and unconscious use of social theory. They 
expropriate concepts and analyses from each other, and the 
various prevailing orthodoxies that impinge on the policies 
and processes under dispute. Yeatman has described the 
generic managers as teleologically promiscuous, ready to 
turn their managerial technology to any end. In opposition 
to this I have portrayed consumer advocates as strategically 
promiscuous, prepared to use any strategy to pursue the ends 
they had in mind, including managerial techniques they could 
have been expected to find abhorrent. The home birth 
movement's call for increased professional surveillance of 
home births, which would give them difficult to obtain data 
about the outcomes of medical intervention, is an example of 
this.
255
One disturbing trend in the uptake of social theory into 
policy formation is the widespread use of ascriptive 
categorisation in programs. This can happen as a pragmatic 
way of applying targeting to social welfare, or for 
accountability purposes in the managerialist style. While 
ascription may be used as innocent shorthand in policy 
debates and program statements, there is a tendency for it 
then to creep into legislation and service agency 
procedures. This can be problematic for both service 
agencies and consumers.
In discussing social welfare provision for the aged, Neville 
Hicks identifies several problems that arise from 
categorical service program descriptions. He notes that as 
a population ages, the accompanying restructuring of aged 
welfare services necessarily lags behind. He argues that 
"the lag will be worse where the service is categorical, not 
personal". Categorical services seek:
"to fit needs to services when funding is provided 
under legislation which defines too closely how funds 
may be spent. That kind of 'categorical provision' is 
insensitive to the needs which recipients perceive they 
have themselves... Categorical services also suffer 
from the enormous drawbacks that if the client does not 
fit a predetermined category the response normally will 
be to move the client, rather than change the category. 
That move will almost always be towards residential 
care" (Hicks 1992 p 8).
Chapter four above outlined the parallel development during 
the 1980s of welfare programs targeted at various groups, 
and consumer advocacy groups with ascriptively defined 
constituencies allied to the program targets. Chapter five 
discussed the problems of consulting with these groups, and 
noted that focussing on the ascribed problem (for example,
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arthritis, or being between 14 and 26 years old) may lose 
sight of the way these people live their lives through 
relationships they have with people outside the target 
group. To overcome this, the self help movement has 
focussed on community integration and abilities rather than 
on difference and disability, preferring active signifiers 
such as "people living with AIDS" (the title of a government 
funded self help group) over the passive form such as "AIDS 
victims" or "sufferers".
My argument is that the root cause of problems of this type 
is that ascriptive categorisation overlooks, and in a sense 
subordinates, the active life of the welfare consumer in 
their community, including their active participation in the 
welfare program in question. In resistance to this, 
organised target groups have in many cases speculatively 
inverted their ascriptive signifiers from a passive to an 
active form.
The final example of the speculative interplay between 
theoretical concepts and developments in welfare that I wish 
to discuss relates to the use of concepts developed in 
market economics. It should be clear that in the body of 
the thesis, I have not sought to apply market theory to the 
welfare field. As Hindess has pointed out, it is an error 
to assume an essentialism about markets, for example that 
they are inherently efficient distributors, or that they 
always lead to exploitation. Rather:
"What is shared by all markets is little more than the 
fact that something is marketed in them. Otherwise, 
they are highly differentiated, and there is little 
point in Marxists or liberals or anyone else trying to 
analyse the functioning of the market without further 
specification" (Hindess, 1987, p 89).
257
The specific institutional forms and historical service 
exchange patterns in welfare markets are tremendously 
variable. Chapter Eight, and to a lesser extent Chapter 
Five, were concerned with the use of market concepts, such 
as consumer, commodity, equity and profit, in the welfare 
field. The historical examples investigated in the thesis 
such as the debates over pharmaceutical benefits and AIDS 
education, are contributions from the field to what Offe 
articulated in his essay "Social Policy and the Theory of 
the State" as the "need for substantive, functional 
analyses of the state or of particular areas of state 
activity" (Offe, 1984, p 89). This type of detailed 
analysis is exactly what is undertaken by managers and 
consumer advocates as they speculatively engage with 
political directives and sociological accounts of problems 
to be addressed in welfare policy formation.
The discussion of various uses of the notion of commodity in 
Chapter Eight showed the highly malleable nature of such a 
concept for social theorising. The subsequent discussion of 
equity and profit as alternative distributive principles 
pointed out various problematic aspects for the use of these 
concepts in the welfare field. Consider the concept of 
profit, for example. State agencies are able to determine 
profitability for other market actors by operating as a 
large scale consumer, a service provider, a third party 
payer or a regulator. The maximisation of profit by the 
agency itself does not usually come into the selection 
between such strategies. In fact, orientation toward profit 
may involve the agency in competitive activities perceived 
as unethical by the electorate. The analysis of profit 
outcomes thus involves a very different set of issues for 
the state welfare manager, concerned about the complex 
effect on service development, than it does for the private 
sector manager, who may be single mindedly concerned with 
its maximisation.
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The speculative nature of the uptake of social theoretical 
concepts into the active discourses of the state, and the 
reflexive development of such concepts through interaction 
and identity of actors in academia and administration 
combine to ensure there is no immediate association between 
concept and action, between principle and program, between 
analysis and structure: in short, between the level of 
actor, organisation or system, however conceived.
Perversely, it is precisely such speculative interaction 
that may produce the illusion of fixed relationships between 
the levels that I described in chapter one as errors of 
reductionism and conflation. The problem of such errors is 
that they overlook the transformations wrought by the human 
creativity and struggle involved in reinterpreting the 
generality of the concept in the specificity of action.
This thesis has traced developments in the welfare state 
during the 1980s by focussing on the interplay between the 
new managerialism and expanded consumer advocacy. I have 
proposed no hypothesis about the outcome of such interplay, 
and have not sought to establish the truth of claims made by 
management theory or the critics of the welfare state. The 
most worthwhile theories of human action and the nature of 
the state operate as guidelines for investigation, not maps 
of what will be found. They are methods, not histories. 
Through my investigations I have tried to show that the 
interplay between management and advocacy is frequently a 
force that shapes state programs, but that the way this 
occurs is continually surprising.
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PD: Was the Health Advancement area the first time that
you had been involved with consumer consultations or that 
type of thing?
TS: No. I had been involved in the industrial
relations activities prior to that. Not extensively but 
often over the years, either with industrial disputes 
arising out of management roles or in terms of introducing 
new technology or new working arrangements where there was a 
need for consultation.
PD: Was this back in the Departments of Housing and
Construction and Customs?
TS: Yes, in corporate affairs. In the computing area
at the time new technology was still making its presence 
apparent, and the unions were particularly concerned about 
the impact on jobs. It is less so today. I think everybody 
accepts that new technology is sweeping through society and 
people are less frightened of it. The new generation of 
course comes through schools where they expect to have the 
latest technology and speak up if they haven't, so it is a 
different problem to one where people felt that their jobs 
were threatened.
In that world going back say 10 years the union leadership 
was very concerned about jobs and about internecine union to 
union concerns because if for example, in the draughting 
area which covered a lot of Telecom's work, the draughting 
union could see that with new technology draughtspeople 
would align themselves more with professional groups than 
seeing themselves as being strictly a technical union 
organisation. The union was actually fighting for its 
survival. So the agenda was outwardly about jobs and about 
conditions of service and sharing the rewards; in fact, what 
it was about as always, was survival of the organisation.
PD: We might come back to that sort of point at the
end when we talk about consumer advocates. Initially, 
perhaps you could talk about managing consumer consultation. 
How is it the same as managing some other form of 
consultation, say interdepartmental consultation; how is 
the same as managing program delivery; and how is it 
different?
TS: By definition organisations have a structure, an
authority base, and certain powers invested on individuals.
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So in any interdepartmental negotiations or with 
intradepartmental program negotiations, there is very much 
an organisation structure and a power structure, which, at 
the end of the day, whether it is invoked or not, is ever 
there. For example, Mary Parker Follett said that in 
industrial negotiations that if you ever get to have to play 
your authority then you have lost the negotiations. 
Nonetheless the authority is always there and the ace card 
is always there if you ever need it in those negotiations.
With consumer groups, or lobbyists, there isn't that 
understanding of where the group fits in and where they are 
coming from. So in discussions with advocates and outside 
bodies, it is not vastly different from discussions with 
private sector commercial firms. One has to understand what 
each party is seeking. So beforehand it is important that 
you understand what the groups agenda is and work out how 
that agenda might fit into the objectives of the program 
that you are seeking, and of course with the government of 
the day's desires. And the government of the day's desires 
may well be to have that group satisfied. So in fact the 
consultations may well be about determining the agenda of 
that consumer group. So there has to be a lot of homework 
done to determine what are the objectives of the 
negotiations from all sides, and what can be accommodated 
and what can't.
PD: Would the consultations over the women's health
strategy be an example?
TS: Yes, it is an excellent example because the
women's network had had a large input to a report which very 
much reflected their agenda but which we judged would have 
been difficult for the government of the day to consider 
because it didn't have either the polish, the breadth of 
view of the issues, or the wherewithal to get government 
support, particularly in terms of funding. Now there was 
extreme delicacy in ensuring the women's health network 
people did not think that the report was being taken out of 
their hands by the bureaucrats after they had done all the 
work, and that bureaucrats then took it over, owned it, 
changed it, and put it forward as theirs. So there was 
considerable delicacy in ensuring that ownership was 
retained while shaping the document to produce the outcomes 
the government wanted and in a way which would win Cabinet 
support.
PD: How did you do that and how did you keep the
women's network on side?
TS: I put in place, over and above the women's sub­
committee that AHMAC had set up, a departmental steering 
committee which I chaired and which had on it the 
chairperson of the women's sub-committee. The terms of
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reference of the departmental committee were reasonably 
narrow and that was to ensure that all interested program 
areas had input, because the women's health statement goes 
across programs, for instance aged care, children's 
services, medicare, those sorts of issues. And I made sure 
that that committee had on it women's representatives that 
were acceptable or were seen as being very acceptable to the 
women's network.
Because I chaired it, there was some noise from the women's 
groups outside about the fact that a male was chairing it 
and that it was being taken out of their hands. However, 
the chairperson of that subcommittee who was on the 
departmental steering committee did her work exceedingly 
well, reassured them, pointed out the objectives of the 
steering committee. She was quite crucial, and her 
credibility of course was on the line - within the women's 
network, not within the department.
With each succeeding draft as the departmental committee 
went through, any changes went back to be debated by the 
sub-committee of AHMAC so that they could see the changes.
As you well know, towards the end with the Minister focusing 
on it, a very sharp thrust for that policy came out, and 
that was about community women's health centres, which in 
the original document hadn't assumed an importance or a 
focus, yet that had become the thrust of the policy. So 
with the discussions at Bowral with the Minister, and an 
agreement about just what could be politically achieved, we 
then had to come back and re-focus the document. Because of 
the goodwill and the trust and the understanding that had 
been built up, it went through with a minimum of fuss.
PD: To try and distil what you are saying there -
developing that trust and keeping the consumer group 
informed...
TS: Very crucial.
PD: ... then enabled you to participate in the cut
and thrust of government policy making.
TS: It meant that when we went back and said - look,
for this policy to go forward, for the Minister to be 
comfortable in taking it forward and for the government to 
support it, the policy has to have a much sharper focus in 
this area - that was accepted. We ensured that it didn't 
lose its ideological base. There is a fine line, as you 
would know, between what is ideologically acceptable in a 
consensus sense to the group, and what could be important to 
leading members of the group - there is a difference because 
of other agendas. Leading members were the ones that 
needed to be targeted first, and got on side.
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PD: So you need to be politically strategic in
working with the consumer group?
TS: You need to be managerially strategic in the
sense of knowing the group dynamics and how that group would 
best accept change.
PD: Could you expand on that perhaps a little bit
more generally, and give another example.
TS: I guess if we move to the AIDS area and look at
the involvement of people whose behaviour places them at 
risk. In the Gay community there are a range of views about 
the objectives of Gay organisations and very much about what 
activities are vital in achieving objectives in those 
organisations, and what change in behaviours is acceptable 
to the different groups.
There are some very important spokespeople in the Gay 
community. It is crucial to have those people who are more 
influential than others within that organisation understand, 
accept and be prepared to advocate behavioural change? to 
quell or quiese any fears about what might well be a change 
in the direction of the community's aims; have the 
perspective and see the big picture I guess? and get that 
across. Having those people agree with the strategy is 
crucial and not only is that an interactive process but they 
have to have an opportunity to ensure that their power base 
within the organisation isn't eroded by the change either.
Within the Gay community, of course, there are local 
politics within local groups, and there are National 
politics, and there are different players in both those 
areas. I think it was one of Dr Blewett's great 
achievements. While the Department played a part, there are 
players outside of the department I think that are more 
crucial, such as Mike Clarke and Bill Bowtell [former 
members of Dr Blewett's personal staff] and the like, who 
were very influential in getting to key players in that 
community and convincing or enlisting them to get out and 
understand the direction ahead and what changes had to come, 
so that within those groups they would advocate a change.
PD: You mention the involvement of politicians, of
Blewett, as a Federal politician, and his staffers, and also 
of the politicians within the Gay organisation. I guess the 
involvement of politicians is a feature of consumer 
consultation, generally.
TS: Yes, because at the end of the day consumer
advocacy, lobbying, is about influencing government 
decisions. The government will get a feeling about what are 
the costs of not satisfying a particular lobbyist, and will 
judge the lobbyist on that.
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PD: The political costs?
TS: Yes, political costs. That cost in some cases
will be votes. At the end of the day whatever it is it 
will be translated into votes. But the costs can come 
through the direct shifting of votes, or by publicity where 
the lobbyist can make the issue one that more generally is 
likely to change people's voting patterns. A good example 
of that is Eric Ristromm's self-created taxpayers' 
association. I'm not even sure that Eric Ristromm is a PAYE 
tax-payer, and how he represents all taxpayers - 
particularly the majority of taxpayers who are all wage and 
salary earners - is amazing, but nonetheless, his advocacy 
is able to swing votes broadly. He is not, through his 
organisation, able to deliver a great number of votes, but 
the publicity, the issues that he raises are. So that the 
government, in weighing up its decisions to support Ristromm 
or otherwise, would look at his ability to swing votes right 
across the board. As politicians, they weigh up the 
political cost.
PD: One of the things that you have to manage in
managing consumer consultations is the involvement of 
politicians. How do you do that?
TS: You're very much at the nub of what is the
difference between a bureaucrat and Ministerial office 
staffer, and at senior levels it becomes a shade of grey to 
a large extent. It is important that government officials 
be able to understand what the will of the government of the 
day is and be able to translate that into appropriate 
policies and appropriate practices and procedures and 
changes and legislative amendments, etc. And to be able to 
give good advice about the impact of those things. Now it 
is in that latter area that you get a little closer to what 
is called political advice. In that sense the power, the 
strength, the views, and the likely outcomes of discussions 
with advocates or lobbyists are quite crucial to judge.
We were talking about the involvement of the Gay community 
in Aids education. You would well know there were hard line 
groups who had lobbying power who were opposed to the way 
the government set about managing the AIDS epidemic. Now 
those hard line groups, also had influence, also were 
organised; by definition had lobbying power, were advocates. 
So the politician isn't only having pressure from one 
direction, he has it from many directions. One of the 
roles that we have here is to be able to understand those 
pressures? to try and give a balanced view of what the 
impact of the various changes of policy that are being 
advocated would have; and in terms of knowing the 
governments long term objectives - for example in the AIDS
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area about stemming this epidemic - to advise about what is 
the best course.
PD: Lets turn now to a more technical side of
managing consumer consultation. You have talked about 
setting your objectives for the consultation, and the 
importance of being clear about both your own objectives and 
the objectives of the organisations. You talked about the 
strategies needed to conduct the consultation. What about 
the outcomes, and the evaluation of the consultation?
TS: Let's talk about the women's health policy as an
example. The objectives of the women's health network was 
to improve health services for women, plus other changes 
that would fit in with what we'll call the women's agenda.
It was important in framing that policy that those longer 
term agenda items were there, visible, so that people could 
relate to them. Similarly with the decision on the media 
ban on smoking, if I died tomorrow I would feel that 
something that I had always wanted in my life, in the public 
interest, a step forward has actually been taken. I feel 
really good about that, despite the fact that I was only one 
player in the process: one can feel that Australia has
taken a very important step forward.
Evaluation and performance measurement of outcomes should 
always be a part of program implementation. Having built up 
that trust and got the consensus and agreement about what 
the policy should stand for, it is absolutely crucial that 
you maintain the confidence of all of the interested 
parties. Now there are simple strategies for that. You 
can involve them in oversighting, but you have got to be 
careful not to throw away the management responsibility and 
management flexibility, because there does need to be the 
ability to make changes on the run.
PD: Are these issues of management autonomy?
TS: Yes. Management autonomy, but also not to give
someone the right of veto over the content or the direction 
of how it is being managed, unless you deliberately want to 
do that. So in framing the involvement of interested 
parties outside of the direct responsibility for 
implementation , one has to have it very clearly in mind 
what involvement you want from them. At one end of the 
spectrum that may just be to consult with them on the way as 
a minimum of involvement; to at the other end of the 
spectrum, actually involving them in the management of the 
program. Most times you wouldn't involve them in the 
management but you would have a mechanism where they could 
feel as though they were being involved, where they at least 
could be assured that the thing was heading in the direction 
that was originally agreed, and if there are changes that
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they understand the reasons for those changes, endorse them, 
and are able to articulate them to their community.
PD: What would be an example of when you would go
beyond that and actually involve them in the management, and 
how would you do that?
TS: Let's go to the health promotion area. An
example where we have actually involved an advocate in the 
management process is having Stephen Leeder [Professor of 
Community Medicine, University of Sydney] involved on the 
management committee of the Better Health Program. Stephen 
Leeder represents loosely the professional health and 
promotion experts in the country. He is actually on that 
management committee because of his profile, because of the 
audience and because of his ability to contribute: better
to have him inside managing than outside being very 
critical.
PD: Could we move on now to look at the difference of
the environment that bureaucrats and managers work with and 
are accountable within, and the environment of the consumers 
themselves and the consumer advocates.
One theoretical line in management theory is that management 
seeks to reduce the complexity and unformed nature of ideas 
and communication within the broader community, aiming to 
reduce those into achievable and comprehensible policy 
formulations and programs. The picture is of the broader 
world where people are talking about all sorts of things 
that they want to see happen and want to do, and the role of 
the bureaucracy in a democratic society is to try to make 
sense of the complexity and scattered nature of what is 
being said, and reduce it to policy directions and programs 
that give people what they want.
TS: I would have described that broad canvas a little
differently than that. The role of the civil service is to 
serve the government of the day. Now that sounds like 
motherhood, but what it essentially means is that there is a 
role for bureaucracy in helping the government frame 
appropriate policies in response to what they see as a 
direction they want to head in a particular area. Now it 
could well be for example that the government, an incoming 
government, says that they want to do a lot about aboriginal 
health. In selling that to the electorate and gaining 
enough votes to win power they don't need to put a lot of 
flesh on the bones always. So there is a role, a primary 
role, for the bureaucracy in helping to flesh out workable 
policies. It is very crucial that those policy objectives 
are ones that are accepted by the government at the end of 
day.
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While there is a need in a management sense for the 
bureaucracy to have commitment to those policies, the 
responsibility for policy pronouncement and policy 
development is seen as the role of government, with it being 
up to the bureaucracy to implement those policies. In fact 
there is a continuum there where the bureaucracy is involved 
in the framing of policies, in advice about the workability 
and achievability of policies right through to the 
implementation stage. And I think it is crucial that 
there is a close working relationship formed between the government of the day and the bureaucracy.
That leads you into the whole issue about politicisation of 
the public service. In the US the top echelons are cleaned 
out in virtually every department with each change of 
government. Under the Westminster system the public 
service is meant to stand back and not be wedded to a 
government's program. That is not to say that it is not 
committed to it — but that it is able to change direction, 
totally if necessary. I think that while the bureaucracy 
can do that, it would be beyond most human beings if there 
weren't some individuals who were committed one way or 
another to particular programs. Now I think in that case 
governments may need, or certainly I believe have the right 
and maybe the need, to ensure that people who can deliver 
their programs are in strategic positions within the public sector. I think that is happening a bit.
PD: Does that commitment tie into a commitment topublic consultation by the bureaucracy?
TS: Again I think that is very much dependent on how
the Government wants to go about achieving its particular 
programs. Take the development-conservation nexus. It is a 
classic where you have got ministers with different 
portfolio responsibilities feeling various tensions, and 
they have different policy perspectives. Now those tensions 
between opposing forces have to be resolved somewhere, and 
they are resolved in the Cabinet Room. There needs to be a 
clear message come out to policy implementers and policy 
developers about what the government's approach to resolving 
that tension is. There is whole set of advocates on each 
side, consumer advocates and commercial advocates.
PD: Perhaps we can also talk about the role of the
advocate and their relation to consumers or to the public, to citizens.
TS: We started out I think by very simplistically
defining that as about votes as far as the government was 
concerned; and for the lobbyist about private gain, or for 
an advocacy group the particular gain to members of that 
group either in terms of having their policies accepted or 
some practical gain. For the Haemophilia Foundation, the
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practical gain there, through their lobbying efforts, was 
financial reward for their members through the setting up 
of the Trust for people with medically acquired HIV 
infection. So there is a mixture: essentially some private
benefits somewhere generally at the end of day, but it can 
be loosely termed a public benefit to the group.
PD: Have their been problems in working with consumer
advocates where you thought that they weren't really 
representing their constituency?
TS: Well, you get factions within consumer advocacy
groups. Like in any organisation there are group dynamics 
and power struggles. So from time to time you do get 
conflicting messages about what the objectives of the groups 
are. I suppose really the question you are asking is, are 
some of the consumer advocacy objectives untenable judged in 
a political sense or a policy sense. That is where it 
really becomes a decision for the government of the day.
PD: What about in the terms of the objectives of the
consultation? For example, perhaps you could talk a bit 
about the aboriginal health strategy, where the government 
of the day had a clear commitment to consulting and yet the 
consultation process became very difficult to get outcomes 
that the government could then respond to.
TS: That is really a classic of factionalism in the
consumer advocacy group. Again there is an exceedingly 
large and diverse group with some individuals involved for 
no other objective than individual power. And the 
objective of developing a framework of consultation with 
them and getting them to have an input, which was what the 
aboriginal strategy attempted to do, was lost by those 
individuals seeking their own internecine objectives. 
Sometimes, and that could well be an instance, by disrupting 
the process they in fact achieved their objectives.
PD: Their personal objectives?
TS: Their personal objectives.
PD: Whilst frustrating the objectives of the
consultation?
TS: Yes. There is no question in that aboriginal
health strategy development process, there were individuals 
who didn't want to see the process come out with any 
effective result.
PD: Can you foresee these sorts of problems? Are
they structural problems or are they problems that are 
specific to a particular issue?
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TS: Yes, they can be foreseen and yes, to answer your
question you can structure the process to get around that, 
if it is foreseen. But from time to time those agendas are 
not well known or well stated.
PD: One of the other more general issues in consumer
consultation is working with dissatisfaction. You ask 
citizens about particular areas, not for them to say they 
are happy with how it is going, but for them to express 
dissatisfaction, so initially you provoke some expressions 
of dissatisfaction. Later on I guess there is always some 
dissatisfaction with the consultation process itself, and 
some dissatisfaction with the outcome from one faction or 
another. Are there any things in managing the consultation 
that you can specifically address that problem with?
TS: The whole question of efficacy based on
dissatisfaction is best exemplified by the Majura 
Development Group, where because an issue arose, an advocacy 
group was set up.
PD: What was the issue?
TS: It was about the proposed road going around the
base of Mount Majura. Now the residents up there, and other 
interested individuals, set up an organisation to fight that 
road going in. They came together as a result of a 
decision, or an intention, of the government of the day, 
through the ACT Planning Authority in this case. The 
group's life was about achieving one outcome. When that 
outcome was achieved, essentially the group was dissolved. 
Managing a process like that it is very difficult because 
what binds a group is a single objective? and it becomes 
almost a political decision to judge the political cost as 
being too great one way or another. The objective in 
managing that process was to try and keep the costs down as 
low as possible.
PD: You have outlined an example where a group forms
around a specific objective. What about where there is no 
group but the department wants to consult on things with 
people in the general public.
TS: Well the AIDS case is a good example where we
tried to consult broadly, ostensibly to get input to the 
policy framework but practically to ensure that there was 
the opportunity for interested people to have been seen to 
have had an opportunity for input to the process. It was 
very important to be able to say that in framing a policy 
for all Australians, the most widespread consultation 
process had been embarked on. The important thing there was 
designing within costs parameters and time parameters what 
could best be achieved and how to best achieve it.
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PD: In terms of managing the consultation?
vou f^nH f h ?  listenin? to a11 y°ur responses, it seems that you fine the management precepts of setting objectives
nnt^Cni,^ ^ ear strategy and having an outcome that you'could put your finger on very helpful.
TS: It is absolutely crucial.
PD: Have there been any problems in that sort of
S h ! ? t i ; n4.a more general sense, where you have wondered whether that was the best way to do it?
TS: No. Look, it is a methodical, set piece
approach. You still have enough flexibility in the wav vou
?rv?n°U£ that ffleet the different situations that youYare trying to consult or to deal with in an advocacy sense. I 
have felt the trade-off between time and cost in managing 
that process. Which means you want a policy out at a
say to go into the bud9et process, and I've feit that the consultation process is another step in what I 
term the critical path to achieve that work deadline and 
that work outcome. I've felt very much the trade-off in 
terms of whether to go ahead with a more elaborate or less 
e^aborabe no consultation process.
End of interview.
WARREN TALBOT
AIDS PROGRAM MANAGER, TASMANIAN DEPT OF HEALTH 
FORMERLY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION OF AIDS ORGANISATIONS 
INTERVIEWED BY PAUL DUGDALE 29/8/90.
PD: I would like to talk with you about three areas.
Firstly, about managerialism in consumer groups? secondly, 
about how managerialism affects the interactions of consumer 
groups with the bureaucracy and the professions? and thirdly 
about managing cultural change.
As the Executive Director of AFAO (Australian Federation of 
AIDS Organisations) you grew up in an era where 
managerialism was taken for granted. How did that affect 
you? How did you manage AFAO in program terms?
WT: I wasn't conscious of it is the short answer.
In terms of my sort of background and the background of 
people involved in AFAO, they were very much people who had 
not been involved in the public sector or government at all. 
Only a short number of years before AFAO was set up, almost 
all our key individuals would have identified themselves 
with a left, feminist, socialist perspective and hadn't 
interacted with governments. So we weren't aware of any 
debates on government in the seventies or whatever. In the 
early eighties we were at National Gay Conferences passing 
resolutions about homosexuals in Cuba? but within a short 
space of time these were the people who had instrumental 
roles in setting up AFAO. So I don't think people were 
conscious of it at all. We knew what we wanted from the 
bureaucracy in a sense or from the government in a sense but 
we weren't the slightest bit conscious of the managerial 
styles or approaches and whether we fitted in or didn't fit 
in.
PD: By the time you submitted your last budget
proposal for AFAO it was very clearly laid out as a whole 
series of projects, with a set of priorities and a set of 
objectives. Was that a gradual learning process? How did 
that sit with AFAO and with the members of AFAO?
WT: People were very much coming in from the outside
and learning. The whole philosophy of having someone full 
time in Canberra, namely my job, was that you would have 
someone who would learn the lingo and know how things are 
presented and all that. It wasn't sort of a thought 
through 'ah-ha,' that this is philosophically the current 
thing. It was a much more realistic approach of 'what is 
the best way to get money out of them' that was always the 
focus. Your could certainly trace the budget submissions if 
you wanted to do that, starting with that of Peter Loggin, 
my predecessor who was the interim coordinator, which was 
basically a letter to Alan Scroop [an officer of the
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Commonwealth Department of Health] which started 'Dear Mr 
Scroop7 and went through one and a half pages saying we'd 
like to do a media kit and we think this would cost $2,500 
and we'd like to have an office in Canberra but we will have 
a desk at the AIDS Action Council so all we need is a salary 
and that will cost us $24,000? it was a very modest 
operation in those days; through to the final budget 
submission which quite consciously tried to develop a 
program, project perspective. It was very influenced in format by Ian Molloy.
PD: Ian Molloy was the Commonwealth Department ofHealth placement in your organisation.
PD: Including the managerial ethos.
WT: oh yes, very much so, and also a knowledge of
technology. He contributed quite a lot to the format of
the final budget submission. The final budget submission 
was much more of a top down exercise than previously, and 
that reflected a change in the organisation. When they 
initially wanted to start a person in Canberra they called 
the person 'Interim Coordinator.' How much more tentative 
can you get! When I was appointed, they called me the 
Coordinator,' for a relatively low salary. Totally off 
my own bat, in correspondence, I started calling myself the 
Coordinator.' I thought if you are talking to 
ational Government you have got to sort of say that you are 
notjust coordinating whatever. And at every Annual General 
eeting that I worked for them there was a title change. So 
I went officially from coordinator to National Coordinator, 
then to Executive Officer and then finally to Executive 
Director. And that was to some extent a good indication of 
both me but also people generally becoming more relaxed about that sort of terminology.
PD: Do you think they will ever have a Manager?
WT: It is interesting how some AIDS Councils have
moved that way but surprisingly, the AIDS Councils that have 
gone for a "Manager" have been the more collectivist 
volunteer-based, like the VAC (Victorian AIDS Council).
They call their senior staff person "General Manager," very 
much so as to control that person. ACON (AIDS Council of 
NSW) is the opposite model and they call their senior person 
Executive Director, and that person has enormous authority.
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PD: To go back to the problems of program budgeting.
You mentioned that it discouraged the bottom up approach, 
that it was a bit top down. Were there any other problems, 
and how did that particular problem manifest itself.
WT: Well, I think in the final budget it meant that
only the staff and a small number of people knew what we 
were saying and what we were on about. The final budget 
submission was enormous. It was a 200 page document, which 
wasn't called a budget submission, it was sort of charting 
the community based response. Interestingly, some things 
were funded that year, a few more have now been funded and 
few more will be. Its eventually being implemented. So I 
think more people understand it now. But just the size of 
the task! AFAO has always had an 18 member committee or 
thereabouts which is relatively unwieldy. But 18 members 
can get their minds around a one and a half page letter to 
Alan Scroop; it is much harder for 18 people to analyse and 
be consistent about 200 pages.
PD: One of the criticisms of the program format has
been that it encourages a commodification of services and 
activities in the sense that you have to provide things that 
you can count, to be well within the intentions of the 
program management rhetoric. Did you find that a problem?
WT: Well I was certainly aware of it as being aproblem.
PD: What is an example?
WT: How we are going to evaluate things always came
out as sort of an issue, which largely we avoided. I 
think the irony was that the Commonwealth was as unable as 
we were to actually sort out what it meant by evaluation and 
what would be expected. It wasn't a matter of the 
Commonwealth saying "these are our strict guide-lines: you 
must distribute 526 brochures." They weren't clear what 
they wanted in a sense.
I could certainly cite six specific projects where there was 
an evaluation component where we did not set up any 
performance indicators or things like that until after the 
project was well and truly finished. They were on our 
backs for a report so we made them up then. I mean 
basically the dynamic in community based organisations is 
that people, usually on an AIDS Council or whatever, see the 
need, they feel it pressing, and they saw AFAO's role was to 
get the money so they could do it. That was the basic 
dynamic. The niceties of evaluation and reporting and that 
sort of stuff was my problem to paper over after the event.
PD: Let's talk about accountability in a different
sense; accountability to your members and to the community.
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Did you have any specific strategies or any specific 
thoughts about that, apart from delivering the money to your membership?
WT: Well, that was fairly essential. There are all
the formal mechanisms, through the Committee and general 
meetings held twice a year, an annual report and all that 
sort of stuff. I used to produce volumes of paperwork, 
telling them what was going on and that sort of thing. I am 
possibly overstating it but I really do feel that if the 
money was flowing, the AIDS Councils felt that AFAO was 
doing its job.
PD: AFAO was in an interesting situation during the
eighties in that you had a rapidly expanding budget. This 
is not a common problem for management in the public sector. 
Could you talk about managing a rapidly expanding budget.
WT: It was a strange sort of process because the
first AFAO budget submission was $40,000 and that was in 
1986 and then at the end of 89, which was only 3 budgets 
later, AFAO administered $1.2 million so it had sort of 
grown fairly quickly. The money did contributed an 
enormous amount to the unity within AFAO because there was 
something for everyone with an expanding budget.
I think that has now changed, and money is now a source of 
conflict whereas previously it wasn't. I could always find 
a little project for some AIDS Council and I could always 
afford to fly our President, or Executive Officer or 
somebody down for something or other. There was always a 
spare air fare. At the height of the pilot's crisis last 
year I succeeded in flying one AIDS Council person to Perth 
via New Zealand. The money was just there to do it. And 
with a bit of careful accounting, all consistent with what 
had been approved.
PD: Let's move on to talk about interactions between
AFAO, the AIDS Councils, and the administration. AIDS was 
a particularly political issue for much of the eighties.
What were the political dimensions of your interaction with 
the administration?
WT: I guess I saw my job as being to present the
respectable face to Canberra, to talk in the terms of 
Canberra and that sort of stuff. Realising that it 
involved some sort of shaping of what the reality was.
There was always a lot of friction in terms of how far 
education projects should and should not go. The 
Commonwealth was always wanting to control and limit, and we 
were always wanting to expand in some way. I sort of had a 
mediating role. So for example, for the Youth Education 
Project we did some tram ad's in Melbourne which were 
basically just designed to tell young lesbians and gay men
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IPPS 51SÜ taar?;
aid our money - none of the Commonwealth's money is to be 
used. So that sort of conflict was always there in terms of 
the message and what money could be used, was this in 
agreement with the Grant conditions, w as it a legitimate
conflict m°ney °r n0t* That WaS 3 constant source of
In that particular case that Slater felt that the 
advertisement on a tram telling young gay men to phone for 
counselling, without any mention of AIDS, was politically 
unacceptable. He saw it as his job to police that fairly 
trongiy. There was a lot of that going on. At the end of
th^+-d?h ln m°St d£ai?atic terms they wouldn't fund a project that they saw as being politically unacceptable, or they 
would fund them and you would haggle and negotiate o v e /  
content. There are all these auditors inquiries showinq the 
massive delays to do with money. The most common point9of
woij?d hfc!he > f W! J 9et thG text ready for something and it ould be submitted to DCSH, and it would be held up. The
Xonth«sPr° 2 ^ t DUSt didn/t 9° anywhere, it took months and onths sitting around the branch because they just weren't 
quite sure politically what was acceptable or not.
PD: What about mobilising public support to getwhat you wanted from the administration.
of a Well I relied on the AIDS Council as the members f AFAO to do that. It is interesting that we never really 
e never had to do that in any serious way, it was almost Y
1QOftd??® W1^h huf£ and Puff* The interesting thing is in 1990 there is a change, where for the first time angry 
groups have actually demonstrated, picketed a Minister, 
disrupted a conference and done all those direct action 
things. We always had it there as a tool, and it is 
interesting to discuss why they have broken out in 1990.
PD: What do you think are some of the factors?
WT: One is that it was just inevitable as large
numbers of infected people were getting sicker and sicker 
whether it was 1990 or 1991 or whenever. Another - and 
probably the organisation would disagree - is that I saw it 
as my role to keep the organisation respectable and proper.
I had a gut instinct that that would serve our interests in 
^°M9^ eril\’ Political action was tossed around at the third National Conference, and I had a role in diffusing 
that. So part of it was inevitable, part of it was a changed style of people.
PD: I guess in a sense with the National HIV/AIDS
Strategy fixing the budget over the next 3 or 4 years, there 
is no longer the incentive to play the game properly so as 
to keep increasing the budget.
WT: I think that is true, one change between let's
say the 3rd and 4th years of AFAO in the third year just 
prior to the White Paper AFAO was larger in the year it had 
got $500,000 plus another $600,000 or so in education 
projects. AFAO was larger than all of its members except 
ACON. The change in the National Strategy - what I called 
the 'Blewett settlement' in my paper at the 1990 National 
AIDS Conference - is that AFAO is now actually smaller than 
most of its members, because the big increase was at the 
State level. So you had a number of medium size state AIDS 
councils, SA, WA, Queensland, which until that point had 
been actually smaller in funding than AFAO - they actually 
jumped AFAO, which stayed the same, and that changed the 
relative position of things. Even the small councils came 
up very close.
Another factor is that for example at ACON, you have got 70 
staff. If you face budget cuts, you have got a lot of 
people out there to get to organise for you. You can feel 
more adventurous, if you have got 70 cadres paid by the 
public purse to mount a public campaign against cuts.
PD: Let's talk about the AIDS Council and their
interaction with the professions and with the service 
providing agencies, whether they be hospitals or clinics. 
Perhaps you could tell a story about trying to get some 
action out of a particular service agency and the strategies 
that you used to get the change.
WT: Change out of a particular service agency in a
particular State or Territory? You would have to actually 
talk to an AIDS Council.
PD: Were you involved in any of the clinical trials?
WT: Yes, in some of the lobbying of Albion St AIDS
Clinic versus St Vincents Hospital and that sort of thing.
A lot of that was traditional confrontational tactics. My 
first exposure to conflict in the AFAO job was at the 
National AIDS Conference in 1986. I had only been appointed 
for 2 or 3 months. Albion St had started the isoprinosine 
trials - goodness knows what's happened to them - and ACON 
put out a blistering attack which they distributed to all 
the Conference participants, and there was a media 
conference, and I was caught up organising it, I didn't know 
anything about the issues. So that was just the 
traditional confrontation - the agency providing the service 
doesn't talk to the consumer group whatsoever, and makes a 
decision? whether it is appropriate or inappropriate,
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consumer group reacts very negatively and hostily. As a 
result I don't think relations between ACON and Albion St 
have ever been reparable, to the extent that 2 or 3 months 
later when Bill Whittaker started to work for ACON he made a 
decision very early on that he would have nothing to do with 
Albion St, he'd work with St Vincents and David Cooper and 
his group. So ACON - the consumer group in that sense, 
pitched its energies that way.
PD: What made St Vincents more attractive to work
with?
WT: Well they offered a couple of places on a
committee to people, which is always a persistent demand.
At the '86 National AIDS Conference DCSH bought this guy 
over from Boston called Dr Martin Hirsh [Director of 
Virology at Harvard University] who had been involved in 
some very early trials over there. In his keynote speech he 
stated that a central factor to assess was having a client 
group on the committee. So his speech was used for a period 
of months as a lobbying point: this eminent expert, who of 
course we had never heard of before, had advocated such and 
such a course of action. Now I don't know exactly what the 
committee is but ACON got themselves on some committee at St 
Vincents which gave them some regular, formal liaison with 
David Cooper, who was running the trials.
PD: Does that continue now?
WT: It has expanded in all sorts of ways, because its
become CATN (Community AIDS Treatment Network), which is a 
committee of [Drs] Cooper, Penny and Donovan, plus Bill 
Whittaker, Roland Petherbridge and one other: 3 community, 3 
medicos. Most committees that have been set up to look at 
trial protocols now involve community based people. There 
is still a lot of agitation in that area.
PD: In Tasmania, where you are involved in the
management side of AIDS, do you use clients or consumers in 
decision making processes?
WT: Prior to November last year Tasmania had an AIDS
Advisory Committee to the Department of Health which 
comprised 5 doctors and 1 nurse. The first thing I did on 
arriving in Tasmania was to abolish that and to set up a 
Ministerial AIDS Advisory Committee which has about half 
medical and half non-medical people. On that we have the 
obvious groups including the AIDS Council with 2 people, 
family planning and people living with AIDS (PLWA). A lot 
of the Tasmanian story this year is catching up with the 
rest of the country. For the first time the main treating 
physician at the hospital was actually forced to sit down in 
a room with someone from the patient group, and they have 
enormous debates just over the use of the word patient
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versus client: the physician sticks to the word patient, and 
the PLWA rep insists on the word client. They are bitter 
debates, it is extraordinary.
PD: What are some of the points of the debate?
WT: The treating physician feels that consumer
advocacy in this specific case, namely having a PLWA on an 
equal basis with him, is a contravention of the traditional 
medical practitioner role. He really is a nice bloke - a 
member of the ALP, a small »'s" socialist, but he has 
traditional belief that the medical profession is an 
honourable profession, he went into that profession because 
he was concerned for human beings, and he could have been 
out making mega bucks in private practice but he worked with 
the public hospital system. He is really a concerned human 
being and I think that is all quite genuine, but in that 
traditional model. Therefore he is trained, and he has got 
the expertise. So he believes for example that there are a 
various set of circumstances where he could do an AIDS test 
on someone without telling him, on the grounds that he is 
weighing up the diagnosis or what is best for their 
management, and he doesn't tell them out of concern for 
their welfare, so it won't cause them anxiety and so on.
For me it has been interesting because it is a quite well 
articulated position. You can't dismiss him as a right wing 
homophobe, it is a serious position.
PD: What are the arguments that the clients or
patients use?
WT: Well all the obvious things, that these things
affect their lives, usually combined with horror stories of 
individuals who have been tested without their consent and 
then have been told. Or individuals who have come in to the 
Royal Hobart Hospital and had their HIV status written 
fairly prominently on the bed notes.
PD: How does that translate into an argument for
calling themselves clients instead of patients?
WT: It is a good question, I don't know. It tends to
be that when they use the word "client”, for them it carries 
a connotation of rights, assertion, their equal place within 
the system. They see the word patient as suggesting a 
compliant, doctor knows best relationship. The medico 
denies it but at the same time defends it.
PD: One further thing on interactions with the
professions. As Manager of AIDS in Tasmania no doubt you 
have been imposing a more rational framework on the 
provision of services there. Has the focus of managerialism 
on outcomes and on accounting practices affected the
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provision of services in any good or detrimental ways that 
you have noticed?
WT: Well it depends on your point of view. In AFAO
I found a lot of the evaluation stuff just to be an utter 
nonsense, just stupid. In Tasmania, once my salary and the 
salary of a clerical officer to assist me were secure, my 
number one priority was to acquire a finance officer. I 
always accepted that our political enemies would never get 
us on our program even if we hadn't done the latest 
evaluation, performance indicators or whatever. But they 
could always get us on misuse of public money . So I've 
never had a problem with utterly strict accounting standards 
of financial reporting.
PD: As a political defence?
WT: Yes. They may well be morally right as well but
my main motivation was primarily political - because I 
thought that was where we were potentially vulnerable. I 
think it has been borne out. The most serious attack on the 
Commonwealth government over AIDS has been by Michael Cobb 
on those consultantcies where things were rushed through 
without tender and that sort of stuff. So from the 
community based point of view I never had any apologies 
whatsoever for insisting on the strictest approach there, 
and likewise from the point of view of Government I have got 
no problem doing that because I think at the end of the day 
a lot of evaluation stuff is bunkum, or a superficial 
rationalisation for what you would have done anyway.
Nothing is more important than to go away and do it. The 
accounting stuff you really have to be really strict.
PD: Have there been any squeals from the service
delivery agencies in Tasmania about the imposition of 
stricter financial standards?
WT: Not at this stage because the AIDS Council were
held down by the previous Government, and were officially 
only funded for office rent and an office administrator.
That was it. The education money came from the 
Commonwealth. We lifted their budget in one financial year 
from $60,000 to $200,000 and they had some program money for 
the first time, so basically it has just been ecstasy. But 
this year it is just going to stay at the $200,000, or it 
may go up with inflation. I think that is when they will 
probably feel it. But that has been their first taste of 
that sort of increase which all the other State AIDS 
Councils had for years.
PD: Have you been involved in the clinic side of it
in the funding for the hospital?
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WT: Yes. Basically the Royal Hobart's been engaged in
an exercise of trying to offload what I would regard as 
being their normal on-going costs to have HIV patients or 
any other patients, on to the AIDS matched funding program, 
so there has been tension there. It is interesting: there 
has been more tension, but because it is another arm of the 
bureaucracy it is more sanitised. It has taken the form of 
a letter from the Chief Executive Officer of the Hospital to 
the Secretary of the Department. Now I know full well that 
the guy who is in charge of AIDS Services has written it - 
he has phoned me about it - he has got his boss to sign it 
and he knows full well that though it is addressed to my 
boss my boss doesn't see it, it comes to me. It is more 
conflictual in a sense because we are saying no, on the 
basis that the Royal should accept a certain number of HIV 
patients that cost the same as if they had cancer, heart 
disease or other sort of thing, that is not dependent on a 
special matched funding program.
PD: So, within the public service it is taking place
within an agreed framework of authority?
WT: Yes that's right.
PD: That was a point that Terry Slater made, that
consultation within the government and between governments 
takes place within an agreed framework. At the end of the 
day there are authority structures whereas consultation with 
community groups doesn't have that.
Let us move on to talking about managing cultural change. 
Most commentators agree that managerialism is good for 
selling products and it is good for providing services on a 
one to one basis, for example immunisation services or 
dental services. But it has been challenged as not being 
appropriate for trying to bring about cultural change in the 
community.
WT: I don't know what this word 'culture' means,really.
PD: Let's start with the common way of
conceptualising culture in terms of knowledge, attitudes and 
behaviours.
WT: Right. Knowledge, attitudes, beliefs and
practices! I sat on the CAPE [Commonwealth AIDS Prevention 
and Education Program] committee this year which was great 
fun. There were 200 applications and because it was a 
Commonwealth Government requirement every submission 
somewhere or other made references to KABP. It was boring 
- it was tedious. Every submission.
PD: Who made the requirement?
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WT: The Commonwealth made the requirement that all
CAPE submissions will address the way in which they respond 
to or cope with knowledge, attitudes, beliefs and practices. 
Every submission, everyone we picked up, said "gee this is 
something new - we had better address the subject. We will 
address the knowledge and we will look at the attitudes, and 
the beliefs will be..." It was just extraordinary.
PD: Where did that paradigm come from?
WT: I don't know, I actually suspect Elaine Hazel
[secretary of the CAPE committee] read it somewhere and put 
it in the Conditions of Grant for this year.
PD: How adequate do you think that is as a framework
for looking at changing culture?
WT: It is a tool but that is about all. You have
got to have some tool or other - you have to have an angle 
on things. That is what you are doing now, you're trying to 
conceptualise and make sense of the whole series events and 
anecdotes or whatever. KABP is a conceptual tool. I think 
the danger is when people actually think it is more than 
that. I think that probably what happens is that if it 
gets put in Grant Conditions, and even if the public servant 
who put it in accepts that it is one conceptual tool that 
helps education, when that person leaves it goes on the file 
and it almost gets an objective life of its own. To the 
extent that 200 submissions addressed it - it is the new god 
you know, everyone chanting: KABP, KABP. It was really that vivid.
PD: What are some of the problems that you see
arisi-n9 from that? How could people take it as more than a 
conceptual tool, and what would the problems be if they did?
WT: I think the problems tend to be more theoretical
because I think on the ground, people do what they are going 
to do anyway, as much as possible. Certainly, you can 
cause a lot of wasted time and energy, which is not 
particularly helpful. Or alternatively, if the community 
organisations get too locked in to all of that, which is 
relatively inaccessible, then you have these alternative 
groups springing up. So in Australia, we had the AIDS 
Councils, and then two and a half years later we had PLWA 
[People Living With AIDS] groups spring up, mostly within 
the AIDS Councils or fraternal organisations, but a bit of 
an uneasy relationship. And in the last six or eight months 
we have had ACTUP [AIDS Campaign To Unleash Power] grow up, 
with some personnel overlap but no formal links and very 
different stuff. So to the extent that all that stuff ties 
down the community organisations, if there is a genuine
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community movement it will find its outlet in other ways, no 
worries.
PD: I think one of the things that has driven the
administration toward the KABP approach is their belief that 
it is evaluatable. You can get a handle on whether you 
changed people's knowledge - you can get a handle on whether 
you have changed their practices. So it is an instrumental 
approach to cultural change and I think that is part of the 
management for results ethos.
WT: It depends how you use it. It has got its place.
After I had been in Tasmania for about 6 weeks and was given 
some line management responsibility - which wasn't part of 
the original deal, I was going to be a free wheeling 
consultant until then - I found out that the department's 
own HIV/AIDS unit didn't keep any figures or statistics 
whatsoever. So we just had to guickly implement three 
systems. It is useful to know how many phone calls from the 
general public you get in a month and where they are from.
It is useful to know how many talks your educator is giving 
and how many people attend, and it is guite useful to get 
some official feedback on it as well. It is useful to know 
how many counselling sessions a week the psychologists are 
doing. So in Tasmania for example despite managerialism 
there was none of that whatsoever, basically because the 
department didn't want to know about AIDS at all. I think 
that is very useful, and I do require that formal sort of 
stuff - I do want to know what people are doing. What I 
have encouraged in the staff, and what most of them can't 
actually handle as yet, is that I also want every month some 
qualitative stuff, some observation, some reflection. They 
find it difficult doing the two. They don't like the first 
- they think it is there to sort of set them up or whatever. 
And the second, apart from very informal reflection, they 
don't know how to sit down at the end of the month for a 
couple of hours and just think through and reflect on Mwhat 
have I done this month, what has actually happened to my 
clients, my education, my work.” That sort of qualitative 
stuff that I think is equally valuable, but it also depends 
on what you do with it.
End of interview.
LOUISE SYLVAN
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INTERVIEWED BY PAUL DUGDALE 25/6/90
PD: Louise I am going to ask you questions in 3 areas, 
but I was hoping that there would be a fairly free 
discussion. Firstly, how has the new managerialism in the 
public sector has affected consumer advocacy. Secondly, 
are there tensions that arise from the government funding of 
consumer advocacy groups, and perhaps you could talk about 
the differences between the Consumers Health Forum (CHF) and 
the Australian Consumers Association (ACA). And thirdly, 
focusing on the work of the advocate, how do you stay in 
touch with your base on the issues, and yet retain the 
flexibility for the swift moves you often have to make in 
order to be effective. First off, how is managerialism in 
the public sector affecting consumer advocacy?
Particularly, just to kick off lets us talk about the 
obsession with objectives.
LS: What the new managers in the public sector have
done is to impose, though it is not necessarily an 
imposition, but to require their way of thinking about how 
you manage tasks, how you manage programs, how you manage 
the whole of your work. It has required a sophisticated 
response from the consumer sector in precisely the same 
terms as is set by the managers in government. You used 
objectives as one indication. That is one part of how you 
manage something, you set objectives you do this and that 
then you evaluate it. Managerialism has required that way 
of responding from the consumer community sector, which is 
largely untrained in responding that way.
It has a positive feature in that people do actually have to 
think about corporate objectives from a consumer 
perspective for their organisations, and then they have to 
think through how best to achieve those, or at least to 
debate how best to achieve those, and then translate that 
into money. Now from the point of view of actually 
evaluating success or failure in some of these areas, its 
actually positive to force a small community group, or even 
a big community group, to go through those sorts of 
exercises rather than digging holes in precisely the same 
spot as they would be wont to do without the imposition of 
defending the money they are given. So that is a positive 
side.
The negative side of managerialism is the requirement to 
manage your organisations. I suppose it has to do with the 
fact that a lot of what these organisations do has a major 
reactive and unplanned component. What you end up doing, at 
least what I found I ended up doing from the CHF, was 
forcing those issues into a definitional framework which put
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them within the stated objectives. That is not that hard to 
do, but conceptually may be a straight jacket that isn't 
that useful in the long run. At the CHF we defined that an 
important objective for us was achieving our rational drug 
policy for Australia, which led to us producing the National 
Drug Policy document. And a whole lot of things which 
probably should have been under other headings of our work 
got stuck under that because that is where we could fit 
them, that is where we defended them. So it channels your 
thinking and not necessarily in a good way.
PD: What about government objectives for their
programs, which you are lobbying about.
LS: Well that is another positive, which is if you
can see very clearly their objectives and what they want, 
you can actually frame your requests for money in precisely 
that terminology, so that you seem to fit within the 
parameters of their own objectives. But once again, it is a 
two edged sword that means you massage a lot of what you 
write for what is the stated government objectives whether 
it really relates to that or not.
Take the debate that we had about our granting function - 
CHF funds for consumer and community groups - whether we 
should say what areas we were particularly seeking our funds 
for. If we had done that the effect would have been to 
narrow the range of areas in which grants were being 
requested from us, and wouldn't have allowed us to see the 
range of actual requirements, which government also needs to 
see. So when you are relating to government objectives you 
make yourself look like those objectives. In fact, 
government might want to see something quite different which 
is really there, rather than the massaged need which you 
display to them.
PD: What about trying to influence governments
objectives, or change them, or being consulted in the 
formation of objectives. Is that much of a reality for 
consumer advocates?
LS: It is a reality in the sense that they are at
least involved to some extent in the broad framing of 
objectives. I've very little experience being consulted and 
involved in the more narrow setting of objectives down the 
line. That is partly to do with a certain lack of 
sophistication in our sector, particularly a lack of 
sophistication about timing. Often it seems we have an 
endemic problem in actually seeing all the things that are 
happening. It also has to do with the fact that the 
bureaucrats don't see themselves as telling us when timing 
is crucial. It takes a fairly well established, fairly 
sophisticated, fairly well resourced consumer group to see 
that it has to program its lobbying activities in relation
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to the budget cycle. To see for instance, that before you 
end up on the table with the Minister presenting your 
arguments, you need to have gone through the whole reguired 
bureaucracy, you need to have got them on side, made it seem 
to someone that this is very important in terms of their 
possible career development. So I suppose I'm talking about 
timing as just an indicator of a lack of sophistication in 
understanding the whole process of the way that government's 
come to those objectives.
CHF was a bit better off than some other groups because of 
the requirement from the Minister to consult, so we often 
did get on to timing. But very early on, for example, we 
had noticed that the medical education inquiry was 
proceeding and realised a little belatedly that we needed to 
do something about getting a submission in and having some 
impact. We proceeded to do that and learned a great deal by 
that process. But without the member of the bureaucracy 
in that case saying what was needed to come in, that it was 
important, we could well have missed it. Similarly with 
the Public Service Board review of therapeutics. By the 
time it finally occurred to somebody to tell us that we 
needed to do something, it was essentially a quick slapdash 
to get everything and go with a submission.
PD: Just before the legislation was introduced, in
effect.
LS: That's right. So the task is staying on top of
those processes of government. And there is almost a 
schizophrenic tension if I can call it that because the main 
purpose of the bodies is not in fact to focus on government 
per Se, but to focus on their members and to translate 
through to government the views of their members regardless 
of the timing in some senses.
PD: One of the comments about the new managerialism
is that it has led to content free management and a lack of 
emphasis on policy, so that the policy skills of the 
bureaucracy have been lessened. Now that debate has not 
really come down on one side or the other, although 
everybody agrees now that policy is terribly important and 
always has been. Do you think that actually pinning the 
bureaucracy down to particular policies was more difficult 
because of their management style? In any sense, has policy 
become more elusive?
LS: We don't have "content free” management?
management has simply got another set of values operating.
It used to be you would have expertise and expert values in 
operation. Then for example in the Department of Health it 
became the norm that a good manager could manage regardless 
of the area. They would just need to learn some bits and 
pieces, but that management was management, regardless of
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what you were trying to manage. Probably, both those 
concepts that you needed to be an expert and that you only 
need to be a manager are wrong. We are finding 
increasingly that you cannot manage an area without knowing 
something, you can't manage it effectively without learning 
something about it. If you have people who are primarily 
managers rather than experts obviously there are policy 
implications.
Its not so much that the policy was hard to pin down, what 
was harder to pin down was policy that was more clearly 
specific. The general policy was very clearly there, but 
the interpretation of that policy, the specifics of what 
that policy really meant from our point of view as a 
consumer organisation were often quite unclear. But then 
one could argue in terms of the managerialist framework that 
the definition of objectives in fact could give you that to 
some extent, and at least by implication they did define the 
policy. So it is a debate that I don't know the answer to. 
Certainly policy units weren't flourishing at the time and 
still aren't, if that is any indication.
PD: One aspect of managerialism in the private sector
is that it is geared to competition, to exploitation and to 
stealing a march on your competitors. Did you come up 
against any of those private sector sins in the public 
sector? My own feeling is that they haven't really been 
imported along with the management ethos, but did you come 
across them?
LS: Not in that way. I suppose the necessary
ambiguity of public service almost precludes that to some 
extent. There is no doubt that there is bureaucratic 
competition for enlarging one's empire and that sort of 
thing, which is also a feature of private bureaucracy. But 
I think that is there whether one has a managerial concepts 
involved or not.
PD: What do you mean 'the necessary ambiguities?'
LS: I mean it is very nice to be in private sector
management, because you have got a bottom line. You have 
got really good fundamental stuff to look at in terms of 
whether you are successful or not. Now you don't have that 
kind of nice simple feedback in the public sector and by 
definition the work that you are doing has a set of vested 
interests all competing in one way or another. In some 
sense there isn't a right or a wrong in some of these 
things. There is no nice bottom line to work to, to say 
yes you are successful. Its inherently ambiguous, and that 
undermines competitiveness. Just to spend public money in 
itself is seen as something which would engender negative 
feedback from a whole range of the community and positive 
feedback from other groups in the community. I suppose
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that is always a danger in importing private sector concepts 
into the public sector without a great deal of scrutiny.
PD: For consumer advocacy organisations, are there
any tensions due to receiving government funds and then 
trying to lobby the government? Do you compromise yourself?
LS: I don't know that we compromise ourselves. We
become more conscious about what we say. You weigh, you 
balance the costs and benefits of what you are about to say, 
in terms of the outcome that you want. Where as at ACA I 
can be inordinately in-concious of government and nobody can 
say boo to me except for a nasty call from one of the 
Minister's people.
If people admit it or not, there is definitely an influence 
in having your funding mainly government funding but I don't 
think it is a compromise that occurs. In fact in some 
cases, not in organisations that I have been associated 
with, but in some cases there is almost the opposite effect 
which is to over-react in the negative because one has to 
prove that one isn't in any way bought by government. The 
reason that I think that it isn't a compromise is because 
many organisations exist under different governments. They 
survive under change of governments, they continue to do 
their jobs, they continue to lobby etc.
PD: In a situation where you are lobbying for a
particular issue, not for your own funding, does the fact 
that you are government funded come into that in a direct 
way? You have mentioned that it makes you more cautious 
and weigh up what you say - are there any other effects?
LS: I think I would actually put it the other way.
The government that is in power at any given time which is 
funding an organisation can behave improperly towards what 
is, in essence, a non party political group and it can 
demand support for something, some initiatives or battles 
that they are involved in, where the group might be 
extremely reluctant, and wouldn't do that normally. So I 
think there can be pressure of that kind which of course 
raises for the organisations some decision making issues.
But as to from the other side, if it really changes things 
when you are lobbying on a particular issue. I think not, 
in the more sophisticated organisations. What does change 
is your level of impact depending on how that government 
sees that particular group. Now if I could use - if I 
could go outside of the consumer health network and ACA and 
look at a body like ACOSS. from talking to Julian Disney 
[former executive director of ACOSS], I think they have much 
more power in their lobbying when it is a Labor Government 
which might be said to be more sympathetic to welfare 
concerns than perhaps the Liberal Party has become. So
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they can be more effective under Labor, and are seen to be 
more effective, than they would be under an opposing 
government. Now that must influence the way a body reacts 
I would think, both publicly and with its funding 
submissions.
LS: I think regardless of who is in power, the
organisations spend a good deal of their time with the 
bureaucracy, and the bureaucracy doesn't change much. I 
mean it changes constantly in a sense but the people more or 
less are the same. But unless there is an absolute major 
departure in policy, to some extent it is always business as 
usual for a lot of programs. Social Security programs 
aren't going to disappear because you have got a change of 
government and many of them stay the same. Certain factors 
with respect to them might change.
The health arena was potentially one of the most volatile 
under a change of government because Medicare might have 
been altered in a significant way and one had a body in the 
CHF arguing for a national health insurance system and 
arguing that on very conservative economic grounds. In fact 
that was one of the bases that it argued from because it was 
arguing to two conservative parties. One clear effect of 
the new managerialism is it has changed the politicians. As 
leaders we have now got economic managers and that has 
undoubtedly changed the way in which one debates an issue.
So that CHF argued about Medicare and private insurance on 
the basis of an industry analysis. Now ten years ago you 
wouldn't have found a consumer group doing that.
PD: You would have talked about how if you have got 3
kids you just can't afford your medical bills ...
LS: We still do, but we also argued the inefficiency
of the private sector, the lobbying going on for a number of 
large U.S. corporations and the costs to the efficiency of 
the private sector vis a vis its exports when they have a 
major private insurer attached to them. We argued all 
sorts of things that 10 years ago we never would have 
argued.
PD: You mentioned earlier that you put your case in
managerialist terms, you have to use their terminology. But 
you are saying you also put a different type of case now.
LS: Yes, quite definitely. You add to your
'government has a responsibility to the poor people' case, 
you undertake analyses that are quite different from what we 
have done previously, and you actually do argue a different 
sort of case.
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PD: How do you find it working in ACA without any
government contribution. You mentioned that you find it 
easier to speak out.
LS: Yes, you don't think about the government when
you speak or its effects or potential consultation with the 
bureaucracy before going out. There is no inhibition to 
hitting very hard at a department for instance. There may 
have been some inhibition with the CHF.
PD: Is there an example from your time here where you
have been on the record doing this?
LS: IUDs for instance. Whether courtesy demanded it
or not, when Barbara won the copper 7 court case we simply 
went with the story, without a nod to the bureaucracy. And 
I think an organisation which is set up primarily to lobby 
government probably wouldn't do that. You see it doesn't 
matter to us what the bureaucracy happens to think - whether 
they like it or dislike it is just not an issue.
Obviously, from the point of view of working on a whole 
range of problems with them, we need to keep reasonably good 
relations but there is no particular feeling that one will 
pull a punch at all.
PD: Does that make you more effective or does that
limit your effectiveness, or does it just change the mode of 
operation?
LS: I think it just changes the mode of operation.
I suppose the other major difference is the level of access 
that an organisation like ACA has through to media. I mean, 
if we want a story to run, the story will run. Its much 
easier for a 30 year old organisation seen as totally 
independent from government and industry to get a run on a 
story, than for a government funded body where the media 
questions each time whether its giving an independent 
comment or not, particularly if its a new body.
The major difference I think between an organisation like 
ACA and those organisations that are sited mainly in 
Canberra and have their focus there, is that we by and large 
ignore what is happening in Canberra. In terms of a great 
proportion of our work it is absolutely impotent. ACA is a 
player in the market place, and focuses on it. This is a 
product testing organisation. A great deal of our time is 
spent with industry (rather than with government), trying to 
influence it. Now at the end of the day if we are looking 
for some major change it normally means that we have to look 
at legislation, look at regulatory control. It comes back 
to government always at the end of the day, either state of 
federal. But I rely on other people to flag a major issue 
in Canberra but by and large I know no more than one would 
generally know than just chatting around the traps. ACA
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doesn't have that same intimate and constant reactivity to 
the hot house of Canberra. I think it is not just because 
it is located in Sydney but because it doesn't focus on 
national government in the same way.
PD: How does an advocate work to attain the
flexibility and impact that you need to be successful whilst 
remaining relevant and keeping the support of your base?
LS: It is one of the enormous tensions of working for
an advocacy body and leading from within, if I can call it 
that, and at the same time being able to lead overtly where 
it is absolutely necessary to respond. And its not a 
tension that will ever go away. The way it is resolved in 
most of the consumer organisations - the small lobbying 
organisations, ACA resolves it differently - 
but in the consumer organisations like the CHF or AFCO 
(Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations), what 
those bodies tend to do is to try to get a sufficiently 
large membership base and communications structure with that 
membership base. Alongside this membership base is a 
consultative base. There is also a set of policies which 
are developed and written down, so there are policy books to 
which one can refer as stated policy of the organisation, 
and people can debate that at annual general meetings and 
that sort of thing. Outside of the new policy arena, the 
way in which you establish your credibility is to speak 
responsibly within that policy framework or at least within 
a consensual position for that range of organisations.
In terms of new policy - and this is where the reactivity 
comes in and where the potential moving away from the 
position that your base of support would have taken - we 
rely very heavily on executive directors, or appointed 
coordinators, whatever title they happen to have, as the 
people who have the responsibility for deciding whether or 
not they will speak on an issue. What has tended to happen 
in both AFCO and CHF and I believe ACOSS as well is that 
there are key designated people the director can ring to get 
a feel for whether they should respond and the nature of 
response. So I think that is the way the tension is 
resolved. And sometimes mistakes are made. People say 
things that the rest of the movement would not adhere to at 
the end of the day.
Now ACA doesn't do that at all in the same way because it is 
an organisation that is so big, and actually in the private 
sector although it is non-profit. We have 30-40,000 
consumers that ring us with complaints, information, 
questions etc, that we record and use as part of our data 
base. We also have a pro-active market research function - 
I am calling it market research because I don't know any 
other term to use for it - we actually go and try and find 
what consumers are thinking, feeling, etc. So we are not
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going to an organisation base, we are actually going to a 
much broader base and not simply to our own subscribers.
We go out and do market research on specific issues. For 
instance at the moment, we are developing some questions 
about what people actually think organic produce is, 
because I am sitting on the committee which is defining the 
standards for Australia. People are saying to me "consumers 
think this" and I say "how do you know that," because 
everybody just gives a straight gut reaction. Now I need to 
know what consumers actually think. I think I know what it 
is they think organic produce is, I know what I think, but I 
need to know what they think. And I need that done with a 
totally defensible, statistically valid survey method. So 
we will go out and actually have that done. No other 
consumer organisation has that sort of money or the luxury 
to do it.
So we have got different ways of being representative than 
any other group, and of course we liaise through the 
memberships that we have with CHF and AFCO and ACOSS and 
other groups, and try to keep in touch with what the 
community groups are thinking.
You trust that the key advocates of consumer organisations 
actually have a very good feeling for the constituency they 
are representing and of course it is a very sensitive issue. 
Consumer organisations get accused all the time for being 
unrepresentative and it would be absolutely foolish to think 
that they are speaking for 16 million consumers. They are 
presenting an overall consensus position, developed as we 
discussed earlier. What I look for when I interview for 
one of those Directors, is the ability to stop and say: that 
is my opinion, what does the movement think? Its absolutely 
crucial that they not be too wedded to their personal points 
of view, or that their personal views are sufficiently 
wedded to what the consumer movement's point of view is, so 
that there is an ability there to step outside their 
personal views.
PD: Consumer organisations are rarely representative
in the traditional liberal democratic sense through direct 
representational democracy, in the way that for example a 
union is representative of its members. In what sense are 
consumer organisations representative, is a key question 
that I am addressing. I suggest that they represent the 
interests of ascriptive groups rather than of 
constituencies. Constructing what is that interest is a 
difficult thing, that for example ACOSS struggles with in a 
different way than AFCO.
LS: I think that is right. They are not
representative, the peak councils, which is what we are 
talking about. It is very different for a small grass roots
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organisation. You are focusing on the peak councils which 
means the national government lobbyists. There is 
absolutely no doubt that what they are representing is a set 
of interests, an enormous conglomerate of interests in many 
cases, and there has been a process through to the 
deliberations at a general meeting of the CHF or the bi­
annual general meeting of AFCO. It is not like the union 
process because it is not directly representative, but it is 
a process of slowly coming to consensus at this point and 
then the next level of consensus is achieved and then the 
next. There is a stepped process that does go through from 
the grass roots through to the peak organisations. Not 
always successfully as you know from some of the battles 
between the state groups that do occur, but what you have at 
the end of the day are a set of interests being expressed, 
and those interests are not necessarily complimentary, which 
is where the difficulty for the peak councils come in.
The peak councils look at the expressed interests and 
concerns that are coming their way and generalise what that 
really means for policy. In other words people relay their 
experience, they don't generalise to what that actually 
means in a policy form. There is a circle that goes on 
where the peak councils actually have to generalise that up 
so it has meaning in terms of national policy and national 
legislation. They then have to - and this is what they are 
very bad at doing - they then have to go back through that 
grass roots constituency to explain how what policy 
positions mean what in terms of what people want. They 
don't do that very well.
PD: Is one part of that explaining what the
objectives of a new program are trying to achieve?
LS: Oh yes. Absolutely.
PD: There is enormous cynicism on the part of the
public, or some people would have us believe that there is 
enormous cynicism on the part of the public, as to whether 
the government is really trying to help. Is that something 
that these peak organisations can overcome?
LS: There are some clear cases where it is debatable
whether the government is trying to help or whether in fact 
it has knuckled under to some major industry pressure for 
example. For the consumer organisation it is partly 
explaining what the objectives are, how they are achieved, 
and partly whether we think they are being achieved well: I
think there is an evaluative function and an assessment 
function for those peak councils back to their constituency. 
There is definitely a two way communication role from the 
peak councils, or there is supposed to be. I actually 
think they are far better at performing the role of 
representing their constituency than going the other way.
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I think the cynicism arises more from the personal 
experience of people and their interaction with governments. 
The difficulties they have and their interactions with 
governments, not from following the policy formation 
process. As an individual citizen, mostly you have 
interaction with the government on something that you would 
sooner know nothing about. You either had something happen 
to you and you can't get the government to respond, or you 
have to pay taxes.
I suppose something has now happened to government which has 
changed it quite considerably over government even 8 years 
ago and that is that the focus on almost everything was on 
fiscal restraints and that permeates every discussion that 
one has about any existing program. Now that cut back of 
government expenditure means the right wing private sector 
interests which say that there is too much government have 
won the day. I think they partly won the day 
bureaucratically and partly from the point of view of the 
politicians. There is a cause and effect going: the more 
you managerialise, the more you use private sector 
methodology in your bureaucracy and in your government 
thinking, the more essentially you have to adopt the norms 
of that sector. And that is what is going on. For 
example, with respect to deregulation and privatisation, it 
is assumed without any question that the private sector is 
more efficient, but this is very doubtful in a number of 
areas. Government is extremely efficient at certain 
things, far more efficient than private sector could ever 
be, although there are questions about when do you and when 
do you not run government monopolies.
PD: One of the arguments for the introduction of
managerialism into the public sector - and this is an 
argument that shows the Labor Party as the natural party to 
introduce these kinds of reforms - was that it confronted 
the pressure of the small government movement head on, 
saying Hwe will become more efficient, we will become better 
managers. There is some truth in what you are saying, but 
let us revitalise the public sector and take the wind out of 
your sails by adopting your own techniques." Now what you 
are suggesting is that although that seemed clever at the 
time, it has resulted in a kind of cultural undermining of 
the mission of the public sector.
LS: I think it has enormously, even though that
obviously was not intended. In some senses we gave away a 
part of the argument by mistake, and never should have done 
it. It surprises me and perhaps will not continue. It 
also surprises me that things like Medicare have continued 
to survive under that kind of ideology. I think they have 
survived because of the existence of certain people, but 
even the new Minister [for Community Services and Health,
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Brian Howe] went into welfare mode on Medicare immediately, 
before as far as I could see realising that there is 
actually a social contract arrangement here, which is quite 
a different thing than a welfare scheme. I suppose what 
has happened is that the Left lost the credibility of its 
arguments somewhere along the line and the Right won, and 
won in some quite clever ways, I suspect.
We are fundamentally a mercantile society. In that sense I 
think ultimately the Left is going to lose the whole 
argument. It was never there for the winning. I suppose 
what is very worrying about the whole nature of the debate 
is the pretence between the public and private distinction 
when in fact the two are so totally intertwined. The 
government as a buyer of private sector goods is one 
example; another is the government provision of 
infrastructure which allows the private sector to operate. 
They don't have to actually pay for the infrastructure, and 
if they did they wouldn't be nearly as profitable.
We don't have the visionary economists to give us the tools 
to actually understand what is going on anymore.
Governments find themselves unable to manage their 
economies, despite doing what the neoclassical economists 
said they should do. It is not delivering the goods for 
them, and I think that is because we haven't conceived of 
the problem correctly. We've lost an ability to actually 
see what is going on as far as I can tell. We are trying to 
manage within a constrained framework with the government 
having virtually no tools left because its given them all 
away under industry pressure.
The other thing with respect to the overall managerialism 
that has entered into the public sector - which was partly 
that the private sector is more efficient and we must have 
some of their tools, - but as you adopted those private 
sector norms and ways of running programs, I think we've 
also adopted something else and it sits in an undercurrent 
and that's maybe why there is so much tension in the 
government. By definition in the private sector and now in 
the public sector in the way we manage the economy, growth 
is good and it needs to be exponential: we need to have 
overall growth in GDP, preferably in private sector GDP 
rather than public sector GDP. What we haven't realised is 
that when you have more affluent societies, 
when you have societies that are growing, people's demand 
for goods and services provided by the private sector is 
equally matched by demands for goods provided by the public 
sector. So that growth of a requirement for consumer goods 
is matched as well by a growth in demand for education, 
better roads, in all of the things that are provided by the 
public sector. But at the same time in terms of what is 
considered to be appropriate in small government, you take 
away the legitimacy and the ability of the public sector to
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actually respond to that. Something else could have 
happened when you adopted the private sector norms, namely a 
legitimation of the delivery of public sector goods in an 
efficient way. But that didn't happen at all, and its set 
up an impossible tension.
PD: I think its partly a problem of the
conceptualisation of service industries in economic 
rationalist terms. They are just not properly understood.
LS: Its partly a problem of the market itself for
services. The good old assumptions of the economic model 
of rationalist man hold only with great difficulty. With 
services in fact its even harder to make the arguments, and 
I suppose that's part of the problem. What government does 
is by and large deliver services, and we don't understand 
that very well.
PD: The key distributive principle of the market is
profitability. But there are a number of normative 
arguments about markets that says that this will also 
deliver what people want, where they want it, when they want 
it, and that there is somehow a conjunction between profit 
as the main interest of the supply side of the market and 
what people want, why they are prepared to pay for it.
LS: Its worse with services in terms of sorting it
through. And when you're actually talking about goods like 
clean air or safety and the market delivering that, it 
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PD: I'm going to ask you about three areas during the
interview. The first is about the influence of 
managerialism on the review of grants to health and 
community organisations being conducted by your committee. 
The second area is the tensions between the parliamentary 
representatives and the community representatives involved 
in the review. The third area is the more practical nitty 
gritty of conducting the review from your perspective.
Could we begin by talking about how the review is actually 
being conducted.
BN: When Brian Howe became Minister for Community
Services and Health, in line with his approach to 
administration generally, he had a close look at the way the 
department was administering its programs. In looking at 
the way that historically community organisation had been 
funded, including the present method of funding peak 
organisations for their national secretariats, he decided 
that it was appropriate to conduct a review of the funding 
process. Rather than taking that on board within the 
department, he decided that it would be seen to be a much 
more objective process by giving it to a parliamentary 
committee to investigate. The House of Representatives 
has a standing committee on community affairs which is set 
up for the life of the parliament to investigate matters 
referred to it either by the Ministers in the portfolios 
over which the committee has jurisdiction, or directly from 
the house itself. So Howe asked the committee to look at 
the funding of these organisations.
Once an enquiry is referred to the committee the committee 
then follows a standard procedure for conducting reviews.
The procedure is to initially call for submissions by 
advertising in all the metropolitan papers and asking 
interested organisations and individuals to make submissions 
addressing the terms of reference for the enquiry. That's 
then followed up with an analysis of the submissions within 
the secretariat, which I head. At the moment, working on 
this particular enquiry I've got two research officers and a 
clerical support position and me. Because of the very tight 
time frame that we were given to conduct this enquiry, that 
most of our resources are now being devoted to getting it 
finished and tabled by February next year.
PD: Can we talk about management of the review. Does
it have a budget, does it have a strategy?
BN: We get a fixed annual budget. All House of
Representatives standing committees get a certain amount of
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money which they can spend on tasks associated with 
completing the enquiries that they have on their books. The 
constraints are that within that budget we have to meet 
travel costs, administration costs, hiring of consultants, 
printing costs and advertising costs, so that really puts a 
limit on the number of enquiries you can do in any one 
financial year. But its quite a good check because it also 
means that the financial and human resources of the 
secretariat tend to balance out to give you a workable 
schedule for conducting two or perhaps three enquiries 
simultaneously. Because this enquiry now takes precedence, 
while its happening it means that activity on the other 
major enquiry has diminished and so there won't be so much 
money spent on that, certainly not in this calendar year 
anyway so that the situation hasn't really arisen where I've 
had to make decisions about spending less on either this or 
the other enquiry.
So then having received the referral and having received the 
submissions, we then decide which of the organisations that 
have made submissions should be followed up in a formal 
public hearing, where they're asked to elaborate on points 
raised in their submissions as well as being available to 
answer questions which individual members of the committee 
may have of the way the organisation sees it's role.
PD: Have any groups that you've invited in that way
declined?
BN: No. In fact they're more likely to be
disappointed if they're not asked to come along to give 
evidence.
PD: Why do you think that is?
BN: Because they see it as an opportunity to
convince the members of the committee that they're a 
worthwhile organisation? to present the human face of their 
organisation? and to reassure themselves that the 
committee's review process is fair and objective by virtue 
of actually having direct contact with the members of the 
committee and with the secretariat.
PD: To what extent is the review a review of the
management of these organisations?
BN: That's a difficult question. The review and the
examination of individual organisations is certainly looking 
at the role and the responsibilities of the organisation and 
the extent to which the organisation is fulfilling its own 
stated objectives in providing services to clients. In 
questioning the representatives from the organisations we're 
asking questions about how they allocate the funds that are 
made available to them? and to elaborate the ways in which
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their organisation is fulfilling a particular niche within 
that area whether its disability or whether its community 
health, whatever the constituency that organisation
PD: Could you discuss the shift from core to project
funding as something that might come out of this review and 
I understand has already happened with some organisations.
BN: The disability area is a good one to discuss.
There's a whole range of different organisations 
representing different interest groups and different 
disability groups. Its a very contentious area because of 
the politically charged and emotionally charged nature of 
disabilities themselves, and also the vocal nature of a lot 
of representatives in that area. They're becoming guite 
sophisticated at manoeuvring both within the bureaucratic 
environment and also within their own local environments. 
There is a lot of antagonism within the area about which 
particular organisation is more representative than another, 
and the relative amounts of funds that they get to represent 
what they see as being the direct concerns of the people 
whom they're supposed to be servicing.
Within an area like disability, very hard decisions have to 
be made about whether or not it's appropriate to fund 
organisations for national secretariats and for quite 
elaborate office infrastructures. There are debates about 
whether you should have separate secretariats or separate 
office premises for people with hearing disabilities and 
people with sight disabilities, or whether you should look 
at ways of providing funds through programs for client 
support, and perhaps have shared office or secretarial 
facilities for a number of organisations. That would be a 
better use I think of the resources that are required for 
those kinds of office activities, and which aren't really 
essential for providing the sort of client support on the 
ground that a lot of these organisations do.
Its also the case in other areas too, where there are 
organisations that have received quite large amounts of 
money over a long period of time that I don't think can 
justify having a national secretariat in the sense that 
large peak organisations which have a range of service 
delivery and client counselling functions do. Those 
organisations perhaps should look at maintaining close 
liaison with the relevant program areas within the 
department to get their funds, rather than setting up 
another level of bureaucracy within their own organisation.
PD: I guess that gets at the two different roles of
some of these organisations, one providing services to their 
clients, and the other providing a voice for their 
constituency that aims to lobby on new policy development 
and program direction. Your comments about shifting over
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to program funding from the Commonwealth relate to their 
support for clients and the services that they provide.
What about the advocacy role of these organisations. I guess 
is one way of looking at it is that it is funding people to 
disagree with the Commonwealth.
BN: Some of these organisations stress very strongly
in their submissions that they see their role as supporting 
the government and providing constructive advice to 
government, whereas others, if they disagree with proposed 
government legislation or they disagree with expressed 
policy then they see their role as representing their own 
constituents, sometimes in a way critical of government. I 
think that organisations that claim to be providing a direct 
voice for their clients and their constituency, can quite 
legitimately criticise government and criticise government 
policy.
PD: Using government funding?
BN: Not using government funding exclusively, because
one of the other strands that we're trying to pursue is that 
organisations that are set up specifically to represent one 
client population should over time establish its own base 
and its own legitimacy, and should become relatively self 
sufficient in the sense that they should be able to attract 
funds both from within their base, but also perhaps from the 
corporate sector. If they're unable to do that after a 
determined period of time, then they can't demonstrate that 
they're doing a job that satisfies the people they're 
supposed to be serving, and perhaps they don't deserve the 
level of funding that they're getting.
PD: Recently the leader of the opposition accused
ACOSS of being a mouthpiece of the government. At around the 
same time ACOSS was refusing some 'no strings attached' 
corporate funding on the grounds that it might be seen to be 
undermining their independence. How is the committee 
handling these sorts of very politically charged issues?
BN: The committee is still sifting through a lot of
the evidence and a lot of the issues and probably won't 
reach a conclusion about those kind of things until we get 
into the report consideration stage of the enquiry. But I 
think that the, a lot of the committee members are adopting 
a reasonably bipartisan view of the funding arrangements in 
the sense that they recognise that the organisations have 
their own legitimate views to express but at the same time 
they have a responsibility to maintain a cooperative 
approach to providing information to government and not 
acting in a way which would jeopardise a good working 
relationship between government and the organisation 
concerned.
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PD: Have there been any tensions between the
parliamentarians' concern to be representatives themselves 
and the organisations claims to be representatives?
BN: Obviously on any parliamentary committee there
are members who have their own particular interests and 
idiosyncrasies. There are some members on this committee 
who come along with their own particular biases about 
organisations that are represented within their own 
constituency, within their own electorate. We had a hearing 
in Melbourne where one particular member of the Committee 
was very vehemently asking organisations whether they had 
any particular religious affiliations, particularly the ones 
in his own state. I'm not quite sure what sort of agenda he 
was pursuing, and he certainly wasn't representative of the 
rest of the committee, but he had very fixed views about 
certain of these organisations. The transcript record will 
identify who he was and the questions he asked.
PD: That's not of real concern to me. What would be
a commonly held position of the parliamentarians on the 
committee about what a community organisation should be?
BN: There is a general feeling that they should be
more concerned about direct client servicing, working 
directly with clients on the ground rather than with service 
providers as such. There is also a concern that the way the 
organisations have been funded reflects a lot of other 
concerns, other than the work of the organisation itself.
For example it reflects the amount of political patronage 
that has been exercised over the years. And then there's 
some concern that the levels of funding, once they've been 
determined, tend to remain without question. There are some 
organisations that have been funded for over 20 years that 
are getting enormous amounts of money relative to other 
organisations.
PD: So is the committee looking at bringing back a
kind of level playing field idea in trying to redress the 
inequalities?
BN: Certainly one of the goals of this review is to
look across the range of all organisations, to look at their 
scope and to look at their present level of funding and 
functioning and then to try and come up with a formula that 
better reflects how the committee sees the role of that 
organisation and perhaps to come up with a tiered system of 
overarching organisations and then smaller organisations 
that may feed through those larger ones.
PD: So you're actually looking at a structure for the
community organisations sector.
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BN: Yes, and a way of encouraging some of the
smaller organisations to utilise the bureaucratic skills, 
the managerial skills and the access to government of some 
of the larger organisations that have been working in the 
area for longer and that have direct links already 
established with government. It doesn't seem to make much 
sense to set up elaborate structures for all the 
organisations when they could effectively use some of the 
infrastructure that's already set up. The problem's going 
to be deciding which of these organisations better represent 
the range of clients and the range of services that are 
required.
PD: You made a point about using the expertise of
some of the more established groups in talking to the 
bureaucracy. Are the parliamentarians quite happy for these 
organisations to communicate directly with the bureaucracy? 
In the pass, a traditional line of approach would have been 
for the organisations to talk to the parliamentarians, who 
would then work through the members of Cabinet to the 
department.
BN: I think that the members generally see the role
of peak organisations as working directly with the 
bureaucracy, to the departments, and that's certainly the 
way that some of the some of the larger organisations that 
we've spoken to see their role as well. And some of them 
have very good links with the federal departments.
PD: You outlined that the committee was set up
because of the concern that funding of these organisations 
has got out of hand. How are you trying to bring it back on 
track? what are the detailed concerns that you're starting 
to look at?
BN: Well, I guess what we're trying to do is to come
up with an agreed model for a peak organisation.
PD: Is that what the committee is trying to come up
with, or are you trying to put this to the committee?
BN: It's a combination of both. As we go through
these hearings, individual committee members have their own 
ideas about how the enquiry is going and what the review 
should be doing. The secretariat then puts up a series of 
discussion papers to committee members where we define what 
we think are the important issues and what the enquiry is 
about, which we then discuss with the members, and revise 
and amend as we go along.
PD: Do you go back to the community organisations,
or informally go to some of the key people?
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BN: Yes. We than informally have discussions with
some of the people who have appeared, but our greatest 
contact is with the Department of Community Services and 
Health, where we'll try out a few of the ideas we have on 
departmental representatives to get a response from them.
PD: So just as you have to take account of the
political realities, you need to take account of the 
bureaucratic realities.
BN: Yes, very much so. An effective parliamentary
committee will balance all those things out and come up with 
solutions to the problems that have been set in a way which 
satisfies all of those considerations. That's the difficult 
part, juggling all the factors involved.
PD: I guess they need a good secretary to be able to
get the balls in the right positions for them.
BN: Also, a good Chairman too, which is very
important. One of the major determinants, of the success of 
a parliamentary committee is the Chairman, who has to be 
able to steer discussions and negotiations in a way that 
overcomes any party political considerations. Particularly 
towards the end of an enquiry, when all the facts and all 
the evidence are there, which is what we then use as the 
basis for drafting the report, there's always a danger that 
some members, because of their own party positions or their 
own personal positions, will disagree with the major 
recommendations or the major thrust of the report, and will 
try and undermine some of the committee's work by writing a 
dissenting report or by dissenting from some of the 
recommendations. Which then detracts from the impact of the 
whole report because the press and other people will then 
focus on the dissent rather than on the main report. But a 
good chairman can overcome some of those problems as well.
PD: Has the chairman had many dealings with the
bureaucracy?
BN: Not directly, no.
PD: So you're the main go-between. What do you see
as some of the main bureaucratic realities of this review?
BN: I think one of the unstated agendas for this
enquiry is that the department, having set in motion the 
funding of a lot of these organisations, is in the position 
now where it's difficult to either change the nature of the 
funding or to terminate funding, and they're looking, for 
some guidance from the committee about which types of 
organisations - rather than individual organisations - the 
committee thinks should be funded, and that they'll use the 
recommendations we come up with as a way of overcoming some
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of the internal bureaucratic resistance to cutting some of 
these organisations off. One of the other interesting 
things, which I'm only really starting to get an idea about 
now, is that some of these organisations have grown up in 
tandem with program areas within the department and that 
there is a culture that's developed between the department 
and the organisation in that area. Individuals who have 
worked in the department in that area for a period of time 
have developed quite a fondness for that organisation and so 
there's a kind of inevitable impetus to maintain the funding 
and the contact.
PD: So you're painting a picture of the department as
seeking legitimacy from the parliament for shaking up the 
funding of community organisation over the coming year or 
so; and, on the other hand, a picture of the bureaucracy as 
having almost extensions of its sphere of influence within 
the community through these organisations. Is that an 
accurate representation?
BN: I think so. It' complicated too by the fact
that governments can't satisfy client needs, can't be a 
front line provider in a lot of these areas because it 
doesn't have the expertise and because it doesn't have 
access to the immediate concerns of people who are being 
helped by these community organisations. Therefore it's 
useful for government to rely on community organisations to 
do those kinds of things, and probably for less money than 
it would cost to try and provide them either on a federal or 
a state level through the established bureaucracy. But, 
yes, I think that there are those other two factors that 
were mentioned about that kind of symbiotic and slightly 
antagonistic relationship between the bureaucracy and the 
community organisations.
PD: Do you see tensions coming up in this particular
review between the parliament and the government?
BN: I wouldn't have thought so. In the last
parliament an area where we were critical of government 
administration was a review we did of the Department of 
Social Security, where we looked at the delivery of services 
by the Department of Social Security to its clients and we 
made quite a few recommendations of ways of improving that. 
The then Minister, Brian Howe, was not happy about some of 
the criticisms that we made of departmental practices and 
procedures. His reasons for that were to do with, I think, 
staff morale within his department.
PD: Rather than with the substance of what the
parliamentary committee was getting at?
BN: I think so. But how that was expressed was that
he thought the committee had overstepped its mark a bit.
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PD: But he's been happy to come back to the committee
for this enquiry?
BN: Yes. There's been a change of chairmanship, but
I don't think that would have mattered very much really, 
because as I said earlier I think that he sees the 
parliamentary committee as being a much more publicly 
acceptable way of conducting a review like this than using 
his department or setting up some other mechanism for 
conducting the review. The positive aspects of 
parliamentary reviews is that they represent the major 
political parties. Generally, deliberations of committees 
are conducted in a public way through the public hearings, 
unless there are specific reasons for conducting enquiries 
in camera which sometimes happens. So it's all on the 
record, at least the first phase of the enquiry is on the 
public record. And members tend to work co-operatively on 
most issues.
PD: What about the rivalry between community groups
appearing before the committee. Is that a concern? Do you 
have to handle that?
BN: I think in an oblique way, I mean we're
certainly not going to adjudicate between community groups.
PD: Although you were saying you need to set a
framework for the departments to do that adjudicating.
BN: Yes. That's the point. I think that we have to
look at what the concerns are that are being expressed, 
what are the specifics of the antagonism, and then look at 
the principles underpining that. One of the things that's 
come up in hearings, and it's been stressed a few times now, 
is that organisations should have client representatives on 
their board of management and that, say in the disability 
area for instance, you should not have people without 
disabilities representing people with disabilities. That is 
something that we'll have to look at pretty carefully, I 
think.
PD: In the mental illness area that's fairly
problematic, I understand.
BN: Yes it is, and it has been raised with us. I'm
certainly not at the stage yet where I've got my ideas 
totally firmed up but by the time we get to the report 
writing I think a lot of these ideas will have crystalised a 
bit more.
PD: How are the organisations actually responding to
the call for submissions in relation to their structure, 
organisation and management?
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BN: Quite positively. Some of them are using it as
an opportunity to re-evaluate where they are. Some 
organisations have been a little bit annoyed because they 
see this as yet another review, and some feel that they've 
been under scrutiny for quite a long time now although in 
practical terms their level of funding has been maintained 
and there's been no talk about cutting them off. But in 
general terms I think they see this as a good opportunity 
for them to make their case on an equal footing with 
everybody else.
PD: Their budget funding submissions are private
documents between the administration of the organisation and 
the bureaucrats doing the funding. This review is a much 
wider exercise, where their submission would need to gain 
the support of their full management structure and is going 
to the parliament and onto the public record. To what 
extent do you think the organisations are appealing to their 
constituency in their responses to the committee?
BN: It varies a lot. Trying to establish the extent
to which organisations truly represent the people they claim 
to represent is something that we're going to have to 
address.
PD: What are the dimensions of that representation?
BN: There's a very broad range of mechanisms for
electing representative members of an organisation into a 
decision making structure. Some of it's very untidy? in 
some organisations there are state and regional levels of 
representation feeding through to national levels. In 
others the process doesn't seem very democratic at all.
Some of that may have to do with whether - and we'll have to 
look at this - an organisation was funded from the top down 
or whether it started on the ground and then worked up.
PD: Do you think there will be pressure from the
committee for the organisations to adopt a formal democratic 
structure in line with parliamentary type representation, 
and that we also see in the unions?
BN: I really don't know what's going to happen in
that area, but it's obviously something that is going to 
determine the way the system will work, I think.
PD: Have you noticed a real change with the
introduction of managerialism into the Public Service?
BN: Yes. It doesn't affect the parliamentary
environment to a great extent, but I've noticed a change in 
the way that the departments approach committees. They're 
very wary now, because a lot of them were put under pressure
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by the Public Accounts Committee and the Finance and Public 
Administration Committee about providing them with proper 
corporate goals and other aspects of accountability for 
programs. They now appear to be much more on their toes. 
They're adopting a much more professional approach to giving 
evidence to committees, and they are better prepared for the 
kinds of questions that the members ask. The members have 
much higher expectations now of the quality of responses 
that they expect.
It's most interesting making comparisons between the calibre 
of people who appear from different departments - not that 
performance at public hearings is the only criterion for 
measuring performance - but it's interesting looking at the 
range of professionalism of the people who appear, who in 
terms of their positions within the bureaucracy are pretty 
even, for example a deputy secretary from one department and 
a deputy secretary from another department, but the approach 
they take with the committees can be quite different. Some 
of them will prepare extensively and will be armed with a 
whole artillery of very detailed specific information about 
how relatively minor parts of the department operate and 
work, whereas others won't do that and provide you with an 
overall perspective, and then rely on section heads or other 
people to provide that level of detail.
PD: I guess there's the same spread of quality and
professionalism in the community groups appearing before the committee.
BN: That's true, although I've generally been quite
impressed with most of the representatives of the community 
groups who appear.
PD: What sort of things have impressed you?
BN: Their ability to discuss their own work and the
work of their organisations; and the lack of suspicion of the process.
PD: Yes, I was surprised that nobody refused to
appear before the committee. Did you notice a strong 
handling of managerial issues?
BN: That does vary. Some of the smaller
organisations obviously haven't thought very much about 
those kinds of issues yet, although they've been stimulated 
by this enquiry to start thinking along those lines. Some 
of the very large organisations have obviously thought a lot 
about that, and they were quite impressive.
PD: Do you think that the enquiry is going to be used
to further the introduction of managerialism into community 
organisations?
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BN: I would think so, even if its not at the direct
instigation of the committee through its report. I think 
it's an inevitable development anyway.
PD: Why is it inevitable?
BN: Because it's the way the climate's developing.
I think that the department certainly expects that now, and 
that organisations are starting to realise that unless they 
move in that direction life's going to be made increasingly 
difficult for them.
End of interview.
